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ABSTRACT 
Europeans have been spending increasingly less on defense. This trend is puzzling on 
two accounts. Empirically, 30% of defense spending cuts correlated with a net increase in 
military capacity, contradicting conventional predictions of military degradation under 
budgetary pressures. Theoretically, it is unclear why cuts happen and whether conscious policy 
choices can translate spending cuts to favorable military capacity outcomes. Is the decline in 
defense spending a strategic choice to demilitarize, or is it intentionally managed to improve 
military capacity?  
I evaluate three conditions under which reductions in military expenditures can lead 
to favorable outcomes in military capacity: defense reform, defense collaboration and buck-
passing. I investigate 30 defense spending cut periods (DSCP’s) in the 27 European states 
between 2000 and 2012. This group of states presents a hard case for my argument: decline in 
European military resources is most-likely intentional. Through Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis, I group DSCP’s by military capacity outcomes. I then evaluate presence of the three 
 v 
 
mechanisms by operationalizing necessary but insufficient conditions, and determine whether 
these potential explanations are sufficient by process-tracing select case studies. 
I find that defense reform presents the most compelling, collective collaboration less 
compelling and buck-passing least compelling explanation of a potentially non-detrimental 
relationship between DSCP’s and military capacity. Under declining defense spending, 
governments routinely chose to produce savings by eliminating redundancies, consolidating 
structures, and reinvested savings in operational readiness and quality of military forces. States 
increased defense collaboration in 47.3% of the DSCP’s, but initiatives still appear divorced 
from affecting robust military improvements at the national level. Under declining defense 
spending, buck-passing increased only modestly (8%-13%), with ongoing deployments 
supporting continued investment in the military. 
These findings imply that defense spending decline does not mean a European choice 
to demilitarize, but a choice to reform, sometimes in tandem with defense collaboration or 
buck-passing. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In the last few decades, particularly in light of the 2008 international financial crisis 
and the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis, Europeans have been spending less and less on 
defense. Over the past ten years, European Union (EU) member states collectively spent only 
about 1.4% of GDP on defense,1 one of the lowest percentages of any region in the world.2 
Some EU members have decreased their national defense budgets by up to 20%, reduced their 
military capabilities and struggled with the deployment of their troops in international military 
operations.3 For example, over the last two decades, the UK decreased its armed forces by 
almost a half, reduced the number of main battle tanks, and still lacks a proper aircraft carrier 
for the British Royal Navy.4 Similarly, France has declared its intention to reduce major 
capabilities by up to 15%, decrease its ground forces by an entire brigade, downsize the 
number of its fighter-bombers and abandon its ambition to deploy up to 30,000 ground troops 
and 70 combat aircraft in a major military operation.5 The US ambassador to NATO Ivo 
                                                 
1Based on the data available in The Military Balance, in the 2000-2012 period, only the UK and Greece met their 
NATO commitment on the level of defense spending. The pattern of low defense spending has not singularly 
emerged with the financial crises, however. European NATO members have been defaulting on their mutual 
commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defense even before the 2008 economic crisis. O’Donnell, Clara Marina 
(February 1, 2013). “Time to bite the bullet on European defence.” Centre for European Reform blogspot. 
2 Rajendran, Giri (April 9, 2014). “What now for European defense spending?” Military Balance Blog. Posts 
from the IISS Defence and Military Analysis Programme.  
3 O’Donnell, Clara Marina (edt.). 2012. “The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest 
Members.” Brookings Institution (July), p. 29.  
4 “NATO’s Military Decline: As Russia re-arms, the West increasingly neglects its defenses.” March 25, 2014. 
The Wall Street Journal.  
5 Watanabe, Lisa. 2013. “France’s New Strategy: The 2013 White Paper.” CSS Analysis in Security Policy, CSS 
ETH Zurich, No. 139, September 2013, p. 2  
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Daalder indicated that Europeans are ‘hollowing out’ their militaries, jettisoning capabilities, 
and failing to spend their decreasing budgets wisely.6 
Spending cuts may be excessive. European NATO member states have been 
defaulting on their mutual commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defense. According to the 
Centre for European Reform “even prior to the economic crisis [of 2008], most European 
countries spent less than 2% of their GDP on defense.”7 The data in The Military Balance shows 
that only the United Kingdom and Greece have been spending the agreed-upon minimum of 
2% of GDP on defense between 2000 and 2012. That makes only 9.1% of the 21 European 
NATO member states. Continued cuts in European defense spending are failing to “reflect 
NATO’s rhetoric about events in Ukraine being a ‘game-changer’ for European security,” and 
could mean “dangerous underfunding for infrastructure and equipment projects, … damaging 
what is left of the European pillar of NATO.”8 
Defense spending cuts furthermore imply undermined credibility of European 
strategic choice to effectively participate in international crisis-management operations.9 EU 
states have been routinely criticized for their unwillingness to “operate in the dangerous areas 
of southern and eastern Afghanistan where troops are most needed,”10 leading to inadequate 
                                                 
6 Croft, Adrian. (2013). “Defense cuts ‘hollowing out’ European armies: U.S. envoy.” Reuters, June 17, US 
Edition Online: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-defence-nato-idUSBRE95G11W20130617. 
7 O’Donnell, Clara Marina (2013) “Time to bite the bullet on European defence,” Centre for European Reform 
(Feb. 1), Online: http://centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2013/02/time-to-bite-bullet-on-european-
defence.html  
8 Neuger, James G. (2015) “Europe Defense Cuts Imperil NATO Readiness, Group Says” Bloomberg Business 
Online, February 25: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-26/europe-defense-cuts-imperil-
nato-readiness-group-says   
9 Cornish and Edwards (2005), p. 804 
10 Daniel Korski, “Afghanistan: Europe’s forgotten war,” European Council on Foreign Relations, January 21, 
2008, 16 
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contribution of troops from EU countries with respect to the demonstrated demand.11 In 
practice, Europeans have exercised considerable restraint in deploying military forces. In the 
2000-2012 period, the EU has deployed more civilian (17) than military (8) operations, usually 
small in comparison to the UN and NATO missions,12 and most often in pre- or post-conflict 
situations.13 When they did deploy, “no vital national interests have been at stake.”14 Europeans 
have generally chosen to intervene in conflicts of “low-to-middle bandwidth in terms of 
values, interests and risks at stake.”15 Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh 
                                                 
11 Ibid.  
12 Hazelzet, Hadewych (2012) “The added value of CSDP Operations,” European Union Institute for Security 
Studies, Brief 31, September, p.2  http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_31.pdf 
13 In the first decade of 2000’s, “no interventions have explicitly fallen under the third category [combat missions 
for managing crises, including peace reestablishment missions], which would entall risks of exposition that would 
hold more significant implications for the risk of war.” [Laidi, Zaki (2010) “Is Europe a Risk Averse Actor? 
European Foreign Affairs Review, Kluwer Law International, pp. 411-426, <hal-01023806>] In 2011, the UN 
deployed 120,000 peacekeepers and NATO almost 150,000 troops – more than 24 and 30 times, respectively, as 
many as the EU. “That said, EU member states provide important shares of NATO troops and carry a large 
chunk of the costs of UN peacekeeping operations. Not unlike the EU, the UN is deploying more and more 
civilian (police) missions, with a growth of 80 percent over the past few years (compared to a 13 percent growth 
in UN military operations). In 2012, the UN deployed a total of 16 peacekeeping operations and one special 
political mission, compared to 15 by the EU.” Hazelzet (2012:1) 
14 Engberg, Katarina (2013). “Ten years of EU military operations,” European Union Institute for Security 
Studies,  Number 41, p.2: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_41_EU_military_operations.pdf 
15 Ibid. The reservation to deploy is often attributed to the states’ political preference to intervene through their 
membership in NATO (e.g. Afghanistan, Libya),15 a coalition of the willing (e.g. Iraq 2003), or as part of a UN 
or regional response (Lebanon 2006-09, Sri Lanka 2009, Kyrgyzstan 2010, Syria 2012). However, “In some cases 
where another actor was better placed or equipped to respond to a crisis and CSDP action was not taken, the 
EU sought to bring value by serving as a clearing house for member states’ contributions (e.g. Lebanon 2006, 
Haiti 2009) or contribute to UN peacekeeping or monitoring missions by other means – such as satellite imagery 
(Syria 2012). The EU has also helped build the capacity of other regional organisations (the AU, ECOWAS, Arab 
League of States).” [Hazelzet (2012: 2-3]. The EU was further deterred from engaging in Lebanon because of the 
opposition of local actors to the deployment of EU forces. In Libya (2011), potential EU-led maritime embargo 
did not materialize mostly because of lack of European political consensus. While France and the UK “advocated 
for the implementation of no-fly zone and asked to keep the door open for a military intervention to protect 
civilians,” [Louati, Claudia (2011) “Military intervention in Libya – where is ESDP?” Nouvelle Europe, April 
20th: http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/en/military-intervention-libya-where-esdp], Germany and to a lesser 
degree Poland and Estonia were against a military campaign. NATO assumed command and control of the air 
and naval campaigns in an Operation Unified Protector, with the US providing most of the capabilities lacked 
by the EU states. 
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Rasmussen warned that “if European defense spending cuts continue, Europe’s ability to be 
a stabilizing force even in its neighborhood will rapidly disappear.”16 
The continued decline in European defense spending paints a bleak picture of the state 
of the European military. However, I question the prevailing notion that declining defense 
spending always leads to unfavorable developments in military capacity of states. I argue that 
intentionality matters in how cuts in defense spending affect military capacity outcomes. Under 
certain conditions – such as conscious policy choices to pursue defense reform, collective 
defense collaboration, or buck-passing/free-riding within alliances, states can intentionally 
counter the negative consequences of declining defense spending. As a result, governments 
could manage important increases in their national military capacity despite declining defense 
spending.  
 
I. The Puzzle 
There appears to be a puzzling disconnect in the observed empirical patterns between 
declining defense spending and military capacity, as well as the prevailing theoretical 
explanations of how diminishing defense spending relates to states’ military capacity. 
Empirically, there is significant variation in whether spending cuts lead to a net decline in 
military capacity. I find that as many as 30% of defense spending cuts in the 27 European 
Union states between 2000 and 2012 were accompanied by a net increase in national military 
capacity, rather than a decline. In 53.4% of the 30 DSCP’s, reductions in defense spending 
                                                 
16 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh. 2011. “NATO After Libya: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times,” Foreign Affairs 
(90: 4). 
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entailed increases in both or one of the two key capacity indicators. What is more, in 85.7% 
of defense spending cuts, declining military expenditures were accompanied by sustained 
service-level increases in military manpower, equipment or line-item R&D spending. These 
trends suggest the possibility of qualitative improvements in military capacity even under 
declining defense spending. 
Similarly, theoretical explanations of this relationship are also puzzling: while some 
theories predict that a decline in defense spending will degrade national military power, other 
scholars argue that states can improve aspects of the military despite declining military 
expenditures. Mainstream IR theories on military power in international relations17 predict that 
declining defense spending will degrade states’ military capacity.18 At the most fundamental 
level, the amount spent on resources accurately reflects actual military capacity.19 Decreasing 
spending and fewer resources are expected to result in proportional decreases in military 
capacity:20 the more equipment, troops, and money a state has the more militarily powerful 
(and able to win a war) it is.21 Research on strategic threats similarly assume that increasing 
defense spending of the state’s rivals increases the military potential of the rival state.22 
                                                 
17 This logic stems from scholarly conceptualization of power as an index of gross material resources. The 
widely accepted minimalist assumption is that state power is “nothing more than the specific assets and 
material resources available to a state.” Mearsheimer (2001, 57). In the 18th Century, state power was measured 
on the basis of ‘certain well-defined factors’ (Gulick, 1955:24) such as population, territory, wealth, armies and 
navies. This approach evolved into the ‘elements of national power’ reflected in Hans J. Morgenthau’s work 
Politics Among Nations (1948). See also Sprout and Sprout, 1945. [In Baldwin, David A. Power and International 
Relations, p.2] 
http://www.princeton.edu/~dbaldwin/selected%20articles/Baldwin%20%282012%29%20Power%20and%20
International%20Relations.pdf ] 
18 Mearsheimer (2001: 57). 
19 Mearsheimer, John J. (Spring 1989). “Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics,” 
International Security 13/4, 54–89. 
20 Mearsheimer (2001). 
21 See Goldsmith (2003:565). 
22 See Hartley and Rusett 1992, Hewitt 1992, Mintz and Ward 1989, Fordham and Walker 2005. 
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However, more recent research suggests that cuts in defense spending do not have to 
degrade state’s military potential. Over the past two decades, and especially with the rise of 
scholars examining military effectiveness,23 the assumed linear relationship between defense 
spending and military power projection has become much more tenuous.24 Variables such as 
military culture, civil-military relations, capacity for technological innovation and absorption, 
or regime type introduce explanations for why resources do not always equal military power 
outcomes - in a linear fashion.25 Similarly, theory on alliance dynamics suggests maintained 
recourse to military capacities through alliance networks even in the context of reduced 
defense spending.26 In the past, countries have also maintained their relative military posture 
under diminished defense spending and possibly even reduced military capabilities when they 
faced reduced external security threats.27 
                                                 
23 See Weigley 1988, Rosen 1995, Reiter and Stam 1998, Reiter and Stam 2002, Biddle 2004, Brooks 2008, Millett 
and Murray 2010. 
24 International relations scholars have emphasized various intervening variables in the relationship between 
resources and power, such as military culture and organizations (see Posen (1984-1985: 47-88), Kier (1997), Long 
(2010); civil-military relations (see Brooks (2008)); force employment and doctrines (see Mearsheimer (1983), 
Biddle (2004)); threat perceptions (see Talmadge (2012)); technology (see Biddle (2004)); and regime type (see 
Reiter and Stam (2002). 
25 For example, military effectiveness may be based less on overall resources and more on the culture that affects 
how those resources are allocated. A state can spend more on its defense, but poor civil-military relations can 
waste resources and dilute military effectiveness. See Brooks, Risa A., ‘Civil-Military Relations and Military 
Effectiveness: Egypt in the 1967 and 1973 Wars’ in Brooks and (2007), Biddle and Zirkle (1996), Quinlivan 
(1999). When all states have similar degrees of access to the technology that can be purchased with military 
spending, the strategy and doctrine of a state and the capacity for innovation in adopting and training forces may 
introduce variation in how these factors relate to military effectiveness (Biddle (2004). Regime type also matters: 
democracies are more effective than autocracies in spending the same amount on capabilities, largely because of 
competent budgeting processes and the commitment skill of individual soldiers. See Reiter (1998), or Reiter and 
Stam (2002).  
26 Theorists of economic theory of alliances found that members of military alliances share spending burdens 
disproportionately (Olson 1965, Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). In case of the NATO alliance, large members 
were either shown “to carry the defense burdens of the small,” or that a low-cost, small ally will assume a 
smaller defense burden than a larger ally if the smaller ally’s cost advantage of contributing to the alliance is not 
sufficiently great. 
27 Whitten, Guy D. and Laron K. Williams (January 2011). “Buttery Guns and Welfare Hawks: The Politics of 
Defense Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 
117-134. 
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What does this puzzle imply? Although most periods of declining defense spending 
still lead to a net decline in military capacity, it remains unclear under what conditions spending 
cuts lead to a net increase in military capacity. Furthermore, how the net decline in military 
capacity translates to changes at a level below the aggregated numbers also remains unclear. 
When countries face periods of declining defense spending, does it mean they are degrading, 
demilitarizing, or reforming? Can the material decline be counterbalanced by increased defense 
collaboration or other strategic choices aimed at channeling available resources towards 
supporting military capacity priorities?  
I explore the possibility that declining defense spending does not degrade states’ 
military capacity. A focused analysis of strategic intent can shed light on these relationships, 
but has not been systematically analyzed as a factor in the relationship between declining 
defense spending and military capacity of states. Declining military resources may be 
unintentional, but do not have to translate to unmitigated degradation of national military 
capacity. When intended, military downsizing should not be conflated with a strategic choice 
to demilitarize.28 Demilitarization occurs only when a decline in military assets is accompanied 
                                                 
28 Through the work of scholars like Susan Willett, it is becoming clear that the ideational aspect of 
demilitarization must take into consideration the connection between intentions/ideas and national strategic 
culture, national security interests and national security policies. Such strategically intended demilitarization 
should then translate into declining defense expenditures, military equipment, and manpower. She suggests that 
demilitarization implies “a more all-encompassing concept, which attempts to deconstruct the ideological and 
institutional structures of militarism and reassert control over organs of the state and over the economy.” 
[Stearns, Peter, ed. Demilitarization in the Contemporary World. Baltimore, US: University of Illinois Press, 2013, 
p. 25. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 6 July 2016.] The most straightforward definitions of demilitarization have simply 
asserted a reduction of standing armies (Nelson, 1991), downsizing of defense budgets or cutting military 
expenditure (Benoit, 1986; Allan, 1992; Franko, 1994). Other studies employed the concept of demilitarization 
as disarmament of conventional and nuclear weapons (Falk, 1975; Barnay, 1978; Evangelista, 1983; Forsberg, 
1984; Menon, 1987; Bernard, 1995; Beard, 1998; Eberle, 1998, Johansen, 1991; Abad, 2005) or as military 
industrial conversion whereby material resources are shifted from the military to the civilian sector (Fortla, 1992; 
Cronber, 1994; Cooper, 1995; Brzoska, 1999). 
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by the intention of abolishing or minimizing the military as an instrument of foreign policy.29 
Even when reductions in military spending are strategically intended, they may not mean an 
intention to weaken states’ military posture. In fact, it might mean the opposite. 
 
II. Case Selection  
The puzzle of competing theoretical explanations of what defense spending cuts mean 
for national military capacity seems especially acute in the context of 27 EU member states 
between 2000 and 2012. On one hand, European states present a group of the most-likely30 
cases in which observed diminishing defense spending may relate to an intentional decline in 
military capacity. Theories on European identity as a security actor, liberal institutionalism on 
                                                 
29 Former US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated in 2010 that “the demilitarization of Europe – where 
large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it – has 
gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 
21st.” [Gates, Robert M. (2010). NATO Strategic Concept Seminar (Future of NATO). Remarks as delivered by 
U.S. Secretary of Defense, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., February 23.] Others have similarly 
pointed out that “…defense cuts are …about the fact that Europe resigned on her defense and entirely lost her 
ambitions.” [NATO 2020 and the Armed Forces: Way Ahead. Summary and Conclusions of the Conference 
held on October 2-3, 2012 in Bratislava, Slovakia. Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs. The event 
was organized and financially supported by NATO Public Diplomacy Division and Ministry of Defense of the 
Slovak Republic.]  
30 Gerring, John (2007). Case Study Research, Principles and Practices, Cambridge University Press, NY, pp. vii-216, 
p.89 Harry Eckstein describes a crucial case as one “that must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in 
the theory’s validity, or conversely, must not fit equally well any rule contrary to that proposed,” (Gerring 
(2007:115)). Europe presents not only a hard case for my argument, but is a good case for a comparative analysis 
as it entails a group of 27 EU states under a large spectrum of ceteris paribus conditions. EU members are required 
to comply with acquis communautaire, which is a body of European Union law that deals with broad and 
comprehensive issues of governance across the member states. These regulate free movement of goods, persons, 
services, and the capital, taxation, the functioning of the economic and monetary union, external relations, 
common foreign and security policy, and many others.  In the security context, EU members collectively 
subscribe to the grand strategy “to share in the responsibility for global security,” [European Security Strategy 
(2003:1], with foreign policy backed-up by a mixture of credible military and civilian capabilities. Collectively, 
Europe intends to develop “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and, when necessary, robust intervention” 
with recourse to military capabilities [Ibid, p.9-10]. European states aspire to “transform state militaries into more 
flexible, mobile” [Ibid., p. 12 ] units and enable states to systematically pool and share assets as a way to reduce 
duplications, overheads and in the medium-term increase military capabilities. EU law and common security and 
defense policy to some degree decrease the presence of confounders in a comparative, cross-country analysis. 
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the power of the trading states, and democratic peace all assume a degree of rationality behind 
declining military expenditures and the concomitant decline in European military capacity. On 
the other hand, Realist scholarship implies that the changing security role of the US in Europe 
and the nature of security threats might elicit greater European interest in building up military 
instruments. This position aligns with the European Union’s own strategic ambition to pursue 
a credible role as a global player on the international scene. 
Scholars have long argued that one of the main reasons for the existing deficiencies in 
European independent military power is that the EU is comprised of democratic political 
regimes.31 In democracies, defense spending is still a discretionary area of government 
spending and competes32 with other, non-defense sectors for resources.33 Reductions in real 
military spending can produce a “peace dividend,”34 functionally increasing real private and 
public consumption and investment opportunities.35 Democratic states have been shown to 
prefer smaller military budgets (Sandler and Hartley 1995, Gonzales and Mehay 1990, Lee 
1990, and Jones 1992), or to spend less on defense in peacetime because “the private goods 
produced by military spending are less useful to the state leaders”36 (Bueno de Mesquita, 
                                                 
31 All EU members must be developed democracies as part of the acquis communitaire membership accession 
criteria. Maull (2005:793)  
32 This argument aligns with Kant’s liberal argument that citizens of democracies, fearing suppression of civil 
liberties under strong military establishment, would resist the diversion of resources to the military and away 
from private consumption or other collective goods such as public health and education. [Nordhaus, William, 
John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett (2010). “Research Note: The Effects of the International Security Environment on 
National Military Expenditures: A Multi-Country Study.” Yale University, p. 11: 
http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/docs/NOR_AER.pdf]  
33 Erlanger, Steven. March 2014. “Europe Begins to Rethink Cuts to Military Spending.” The New York Times, 
March 26, 2014. Link to the article: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/27/world/europe/europe-begins-to-
rethink-cuts.html?_r=0  
34 Fordham and Walker (2005:144)  
35 Garfinkel (1990:49).  
36 Fordham and Walker (2005:144)  
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Morrow, Siverson and Smith 1999, Bueano de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow 2003). 
Democratic governments have also spent less on defense under pressure from citizen 
preferences (Eichenberg and Stoll 1989, Stoll 1992, Soroka and Wlezien 1995, 2002).37  
Investment in military capabilities has been found to proportionally vary with the 
nature of external threats:38 decreasing threats may reduce the need to mobilize material 
resources for external security.39 In this context, some have argued that the relative absence of 
an existential threat to cotemporary Europe has provided “opportunities for strategic elites to 
decrease military expenditures.”40 The end of the Cold War dramatically weakened European 
perception of former Soviet Union as a conventional military threat, creating a “strategic 
breathing space for new ideas about defense” and an “ideational shift away from territorial 
                                                 
37 Eichenberg and Stoll (2003:401)  
38 For details on empirical research see Rosh (1988), Dunne & Perlo-Freeman (2003), Dunne et al. (2008), Gadea 
et al. (2004), Yildirim and Sezgin (2005), Collier and Hoeffler (2007), and Nikolaidou (2008). Increasing security 
threats were found to increase national defense expenditures if threats were measured as the increasing 
expenditure of threatening neighbors. Realist scholars explain this relationship by states’ motivation to increase 
their defense spending in search for their survival. Under this premise, defense spending is a function of state’s 
insecurity (Walt (1987, 1995)) and the purpose of rising defense expenditures is to “provide defense against a 
threat posed by the expenditure of the neighbor.” [Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2002), “Military Expenditure: 
Threats, Aid and Arms Races,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper2927, November, pp. 23, p.3] 
Consequently, the greater the level of international security threats perceived by a state’s policymakers, the higher 
the expected military expenditures of states ((Walt (1987), Jervis (1976), Quester (1977), Van Evera (1984, 1997), 
Glaser and Kaufmann (1998), and Jones (1995)). [Rand Monograph, Chapter Four: Alternative Hypotheses about 
the Growth-Military Expenditures Relationship, p.54] More on how elite consensus affects whether a 
government acknowledges that a threat exists and how it is to be addressed can be found in Schweller, Randall 
I. (2006), Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, Princeton University Press: Princeton Studies 
in International History and Politics, pp. i-182. 
39 Whitten, Guy D. and Laron K. Williams (2011: 119). 
40 Whitten and Williams (2011:118). Liberal theorists have long theorized reductions in military assets as 
possible when states transcend the state of anarchy and became democratic. The assumptions behind these 
claims can be traced to Kant’s idea of Perpetual Peace. Kant envisioned the possibility of a political arrangement 
in which states were able to escape the state of anarchy by forming a federation governed by the Law of 
Nations. In this scenario, states – much like those bound by laws, rules and shared norms within the EU - 
would not feel the need to compete militarily for their survival. In fact, Kant theorized that they would base 
their security on the common commitment to reduce their military ambitions. Perpetual Peace Project: 
http://perpetualpeaceproject.org/resources/  
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defense towards expeditionary warfare in wars of choice (Meyer, 2006; Howorth, 2007).”41 
Since the end of the Kosovo conflict in the late 1990s, “many commentators and the general 
public find it difficult to identify a threat that requires the EU to have a military dimension.”42 
European sense of security has been also attributed to ongoing American protection, 
diminishing the utility of military power in Europe.43 
Liberal institutionalists claim that globalization and increasing interdependence also 
do not warrant the EU to build up its military instruments.44 The interdependent post-Cold 
War world decreased the utility of military force45 because “military power is more costly and 
less transferrable today than in earlier times.”46 Mutual dependence established between two 
trading partners is sufficient to raise the costs of conflict (Polachek, 1980). 47 Rosecrance (1986) 
                                                 
41 Meyer, Christoph, O. and EvaStrickmann (2010: 77). This shift from territorial defense to expeditionary 
operations partially explains why European states cut their defense expenditures, reduced their military force 
numbers and committed to force disarmament immediately after the end of the Cold War. Asch, Beth J. and 
James R. Hosek, (2007) “Chapter 32: New Economics of Manpower in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Sandler, 
Todd and Keith Hartley (edt.), (2007) Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol. 2, Defense in a Globalized World, pp. 607-
1258. 
42 Salmon and Shepherd (2003), p. 11 
43 Some have pushed for a division of labor between the US and Europe, with the US handling militarily harder 
cases and Europe developing a military capability to handle the less militarily demanding crises. In the words of 
the former UK foreign minister Jack Straw, who echoed the views of US national security advisor Condoleezza 
Rice: “…the US is better at the tough military action and the EU at stabilizing and rebuilding regions and states.” 
[Salmon and Shepherd (2003), p.4] According to this view, Europeans tend to focus more on security challenges 
such as “ethnic conflict, migration, organized crime, poverty and environmental degradation… [or issues] that 
have a greater chance of being solved by political engagement and huge sums of money.” [Kagan, Robert (2002), 
p. 10] “Europe’s rejection of power politics, its devaluing of military force as a tool of international relations, 
have depended on the presence of American military forces on European soil. Europe’s new Kantian order [can] 
flourish only under the umbrella of American power exercised according to the rules of the old Hobbesian order.” 
[Kagan, R. (2002), p.18] 
44 Hyde‐Price, Adrian, (2008). A ‘tragic actor’? A realist perspective on ‘ethical power Europe’. International 
affairs, 84(1), 29-44., p. 30 
45 Nye, Joseph S. Jr (1990). “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn, 1990), p.156: 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.bu.edu/stable/pdfplus/1148580.pdf   
46 Ibid., p. 159  
47 “It is argued that the mutual dependence established between two trading partners (dyads) is sufficient to raise 
the costs of conflict, there-by diminishing levels of dyadic dispute. a doubling of trade on average leads to a 20% 
diminution of belligerence. This relationship appears robust, holding even more strongly when statistical 
adjustments are made for causality.” [Polachek, S. W. (1980). Conflict and trade. Journal of Conflict resolution, 
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has argued that development increases the potential gains from trade, economic and political 
costs of war and decreases the utility of occupying territories relative to the pursuit of trade 
interests.48 EU institutions have developed to offer “large elements of mutual advantage that 
can be achieved only through cooperation” rather than “military intimidation.”49 In short, the 
EU can achieve more through its economic and trading power, and militarization might 
actually reduce states’ ability to achieve their ends. 
Others claim that European choice not to arm itself sufficiently to fight a “war” is a 
matter of Europe’s security identity, a philosophical conviction, derived from the bitter 
experience of the 20th Century. Europeans believed that they, and eventually the world, had 
to move beyond power.50 Order in Europe is to be maintained not through intimidation by 
force but through ‘rejection of force’ and the exercise of ‘self-enforced rules of behavior.’51 In 
July 2010, Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
                                                 
24(1), 55-78.] Others propose that it is only the future expectation of trade that cements peaceful relations: 
“Interdependence can foster peace, as liberals argue, but this will only be so when states expect that trade levels 
will be high into the foreseeable future.” [Copeland, D. (1996). Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory 
of Trade Expectations. International Security, 20(4), 5-41. doi:1.]  
48 Rosecrance (1986) has argued that development changes four variables crucial to the calculations of state 
leaders: “it increases the potential gains from trade, the economic costs of war, and the political costs of war, as 
well as decreasing the utility of occupying territories relative to the pursuit of trade interests.” [Schneider, 
Gerald, Katherine Barbieri, Nils Petter Gleditsch (edt.) (2003). “Globalization and Armed Conflict,” Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p.1-371, p.208] 
49 Ibid., p. 158  
50 Europe should be on a mission to civilize relations between other states. This idea resonates with the concept 
of a Weberian ideal-type civilian power, which should strive to ‘civilize’ the “relations between the states along 
the lines of their own, democratic, domestic politics.” [Maull, H. W. (2005), p. 779] Limiting military force is a 
key element in how this process takes place: “Constraints on violence become necessary to allow societies to 
deepen and broaden the scope and division of labour and thus to enhance their ability to overcome social 
problems.” [Ibid., p.780] 
51 Kagan (2002:12)  
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stressed that “… we need the EU not just for us in Europe, but also as the vehicle to act in a 
fast-changing world and to influence its direction with our ideas.”52  
The notion that Europe chooses to demilitarize closely relates to the concept of 
Normative Power Europe (Duchene (1972), I. Manners (2002)). This concept is based on the 
vision of Europe that is unique in its rejection of military power, embodying instead normative 
principles such as sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.53 
EU’s “gravitational pull” is generated by the “weight of [the EU’s] markets, capital and 
technological resources as well as … the attractiveness of the European way of life.”54 Joseph 
Nye has defined Europe’s soft power as the ability to “change the behavior of others through 
the means of attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment” (Nye 1990, 2002, 
2004, 2005). Mark Leonard conceptualized the long-term effects of Europe’s transformative 
power, which “cannot be measured in terms of military budgets or smart missile technology, 
but is captured in treaties, constitutions and law” (Leonard, 2005).55  
                                                 
52 Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Europe and the World 2010, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-378_en.htm?locale=en, last accessed 28 May 2013    
53 The idea of Normative Power Europe overlaps with the idea of Europe as a civilian power (Gourlay and 
Remacle, 1998; Galtung in Lister 1997; Telo, 2007), which signifies “EU’s non-military ’role in the international 
community based on a distinctive set of principles… emphasizing diplomatic rather than coercive instruments, 
the centrality of mediation in conflict resolution, the importance of long-term economic solutions to political 
problems… all of these in contradistinction to the norms of superpower politics’ (Hill and Wallace 1996, 9).” 
[Freres, Christian (2000). “The European Union as a Global “Civilian Power”: Development Cooperation in EU-
Latin American Relations, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 42, No.2, v+63-85, p.63] 
54 Maull, H. W. (2005), p. 779 
55 Leonard, Mark (2005). “Europe’s Transformative Power” Centre for European Reform, accessible at: 
http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2005/europes-transformative-power Similar 
concepts of European security identity refer to a post-modern, ethical, and transformative power Europe. These 
describe the EU as an entirely suis generis actor on the international scene, with a unique opportunity to 
“demonstrate the influence which can be wielded by a large political cooperative formed to exert essentially 
civilian forms of power.” [Duchêne, F. (1973). The European Community and the uncertainties of 
interdependence. In A Nation Writ Large? (pp. 1-21), p.19. Palgrave Macmillan UK. For further details on 
normative power Europe see Manners, I. (2002). Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?. JCMS: 
Journal of common market studies, 40(2), 235-258; Manners, I. (2006) „The European Union as a Normative 
Power: A Response to Thomas Diez‟, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2006; 35; 167; Manners, I. 
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The belief that the EU incarnates a ‘virtuous state of mind, a disposition for 
benevolence, confidence and justice’56 seems internalized at the highest levels of EU 
leadership. Europe aspires to be “a leader in diplomacy, a generous aid donor, and a firm 
supporter of multilateral rules for regulating trade and international financial flows.” 57 The 
EU remains the “biggest donor to countries in need.”58 Over the years, the union has 
contributed to human security by “reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good 
governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of 
conflict and insecurity.”59 EU has been ‘evangelizing’ its neighbors through EU’s 
enlargement60 and neighborhood policies.61 EU’s high-ranking policy makers are often heard 
emphasizing the civilian instruments that allow the EU, at least in theory, to assert its power 
over its neighbors normatively. EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement Stefan Fule remarked 
                                                 
(2009) „The Concept of Normative Power in World Politics’ [online]. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 
International Studies; AGGESTAM, L. (2008), Introduction: ethical power Europe?. International Affairs, 84: 
1–11; Smith, K. E. (2005). „Beyond the civilian power debate’ London.] Robert Cooper has described the 
relations among the EU member states in post-modern terms where force is rejected and “security is based on 
transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability” [Cooper, 2003].  
56 “From War to Peace: A European Tale,” Acceptance Speech of the Nobel Peace Prize Award to the European 
Union by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council and Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, President 
of the European Commission, Oslo, December 10, 2012, p. 8 http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/eu-
nobel/pdf/npp2013_en.pdf  
57 Freres (2000), p. 63.  
58 European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (2009), p.8 
59 Ibid.  
60 EU’s enlargement process requires that a candidate country fulfills the three parts of the Copenhagen criteria 
for EU membership: “1) political criteria of stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) the economic criteria of a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, and 3) 
demonstrated acceptance of the Community acquis by a candidate country, which must be able to take on the 
obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.” 
[Kylstad, Ingrid (2010) “Turkey and the EU: A ‘new’ European identity in the making?” London School of 
Economics, Discussion Paper Series, No. 27/2010, p.6, accessible at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSPaper27.pdf]  
61 Zielonka J. (2013b): ‘The International System in Europe: Westphalian Anarchy or Medieval Chaos?’, 
Journal of European Integration, 35:1, 1-18.  
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that: “Enlargement is … the most powerful instrument of transformation – it serves as a 
strong incentive for reforms.”62 
However, there are compelling theoretical claims that defy the notion that Europe 
chooses to reduce its military assets. According to mainstream IR theory, continued European 
decline in defense spending is counter-intuitive to the state’s interest to seek power in an 
anarchic world, jeopardizing its security. After the end of the Cold War, Europe’s key security 
threats - threat of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional 
conflicts, state failure and organized crime, have emanated from outside of the EU zone. Such 
threat environment requires Europe to be a “more active, more coherent and more capable”63 
expeditionary actor in order to address these threats before they reach European soil.  
It has been established that countries increase investment in the military as much as 
possible when they face an existential threat:64 a heightened or fatal threat … necessitates 
greater commitment of resources to the military.65 Resurgence of nationalism on the European 
continent after the end of Cold War initially rationalized EU’s pursuit of military power: 
“…although there has been little threat of all-out war within or involving EU states, there has 
been a continuing presence of instability, disintegration of states, and armed conflict across 
                                                 
62 Stefan Fule, Commissioner in charge of Enlargement and ENP, 10th Anniversary of 2004 Enlargement, 
European Commission, accessible at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-143_en.htm  
63 European Security Strategy (2003)  
64 Whitten, Guy D. and Laron K. Williams (2011). “Buttery Guns and Welfare Hawks: The Politics of Defense 
Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 1(January 2011), 
pp. 117-134, pp.117-118. 
65 Nordhaus, William, John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett (2012). “The Effects of International Security 
Environment on National Military Expenditures: a Multi-country Study.” International Organization, 66, pp. 491-
513, p. 493. A recent study on the relationship between external security environment and military spending 
confirmed that military spending goes up with increasing likelihood of fatal conflict (Nordhaus, Oneal and 
Russett (2009: 2). 
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the world and especially in the regions close to the external borders of the EU.”66 The violent 
breakup of Yugoslavia in particular “underlined the limitations of soft power and the need for 
the EU to have credible military forces to back up its diplomacy if it wished to engage in 
effective coalitional crisis management…”67 More recent perception of Russia as an 
increasingly serious threat to European security might compel relevant peripheral EU states 
to mobilize more resources and increase their military capacity: “Without an EU ability to 
threaten the use of force, the more belligerent personalities within crisis regions will ignore the 
other instruments at the EU’s disposal.”68 
In the post-9/11 world, some European leaders also expressed the wish to enhance 
Europe’s military power as a way to balance69 the US and to reduce its reliance on US military 
capabilities. B.R. Posen wrote that “insofar as the US disinterest is enabled by its great power 
position, Europeans find it necessary to build up their own power in response.”70 Strategic 
differences between the US and Europe have culminated in the ‘continental drift,’ peaking 
over the need to invade Iraq. Europeans needed to build up their own military instruments in 
reaction to the gradual distancing of the US’s from Europe. In developing the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) EU responded to the uncertainties of US security policy 
in the context of global unipolarity,”71 providing insurance policy against “increasing 
uncertainty about US military involvement in Europe.”72 Deteriorating US-EU relations 
                                                 
66 Salmon and Shepherd (2003), p. 5 
67 Hyde-Price, A. (2006). ‘Normative’ power Europe: a realist critique. Journal of European public policy, 13(2), 217-
234, p. 227 
68 Salmon and Shepherd (2003), p. 6 
69 Hyde-Price A. (2006) 
70 Posen, B.R. (2006), p. 162 
71 Hyde-Price A. (2006), p. 230 
72 Kagan, R. (2007). Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order. Vintage, p. 195 
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provided the necessary impetus for creating a “more cohesive EU with a sharper and more 
effective international role.”73 Samuel P. Huntington predicted that the coalescing of the EU 
would be the “single most important move in a worldwide reaction against American 
hegemony and would produce a truly multi-polar twenty-first century.”74 
European commitment to developing military instruments as a global security actor75  
helped shape a “strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and, when necessary, robust 
intervention.”76 Success in these strategic pursuits envisions European cooperation in a timely 
and coherent manner, backed by “the right capabilities,”77 as well as “more resources for 
defence and more effective use of [these] resources.”78 To this end, Europeans have agreed to 
invest in the transformation of their militaries into more flexible and mobile forces.79 In the 
Treaty on the European Union, states committed to build capabilities to conduct ‘Petersberg 
Tasks’ – peace enforcement, peacekeeping, military assistance, evacuation and humanitarian 
support.80  In 2007, EU created a more agile “military instrument for early and rapid response,” 
                                                 
73 Hyde-Price A. (2006) 
74 Salmon and Shepherd (2003), p. 21 
75 On March 8th, 2015 European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has called for a combined EU 
military force, which might improve the EU’s standing in the world as well as send a message to Russia that the 
EU is serious about defending the values of the EU. According to Juncker “an army like this would help us to 
better coordinate our foreign and defense policies and to collectively take on Europe’s responsibilities in the 
world.” [“Juncker calls for collective EU army.” Deutsche Welle: Defense, March 8, 2015 
http://dw.de/p/1EnIx] The same idea has been recently endorsed by former CFSP High 
Representative/Secretary General of the EU Javier Solana in Solana, Javier and Steven Blockmans (2015). 
“Europe Needs More Union to Defend Itself.” The Wall Street Journal, March 10th: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/javier-solana-and-steven-blockmans-europe-needs-more-union-to-defend-itself-
1426016839    
76 European Security Strategy (2003), p.12 
77 European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (2009), p. 8 
78 Ibid., p. 40 
79 European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World (2009), p. 34 
80 European Union External Action: About CSDP – The Treaty of Amsterdam, Overview: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/amsterdam/index_en.htm  
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the EU battle group.81 Institutionally, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established 
in 2004 to support the EU states’ ambition to improve their military and forward-deploying 
capabilities.82  
In sum, declining defense expenditures in 2000-2012 Europe are puzzling because it 
is unclear whether they imply a growing credibility gap between European strategic goals and 
actual military capabilities, or intended demilitarization along the lines of the 2010 statement 
of the former US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.83 I argue that normative 
understanding of ‘soft power Europe’ conflates absolute material decline in resources with 
strategic choice to decline military assets as useful and appropriate tools of foreign policy. Such 
views may lead to overstating the negative impact of defense spending cuts on states’ military 
capacity (especially in the long term), or completely dismiss the possibility that decline in 
defense spending and other military assets relates to strategies aimed to counter military 
decline. Even when reductions in military spending are strategically intended, they may 
translate to intentional strengthening of states’ military capacity.  
 
                                                 
81 Battle groups are to provide “rapid response elements available and deployable at very high levels of 
readiness,” either as a stand-alone action or as part of a larger operation. Common Security and Defence 
Policy: EU Battlegroups: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/91624.pdf 
82 EDA acts as a catalyst, promotes collaborations, launches new initiatives and introduces solutions to improve 
defence capabilities. The agency falls under the authority of the Council of the EU, to which it reports and 
from which it receives guidelines. Defence Ministers decide on the annual budget, the 3-year work program and 
the annual work plan, projects, programs and new initiatives: http://www.eda.europa.eu/home  
83 “The demilitarization of Europe – where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to 
military force and the risks that go with it – has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to 
achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st.” [Gates, Robert M. (2010). NATO Strategic Concept Seminar 
(Future of NATO). Remarks as delivered by U.S. Secretary of Defense, National Defense University, 
Washington, D.C., February 23.]  
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III. Argument in Brief  
I argue that under certain conditions, cuts in defense spending do not degrade military 
capacity. I conceptualize military capacity in narrow, technical terms related to two 
fundamental input-indicators defining states’ readiness to project their military force abroad: 
manpower and equipment.84 I use the term military capacity interchangeably with military 
potential for expeditionary operations (the first line of defense), but not with military power. 
Military power relates to Clausewitz’s understanding of military force as a continuation of their 
policies by other means. Realist scholarship therefore typically analyzes military power more 
broadly, considering several elements such as resource mobilization, resource conversion, 
force generation and operational execution. In comparison, military capacity is a narrower 
concept. Military capacity (as used here) also differs from military capabilities. Military 
capabilities refer to military weapons and technology, while military capacity considers 
manpower in addition to the technological dimension.85  
 When defense spending cuts do not degrade military capacity, we should see evidence 
of increases in all or some indicators of military capacity in combination with policy choices 
designed to improve states’ military potential.86 Such ‘non-detrimental relationship’ between 
                                                 
84 Some of the key characteristics of expeditionary relate to the ability to mount military operations on short 
notice, consisting of forward deployed, or rapidly deployable, self-sustaining forces tailored to achieve a clearly 
stated objective. [Benes, Thomas A. (2013) “Navy, Marine Corps Rethink Expeditionary Warfare,” National 
Defense, available at: 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/January/Pages/Navy,MarineCorpsRethinkExpedition
aryWarfare.aspx]  
85 See Gentry (2012: 14-15). Constructivist literature analyzes military power by examining how logic of 
appropriateness and leadership affect force generation (Kier (1995), Rosen (1995), Byman and Pollack (2001), 
Tannenwald (1999, 2005, 2007) and Price (2003)). Sociological institutionalists consider how norms affect 
military operations and hence military power (Farrell (2001), Thomas Diez (2001)). 
86 Detrimental relationships are defined by detrimental defense policies (e.g. demilitarization) accompanied by 
an empirical decline in key military resources of the state (e.g. defense spending, military 
equipment/capabilities, and manpower). 
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defense spending cuts and military capacity can be explained by any one of the three 
mechanisms: defense reform, collective defense collaboration, or buck-passing of states’ 
foreign military engagements to their allies.87  
Defense reform minimizes ineffective or wasteful use of resources without 
compromising military capabilities. It prioritizes spending on new military equipment, while 
eliminating expenditures associated with retirement of outdated equipment. Defense 
collaboration increases affordability of equipment procurement by disbursing total expense 
among several partners. A net decline in defense spending may occur when buck-passing states 
minimize expenditures associated with deployment of their military personnel in operations 
abroad, but continue to invest in national military capabilities.  
 
IV. Methodology 
I choose a group of 27 European Union states88 in the period from 2000 through 
201289 to determine whether reductions in military expenditures can produce non-detrimental 
outcomes in military capacity. To evaluate the relationship between defense spending cuts and 
military capacity in contemporary Europe, I employ elements of a Qualitative Comparative 
                                                 
87 Unlike most existing studies, I utilize mid-level IR theories to evaluate military capacity as states experience 
periods of defense spending decline. This analysis adds to the scholarship that examines the relationship between 
defense spending and military power in general. 
88 Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), 
Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), United Kingdom (UK), Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), 
Poland, (PL), Austria (AT), Finland (FI), Ireland (IE), Sweden (SE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Estonia (EE), 
Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Malta (MT), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), and Slovenia (SI). 
89 The 12-year timeframe is sufficient for measuring the trajectory of the developing European military capacity 
in the context of contemporary reductions in defense expenditures. The period from 2000 to 2012 covers three 
full 4-year electoral cycles after the collective decision of the European states to build-up their military capacity. 
It also covers four years after the 2008 global financial crisis. 
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Analysis (QCA). I inductively investigate evidence of several theoretical explanations of a non-
detrimental relationship between declining defense spending and an increase in military 
capacity.  
In theory, mechanisms such as defense reform, defense collaboration or buck-passing 
can mediate non-detrimental relationship between declining defense spending and military 
capacity. These three mechanisms present necessary and sufficient conditions for the non-
detrimental outcome to occur. I refer to these mechanisms interchangeably as conditions, 
potential or hypothesized explanations, or hypotheses. All these terms refer to a set of 
necessary conditions designed to probe theory-derived explanations of the non-detrimental 
outcomes in military capacity during periods of declining defense spending.90 I conduct the 
analysis in three steps.   
First, I probe for associations between periods of sustained cuts in defense spending 
and variation in military capacity. Defense spending cut period (DSCP) means a minimum 
sequence of two biennial reductions in annual defense spending. Change in military capacity 
is defined by a percent change in military equipment and manpower. The difference is 
measured over the span of a DSCP, relative to the year prior to the beginning of the DSCP. 
An aggregated decline in military capacity during a DSCP presents a group of negative cases, 
while an aggregated increase in military capacity increases presents a group of positive cases. 
                                                 
90 For further details on QCA see: Gerring, John (2012). Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework, 2nd 
Edition, Cambridge University Press, pp.518; Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C. (2006). Reducing complexity in 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): Remote and proximate factors and the consolidation of democracy. 
European Journal of Political Research, 45(5), 751-786. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00635.x; Ragin, C. (1994). 
A qualitative comparative analysis of pension systems. The comparative political economy of the welfare state, 
320-345. 
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The latter group strongly implies a potential presence of other factors – such as strategic 
intentions – that mediate the relationship between defense spending cuts and military capacity 
in non-detrimental ways. 
Second, based on the findings on potentially non-detrimental relationships between 
DSCP and military capacity, I evaluate whether increases in military capacity relate to any one 
of the three mechanisms: defense reform, increased collective defense collaboration, or buck-
passing. I compare patterns between a group of positive and negative cases. I operationalize 
each of the mechanisms by a set of necessary, but insufficient, empirical conditions.91 
Sufficient evidence of the intent to do defense reform, increase collective defense cooperation, 
or buck-pass is investigated in follow-on case studies. 
In general, defense reform requires evidence of service-level increases in military 
manpower or equipment, or in line-item spending on military R&D during a DSCP. Such 
increases indicate critical information about a country’s intent to continue or increase 
investment in the quality of its military potential, not deterioration.92 For example, 
expeditionary operations require rapid, forward-deploying and self-sustaining forces that are 
mobile, agile and networked. Naval and air force equipment provides key assets for 
expeditionary operations by making forces more mobile and deployable. A more robust 
                                                 
91 I discuss necessary but insufficient conditions of each of the hypotheses in greater detail in chapters 4 to 6. 
92 In practice, defense reform has meant that states cut some programs but simultaneously reinvested in others, 
or cut some defense spending line-items (such as Operation and Maintenance) in favor of other line-items 
(such as RD&E and procurement). Eaglen, Mackenzie (February 3, 2011). “Taking a Scalpel to the Defense 
Budget.” The Heritage Foundation. For example, the US defense reform in the 1990s initially cut Procurement 
as a way to accelerate RMA. (See Cordesman, Anthony (1998:30-41)). And investing in RDT&E and 
Procurement while reducing waste and excess capacity in operations, maintenance, and personnel was part of 
the explicit strategy behind US defense transformation efforts in the late 1990s. (See Neal (2006:87). 
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increase in naval or air force equipment relative to army equipment can indicate support for 
expeditionary capabilities rather than traditional territorial defense.  
Increased defense collaboration requires evidence of increased investment in 
collaborative military equipment procurement or in collaborative R&T, relative to national 
levels of investment in comparable programs. This difference-in-difference model works 
better than enumerating Letters of Intent related to European collaborative projects, or 
counting national military equipment assets declared for the EU. The former relates to political 
willingness and a strategic intent of potential collaboration in the future. It does not capture 
variation in collaborative projects that actually materialized during a DSCP. The latter does 
not capture sufficient variation in military capabilities, especially in the context of the slow 
progress the EU states have made in remedying outstanding capability shortfalls. 
Buck-passing requires evidence that European states decreased their military 
deployments abroad as key allies – US, UK and France – increased theirs. Diminished 
expenditures related to deployment of military personnel in operations abroad can result in a 
net decline in national military spending. If a country reinvests part of the deployment savings 
in force modernization, for example, the net decline in defense spending does not have 
detrimental effect on military capacity of the state.    
Operationalization of the three hypothesis probes data for potential explanations of a 
non-detrimental relationship between DSCP’s and military capacity, but does not in itself 
present a causal model. The conditions are necessary but insufficient to establish causality. 
Missing variables or other, unaccounted for, phenomena might also account for the observed 
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relationships between DSCP’s and military capacity.93 Probing for evidence of the three 
hypotheses therefore leads to potential explanations of non-detrimental relationships between 
DSCP’s and military capacity. I used caution in the language describing the findings, results 
and associations to avoid causal claims. If causal language is used out of context of case-study 
analyses, the choice has been made for reasons of parsimony and readability and does not 
indicate a causal claim. 
Third, I process-trace select cases to evaluate intentionality behind the hypothesized 
mechanisms. This step is necessary to discount outcomes based on ontological or spurious 
correlations.94 In this portion of the analysis, I rely on policy documents, political party election 
manifestos, statements of key political figures, or legislative acts pertaining to defense and the 
armed forces. For example, the empirical finding of a potentially non-detrimental relationship 
between defense spending cuts and military capacity due to defense reform requires evidence 
that governments implemented defense reform policies. 
QCA is an ideal research method for understanding the patterns of change defining each 
mechanism in the relationship between defense spending cuts and military capacity outcomes 
in a medium-N research design (involving 10 to 50 cases).95 Analysis of thirty cases of defense 
spending cut periods falls within this range. This range is too small for conventional statistical 
                                                 
93 This consideration also relates to the possibility that non-detrimental relationships result from the effect of 
parallel hypotheses. For example, states may diminish their defense spending as they conduct defense reform 
and simultaneously increase their collective defense collaboration. 
94 Ontological relationship between two factors means that these factors are linked because one constitutes the 
other rather than because one causes the other (Goertz and Mahoney (2005). Spurious causal links mean that 
two events or factors are associated because they are both caused by a third unobserved factor. See Legewie 
(2013). 
95 Ragin, Charles C. “What is Qualitative Comparative Analysis?” Department of Sociology and Department of 
Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA., p.4 
http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/250/1/What_is_QCA.pdf 
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techniques and too large to conduct only case-study analysis. Patterns of change between two 
consecutive years would be invisible if standard statistical methods were implemented. 
QCA effectively bridges quantitative and qualitative analyses96 and allows me to 
evaluate multiple explanations that lead to the same outcome: a non-detrimental relationship 
between defense spending cuts and military capacity. QCA provides analytical tools to assess 
the impact of defense spending cut periods on military capacity in binary terms – increases or 
no increases - in the key indicators of military capacity over the course of the defense spending 
cut periods. Increases in key indicators of military capacity are necessary to identify a set of 
cases with positive outcomes: potentially non-detrimental relationships between defense 
spending cuts and military capacity.  
QCA is a powerful tool for analyzing complex causal relationships97 by determining 
key cross-case patterns. Investigating data for presence of hypothesized mechanisms – defense 
reform, collective defense collaboration, and buck-passing – during defense spending cut 
periods acknowledges possible causal complexity between spending cuts and non-detrimental 
military capacity outcomes.98 By establishing necessary but insufficient conditions for each of 
the hypothesized mechanisms, I systematically explore a number of different conditions that 
possibly relate to a non-detrimental outcome in military capacity of states. As a result, I am 
                                                 
96 Legewie, Nicolas (September 2013). “An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis with Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA). Forum: Qualitative Social Research (Sozialforschung). Vol. 14, No. 3, Art. 15 
http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1961/3594 
97 Ragin, Charles C. “What is Qualitative Comparative Analysis?” Department of Sociology and Department of 
Political Science, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA., p.3 
http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/250/1/What_is_QCA.pdf 
98 See Goerge & Bennett, 2005, p.25; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006, p. 229, Rihoux, 2009a, p. 379. 
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able to group cases by shared combinations of conditions and evaluate how these lead to an 
increase or a decrease in military capacity during the defense spending cut period.99  
Under the QCA method, defense spending cut periods provide natural (quasi) 
experiments100 to probabilistic causal linkages between defense spending cuts and military 
capacity outcomes. Naturally occurring randomization of defense spending cuts allows for 
quasi experimental evaluation of the conditions under which reductions in defense spending 
relate to potentially detrimental and non-detrimental capacity outcomes. I am able to evaluate 
whether the hypothesized mechanisms explain greater variation in those defense spending cuts 
that relate to increases in military capacity than in those spending cuts that do not. 
QCA relies on qualitative case study to establish causality between defense spending 
cuts and the hypothesized mechanisms potentially related to non-detrimental military capacity 
outcomes. As already mentioned, findings derived from the formalized QCA analysis do not 
“prove” causal relations. They only “reveal patterns of associations across sets of cases,” 
requiring further evidence to determine existence of the hypothesized causal relations.101  
QCA is increasingly employed in security studies that attempt to understand complex 
relations. In 2004, Frank Shimmelfenning examined the conditions under which governments 
in Eastern Europe complied with demands of European regional organization, showing that 
credible perspective of EU or NATO accession combined with low political adaptation costs 
                                                 
99 Legewie, Nicolas (September 2013). “An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis with Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA). Forum: Qualitative Social Research (Sozialforschung). Vol. 14, No. 3, Art. 15 
http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1961/3594  
100 Gerring, John. (2012) Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework. Cambridge, 2nd Edition, February 
2012, pp.522. 
101 Legewie, Nicolas (September 2013). “An Introduction to Applied Data Analysis with Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA). Forum: Qualitative Social Research (Sozialforschung). Vol. 14, No. 3, Art. 15 
http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1961/3594 
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were sufficient conditions of compliance.102 In another example, QCA method was used to 
analyze the determinants of highly coherent security strategies. The research established that 
none of the country’s characteristics (size, budgetary efforts, energy dependence, engagement 
in international defense organizations), or public opinion mattered, while political motivations 
were still a salient explanatory factor in early formation of defense policies.103  
Alrik Thiem recently conducted a QCA fuzzy-set analysis and data-driven 
combination effects in his study of the conditions of intergovernmental armaments 
cooperation in Western Europe.104 He identified political and economic sources of variation 
in 15 EU member states and created six theory driven models to explain increasing rate of 
membership in armaments cooperation fora between 1996 and 2006. Intentions to create 
collective defense technological and industrial benefits and the trust in partners’ ability to form 
essential conditions of cooperation were found to be the primary drivers behind this 
phenomenon. Mello’s recent volume recently explored the question of what drives democratic 
participation in wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran, or what causes governments to abstain 
from such wars. Mello found that these contributions are explained by complex interactions 
between parliamentary veto rights, constitutional restrictions, partisanship, public support and 
military power.105  
                                                 
102 Schimmelfenning, Frank (2004) “The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe: a 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” Center for European Studies, Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper 
No. 61, pp.20 http://aei.pitt.edu/9272/1/Schimmelfennig.pdf.  
103 Medina, Ivan and Jose Antonio Pena-Ramos (2013). “General Theoretical Framework for the EU 
Countries’ Defence Strategies,” Paper presented at the 2013 ECPR General Conference in Bourdeaux, France. 
104 Thiem, Alrik (2011): “Conditions of intergovernmental armaments cooperation in Western Europe, 1996-
2006.” European Political Science Review, 3:1, 1-22, European Consortium for Political Research 
105 Mello, Patrick A. (2013) Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict: Military Involvement in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Palgrave MacMillan, Palgrave Studies in International Relations, pp. 280 
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My work is similar to the recent QCA security research in that it also attempts to 
understand the complexity between defense spending cuts and a potentially non-detrimental 
change in military capacity of European states. I evaluate such complexity by assessing 
evidence of defense reform, collective defense collaboration, and buck-passing – all of which 
can lead to non-detrimental changes in military capacity during periods of declining defense 
spending. 
 
V. Main Findings 
Without knowing more about intentionality, an analysis of the relationship between 
defense spending cuts and aggregated military capacity alone would suggest that most periods 
of declining spending are detrimental to military capacity. In 70% of the defense spending cut 
periods, states reduced their net military capacity. However, evidence of increases in at least 
one military capacity indicator reveals potential intentions to pursue non-detrimental changes 
in military capacity, invisible at the level of an aggregated decline.106 Only in 46.6% of the 30 
DSCP’s did the aggregated decline in military capacity result from a decline in both military 
manpower and equipment stock.  
These findings potentially disconfirm Europe as the most likely case in which 
diminishing defense spending and declining military capacity result from strategic 
                                                 
106 Conventionally, studies utilize data that relates only aggregated information on military power (SIPRI, 
COW, World Bank), but rarely combine these with an analysis of lower-level data. However, we cannot 
convincingly discuss actual or future development of states’ military potential in its absence. 
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demilitarization.107 In 53.4% of the 30 DSCP’s, reductions in defense spending entailed 
increases in both or one of the two key capacity indicators. Evidence of such increases 
challenges the conventionally expected detrimental decline in military capacity. In as many as 
30% of the 30 DSCP’s, declining defense spending actually correlated with a net increase in 
military capacity. These findings imply that the intentions with which declining defense 
spending is managed may lead to targeted increases in key military capacity indicators. 
First, I find that defense reform offers most compelling explanation of a non-
detrimental relationship between defense spending and military capacity. Defense reform 
appeared more frequently in DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase in military capacity. I 
also find that almost all defense spending cuts potentially related to defense reform. In 97% 
of the cases, governments made sustained increases in service-level military manpower and 
equipment stock or line-item spending on R&D during the DSCP’s. In 85.7% of the cases, 
DSCP’s were accompanied by sustained increases in line-item spending on R&D alone. These 
findings imply strategic intent to counter rather than to accept the conventionally assumed 
detrimental relationship between defense spending reductions and military capacity.  
Second, I find that defense collaboration presents a less compelling explanation of 
non-detrimental relationship between defense spending cuts and military capacity. Although 
states increased the frequency either of collaborative procurement or collaborative R&T 
spending relative to the 2000-2012 baseline pattern in as many as 47.3% of the 19 DSCP’s 
defense collaboration was 20.5% less frequent in DSCP’s related to increased military capacity 
                                                 
107 Unlike more theoretical works on normative power Europe, I confront the theoretical assumptions with 
data. The findings build a tangible case against claims of European demilitarization and the related assertions of 
emerging post-military culture in the European rendition of Kantian peace. 
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than to its decline. At the same time, sustained service-level increases in manpower and 
equipment or line-item spending on R&D occurred more frequently in those DSCP’s related 
to increased defense collaboration than to those that did not. However, declining defense 
spending does not appear to have successfully translated collective collaboration into 
immediate remedies for military capability shortfalls, with states seemingly increasing their 
collaborative investment in the future development of European military capabilities during 
periods of declining national defense spending. These findings imply that although defense 
collaboration is empirically real, it still appears divorced from robust material improvements 
at the national level.  
Third, I find least compelling support for buck-passing/free-riding as an explanation 
for non-detrimental capacity outcomes during periods of declining defense spending. 
Although declining defense spending appears to have galvanized potential buck-passing 
frequency in 43% of the 30 DSCP’s, the increase in frequency was relatively small: 8% to the 
US and the UK, and 13% to France. Out of the DSCP’s potentially related to buck-passing, 
about 30% less cases related to a net increase in military capacity than to its decline. The 
restrained nature of buck-passing during declining defense spending seems to correlate with 
some non-detrimental military capacity outcomes. As many as 61% of the 13 DSCP’s related 
to buck-passing was accompanied by defense reform-related investment in national militaries, 
and 13% of all DSCP’s co-varied with an aggregated increase in military capacity. These 
findings imply that the choice to continue deployments of military forces abroad even during 
declining defense spending, in spite of limited buck-passing, might have supported continued 
modernization of the national armed forces. 
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In sum, these findings imply that European states – despite declining defense spending 
– managed to continue with military reforms: Europe appears to be an intentionally reforming 
power, not a demilitarizing one. When evaluating multi-causality, I find robust evidence in 
support of defense reform. Defense reform alone appears to explain 44.4% of DSCP’s related 
to an aggregated increase in military capacity. This exceeds the 33.3% of DSCP’s cases in 
which defense reform appears to relate to DSCP’s with an aggregated decline in military 
capacity by 11.1%. In additional 33.3% of the positive cases, decline in defense spending 
correlates with defense reform in tandem with increased buck-passing frequency. In another 
11% of the DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase in military capacity, defense spending 
cuts correlate with defense reform in tandem with increased defense collaboration. These 
findings challenge the expectations that all reductions in military expenditures in Europe are 
detrimental to states’ military capacity. Even states that are cautious about deploying their 
armed forces in military operations and continue to spend less and acquire less military 
equipment, continue to invest in and support – individually or in cooperation with others - 
modernization and transformation of their militaries.  
 
VI. Roadmap  
In the following chapters, I challenge the claims that cuts in defense spending are 
necessarily detrimental to national military capacity of European states. I address and analyze 
conditions under which defense spending cuts in Europe may not have been detrimental to 
military capacity between 2000 and 2012. I do this in the following steps:  
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Chapter 2 empirically challenges the assumption that defense spending decline leads 
to a decline in military capacity. I evaluate the relationship between defense spending cuts and 
military capacity through an aggregated and disaggregated analysis of military capacity. 
Aggregated analysis evaluates evidence of a net increase in military capacity during DSCP’s. 
Disaggregated analyses examine change in the individual indicators of military capacity. Only 
defense spending cuts that reduce both military manpower and equipment stock support the 
conventional wisdom that reductions in defense spending decline military capacity of states. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of three mechanisms under which reductions in 
defense spending can lead to non-detrimental military capacity outcomes: defense reform, 
collective defense collaboration, and buck-passing.  
Chapter 4 examines the defense reform hypothesis. I identify the strongest and the 
weakest periods of defense spending cuts potentially related to defense reform. I conduct case 
studies of two most similar cases with divergent outcomes, and two similar outcomes occuring 
in countries with different security backgrounds. I do this through the examination of three 
country-cases of defense spending cuts: Sweden (2007-2009), Bulgaria (2008-2012) and 
Slovakia (2008-2012). 
Chapter 5 addresses the collective defense collaboration hypothesis. I evaluate whether 
the decline in national defense spending was compensated by pooling and sharing of military 
resources among allied states. I examine whether increased collaborative investment in military 
equpiment procurement and R&T exceed investment on a national level. I conclude the 
chapter by process tracing UK (2007-2009) and France (2008-2012). They present cases of 
two leading European security powers with divergent collective collaboration outcomes. 
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Chapter 6 examines the buck-passing hypothesis. I analyze whether European decline 
in defense spending might have been associated with buck-passing behavior. I investigate 
whether states decreased their defense spending and military deployments abroad as the US, 
France, and UK increased their foreign deployments. I conclude the chapter with process 
tracing of Germany (2004-2006) and Austria (2003-2005) – the former case meeting and the 
latter case not meeting the necessary conditions of the buck-passing hypothesis. 
Chapter 7 concludes the analysis of defense spending cuts by summarizing the 
findings, addressing their theoretical implications, and introducing potential areas for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2: Military Capacity during Declining Defense Spending 
 
 
Conventional IR theories suggest that declining defense spending diminishes military 
potential of states. Defense spending and military capacity are assumed to be directly 
proportional: increasing spending increases military potential while declining spending 
diminishes military potential.  
In this chapter, I examine whether and to what extent the assumption that a decline in 
defense spending declines military capacity holds in contemporary Europe. I explore how 
defense spending cuts relate to aggregated and disaggregated changes in two key indicators of 
military capacity: manpower and equipment stock. This analysis represents the most basic test 
of a potentially detrimental relationship between defense spending reductions and a decline in 
military capacity. Only an aggregated decline that entails cuts in both key indicators of military 
capacity supports claims of a potentially detrimental relationship between DSCP’s and military 
capacity outcomes.  
This chapter proceeds as follows: first, I present IR theories that posit defense 
spending to be directly proportional to military potential. Second, I empirically evaluate these 
claims. I define and operationalize the concept of military capacity as the dependent variable, 
and discuss defense spending cut period as the independent variable. Third, I present findings 
on how cuts in defense spending relate to changes in key indicators of military capacity. I 
identify those defense spending cuts that challenge the assumption that a decline in defense 
spending diminishes military capacity. Last, I process trace the period of Irish defense 
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spending cuts, as the most likely case of a detrimental relationship between defense spending 
and military capacity. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the findings. 
 
I. Military Spending and Military Capacity in International Relations Literature 
In international relations literature, military potential and military power are routinely 
analyzed as a state’s ability to wage war or the ability to pursue military capability.108 Military 
power relates to the government’s ability to mobilize people, money and material resources 
for external security.109 Conventionally, military capacity is conceived as gross numerical 
strength of material resources of state.110 The number of troops and equipment a country has 
play “a pivotal role in war causation, arms racing, alliance formation, conflict duration, crisis 
escalation, or deterrence literature, among others.”111 Simply put, declining defense spending 
typically diminishes national military potential. 
This logic characterizes classical realist assumptions about what constitutes national 
interest in the anarchical structure of international relations and how this state of anarchy 
compels states to pursue wealth and subsequently enhance their military power. Thucydides’s 
The History of Peloponnesian War, Machiavelli’s The Prince, E. H. Carr’s The Twenty Year’s Crisis 
1919-1939 have all essentially argued that states which have experienced significant growth in 
their material resources “relatively soon redefined and expanded their political interests 
abroad, measured by their increases in military spending, initiation of wars, acquisition of 
                                                 
108 Biddle (2004:2) 
109 Barnett (1992:ix)  
110 Biddle (2004:4) 
111 Ibid. 
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territory, posting of soldiers and diplomats, and participation in great-power decision-
making.”112 Paul Kennedy concluded that "there is a very clear connection between an 
individual Great Power's economic rise and fall and its growth and decline as an important 
military power (or world empire)."113 In this tradition, if military power rises with increases 
military spending, the reverse is also true: declining national wealth and military spending and 
resources limit military capacity of states. 
Scholarship on retrenchment also expects declining military expenditures to reduce 
military capacity. States pursue retrenchment policies in response to their acute relative decline 
in power. Retrenchment scholarship expects governments to retract grand strategic 
commitments by cutting overall costs of foreign policy and redistributing resources away from 
peripheral and toward core commitments (Dueck (2006), Huntington (1988), Mastanduno, 
Lake and Ikenberry (1989)).114 Because states reduce their strategic ambitions by redefining 
some areas as less critical, retrenchment often means a linear relationship between declining 
military expenditures and military capabilities of states (Gilpin, (1983)). In support of this 
argument, MacDonald and Parent (2011) have argued that when faced with diminishing 
resources great powers embrace lesser strategic goals.115 They found that “knowing only a 
state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in 
as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.”116  
                                                 
112 Zakaria, Fareed (1999) From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role, Princeton University 
Press, pp. 216 
113 Ibid. 
114 MacDonald and Parent (2011:11)  
115 Ibid., p. 10 
116 Ibid., p.9  
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Emerging research on demilitarization also expects defense spending cuts to correlate 
with declining military capacity. Demilitarization policies rest on the idea that states 
strategically decrease national defense spending as well as their military power (Batcher and 
Willet (1998), Stearns (2013)). Historically, demilitarizing states have reduced their standing 
armies (Nelson, 1991), downsized defense budgets and decreased military spending (Benoit, 
1986; Allan, 1992; Franko, 1994), or pursued disarmament of conventional and nuclear 
weapons (Falk, 1975; Barnaby, 1978; Evangelista, 1983; Forsberg, 1984; Menon, 1987; 
Bernard, 1995; Beard, 1998; Eberle, 1998; Johansen 1991; Abad, 2005).  
 
II. Dependent Variable: Military Capacity 
I build on the established material conceptualization of military potential. Military 
capacity has been typically captured as a quantitative account of a country’s human, physical, 
and technological resources that the national leadership makes available to its military 
organizations.117 Some have measured military capacity both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Scholars have evaluated countries’ military infrastructure components, number and quality of 
combat research institutions, defense industrial base, conversion capability, and threats and 
strategy.118 Respectively, these indicators relate to the states’ ability to support the warfighter, 
indicate the level of professionalization of the armed forces, refer to the quality of military 
instruments available to the country domestically, indicate state’s ability to convert strategic 
                                                 
117 Tellis et.al. in RAND Monograph, Ch.4 (2000: 136), Barnett (1992:ix) 
118 RAND, Monograph Report, MR1110, Chapter 7, pp.138-144. 
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resources to create a modern force capable of conducting effective operations against a wide 
range of adversaries, and link states’ security objectives with military capabilities.119 
I use two quantitative indicators of military capacity: manpower and equipment.120 
First, states’ economic and technological resources were found to carry more weight as 
determinants of military potential than other factors such as political system, social structure 
and culture patterns (Knorr (1970).121 The number of troops and equipment a country has play 
“a pivotal role in war causation, arms racing, alliance formation, conflict duration, crisis 
escalation, or deterrence literature, among others.”122 Manpower indicates the size of the 
military force.123 It provides useful information about the “relative mass of raw power that a 
country could bring to bear in some warfighting situations.”124 Equipment, especially in 
combination with manpower, indicates the “front-end” dimension of military force. It 
illustrates state’s military potential to “defend one’s own national interest as well as to prevent 
others from reaching their own goals.”125 
Second, material conceptualization of military potential has a long and established 
tradition in the IR literature. Many international security scholars have relied on material 
measures of military power and military potential. These measures relate to iron and steel 
                                                 
119 Ibid. 
120 These indicators are not exhaustive. They are merely indicative. Data measuring qualitative aspects of military 
power, e.g. expeditionary vs. territorial military equipment, level and quality of education of military personnel, 
congruence between the rate of modernization of military capabilities and hiring of military personnel would 
increase the accuracy of defense reform analysis. 
121 Knorr (1970:25)  
122 Ibid. 
123 Tellis et. al. (2000:138)  
124 Tellis et. al. (2000:138) 
125 Tellis et. al. (2000:141) 
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production, numbers of troops, defense budget, and population size.126 The Correlates of War 
(COW) Project relies of national material capabilities data and has become a standard way of 
measuring military power in international relations.127 Domestic resources and economic 
strength have also been used as important determinants of military power (Barnett (1992), 
Saull (2001), Zarzecki (2002), Goldman and Eliason (2003), Sechser and Saunders (2010)). In 
this intellectual tradition, contemporary defense policy debates habitually focus on material 
elements of military potential: “most assume that in the information age, superior technology 
wins wars,” and official policy analyses only reinforce this trend.128  
I measure change in military capacity of a state over the period of sustained defense 
spending decline. Data on both equipment and manpower comes from The Military Balance 
publications from 2000 through 2012. The Military Balance entails the most comprehensive and 
streamlined reporting on military assets across NATO and non-NATO European states. 
Manpower numbers consist of national active armed forces,129 which directly relate to the 
country’s military potential for external military action. As reported in The Military Balance, 
manpower is not confounded by the number of paramilitary forces, which more accurately 
measure internal security potential.  
                                                 
126 Horowitz (2010:6)  
127 Ibid., p.7 
128 Biddle (2004:4) 
129 Total armed forces include all servicemen and women on full-time duty including conscripts and long-term 
assignments from the reserves. Paramilitary forces whose training, organization, equipment and control suggest 
they may be used to support or replace regular military forces are not normally included in the country’s armed 
forces totals. Paramilitary forces include home guard units. The Military Balance, 2001, p.5.  
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Military equipment captures annual holdings per country between 2000 and 2012. 
Army equipment refers to main vehicles, weapons and total artillery.130 Naval equipment 
entails the number of submarines, principle surface combatants (carriers, cruisers, destroyers, 
frigates, and corvettes), patrol and coastal combatants, mine countermeasures, amphibious 
equipment and craft, and support and miscellaneous naval equipment.131 Air Force equipment 
consists of combat aircraft, attack helicopters and UAVs as reported per country each year.132  
Military capacity can decrease, increase or remain the same throughout the defense 
spending cut. Measurement of change in military capacity begins with the year in which the 
reduction in defense spending commenced and ends with the year of the last consecutive 
reduction in defense spending. Annual equipment stock (Table 1.A) and manpower force size 
(Table 3.A) are recorded in absolute terms. Biennial change in military equipment (Table 2.A) 
and manpower (Table 4.A) is expressed as percentage change relative to the numbers in the 
year immediately preceding the defense spending cut period. 
I measure change in military capacity through aggregated and disaggregated analyses.  
                                                 
130 This entails main vehicles (main battle tank (MBT), armored personnel carrier (APC), armored infantry 
fighting vehicle (AIFV), assault amphibious vehicle (AAV), exclusive of 'look alike' types), RECCE, total artillery, 
anti-tank missiles and guided weapons (AT MSL and ATGW), rocket launchers (RL), recoilless launchers (RCL, 
i.e. Carl Gustav), attack/assault helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and surface-to-air missile launchers 
(SAM). These categories were included because states most consistently report actual numbers rather than list 
the type of equipment in stock. Countries usually report data within these categories consistently over time, which 
eliminates measurement error related to the change in army equipment during a period of defense spending cut 
within a country case. 
131 These categories are reported consistently as number of craft and vessels within and across countries, 
increasing accuracy of the measured changes in naval military equipment stock. 
132 Air Force equipment totals exclude the number of missiles and flight hours. Missiles are usually reported as 
types rather than as a number of missiles, which does not allow for measurement of changes in actual 
equipment stock. Flight hours are reported as a range (e.g. 80-130 flight hours) and usually do not change from 
year to year. 
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The former relates to the net percentage change in manpower together with equipment 
over the span of a DSCP. The latter means a change in each individual key indicator of military 
capacity: equipment stock and manpower. Change in these two individual variables is 
measured during a DSCP. The difference is divided by equipment or manpower numbers in 
the year immediately preceding the start of the DSCP.  
Aggregated and disaggregated analyses of military capacity are necessary to understand 
whether a decline in military assets may be non-detrimental. Macro-indices of military capacity 
identify important trends in military potential: these challenge conventional assumptions if the 
decline in defense spending relates to an aggregated increase in military capacity. However, 
macro-trends need to be further refined if we want to understand the nature of changes in 
military potential that are not captured in aggregate: “understanding the distribution of 
resources … provides a preliminary view of a country’s understanding of the salience of 
relative threats, its desired structure of combat proficiency, as well as the relative power of 
various military bureaucracies.”133  
 
III. Potential Measurement Errors Related to Military Capacity 
Increases in military capacity are key to this analysis because they challenge 
conventional assumptions. There are two potential problems related to measuring such 
increases: possible lag structure and errors related to the reporting and calculation method. 
Increase in military capacity could result from choices and decisions that governments took 
prior to the period of sustained decline in military spending. Such lag between strategic 
                                                 
133 Tellis et.al. (2000:136).  
  
 
42 
 
decisions and outcomes might raise concerns about confounded estimations of non-
detrimental relationships between declining defense spending and military capacity. However, 
even if lags are present, evidence of increases in military capacity still indicates a potentially 
non-detrimental relationship: the sustained decline in defense spending did not eliminate 
positive developments in military capacity.  
Increases in military capacity are reliable indicators of a potentially non-detrimental 
relationship between defense spending cuts and military capacity even if lags are present. They 
are reliable because governments can delay or cancel investments in military equipment 
procurement or other improvements of the armed forces during a period of declining defense 
expenditures. Delays or cancellations of procurement programs occurred in Austria, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK.134 
Due to austerity measures and declining defense expenditure, Bulgarian government 
downgraded its original contract with EUROCOPER to acquire three instead of six Panther 
helicopters. Declining defense spending has also stalled collaborative projects and acquisitions 
because it heightened political insecurities and increased ambiguities regarding the partner’s 
ability or willingness to invest under budgetary pressures. Absence of declining military 
capacity provides no evidence that preexisting decisions to improve military capacity are being 
reversed. Therefore, increase in military capacity captures a non-detrimental relationship 
between a decline in defense spending and military capacity even in the presence of potential 
lags between strategic decisions and material changes.  
                                                 
134 The Military Balance (2012), p. 76 
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Relatedly, defense spending decline may have an adverse lag effect on military capacity 
after the end of the DSCP. Although this measurement is in itself beyond the scope of my 
inquiry, it raises at least two relevant concerns: 1) the detrimental effect of a DSCP on military 
capacity does not materialize within the DSCP but occurs in the period when the defense 
budget begins to stabilize or even increase, and 2) the detrimental effect of DSCP draws down 
capacity numbers between two DSCP’s so much that it produces a ‘false’ increase in military 
capacity as measured during the second DSCP.  
As regards the first concern, the change in military capacity occurs at a time when 
defense spending no longer declines. Under stabilized or increasing defense spending, 
continued biennial decreases in military capacity might indicate policy choices to increase 
efficiencies. I find that in 23% of the 30 DSCP’s, manpower declined in the years following 
the DSCP and equipment stock declined in the years after a DSCP in 37% of the cases.135 
Stabilization of or increasing defense spending related to 37% of increases (or no change) in 
manpower, and to 23% of increases (or no change) in equipment stock numbers after the end 
of the DSCP. 
Post-DSCP lag potentially presents a bigger concern in the context of those country 
cases that have two subsequent DSCP’s within the 2000-2012 period. The effects of the first 
DSCP could manifest during the second DSCP. There are 7 country cases with two 
                                                 
135 Change in manpower and equipment is calculated as a sum of biennial percent differentials in all the years 
following the DSCP, within the 2000-2012 period. Decline in manpower is not significant (below 10%)with the 
exception of Germany (-11.3%), Italy (-37.1%) and Latvia (-19.9%). In Germany, the decline occurs over six 
years between 2006 and 2012. In Italy and Lithuania, the decline captures a change between 2010 and 2012. 
Decline in equipment in the years after the DSCP is more significant (over 50%), especially in Germany, 
Austria, Sweden and Lithuania. 
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subsequent DSCP’s: Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Austria, Cyprus, Lithuania and Malta. None of 
these cases, with the exception of Austria and Lithuania, suggest that the changes after the end 
of the first DSCP might have skewed the measurements during the second DSCP. None of 
the country cases made significant increases or decreases in military manpower in the years 
between the defense spending cuts. However, in both Austria and Lithuania, the in-between 
DSCP years register significant biennial reductions in military equipment. These reductions 
stop, or become less significant during the period of declining defense spending.  
The concern may be that Lithuania presents a potential problem related to the 
measurement of a ‘false’ increase in military capacity during the second DSCP (Austrian 
military capacity declines during the second DSCP). However, I argue that an increase in 
military capacity during DSCP that follows a period of larger cuts in military capacity prior to 
the DSCP are not ‘false’ as long as states report their manpower and equipment totals 
consistently: the biennial change in military capacity once the DSCP started relates the choice 
of governments to increase or decrease their military capacity relative to the preceding year.  
Relatedly, inconsistent reporting of equipment and manpower numbers over time may 
lead to problems with measurement reliability. Change in military capacity is calculated in 
relation to the manpower and equipment stock numbers in the year immediately preceding the 
start of the defense spending cut period. If manpower or equipment numbers in the year prior 
to the start of the DSCP are themselves outliers (e.g. an unusually small or large numbers), the 
percent change in military capacity indicators could be a function of inconsistent reporting 
rather than a real change in military capacity.  
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To check whether large changes in military capacity present potential errors related to 
inconsistent reporting, I reviewed all aggregated changes in military equipment. I found that 
in all but one case of DSCP (Denmark), equipment differentials larger than 15% related to real 
changes in equipment numbers, not inconsistent reporting. Most of the larger changes in 
equipment resulted from significant changes in main army vehicles, artillery, and RL.136 In all 
the remaining equipment categories, inconsistent reporting almost never occurred during 
DSCP’s. When it did occur during a DSCP, the differences were small enough not to reverse 
the original aggregated military equipment and military capacity outcomes.137  
The one record that is problematic relates to the Danish case, where the change in 
equipment resulted from inconsistent reporting. Denmark did not report its RL numbers in 
2012, amounting to a 4200 drop in total military equipment count in a category that on average 
accounts for 86% of the total equipment stock total. This is not entirely problematic as 
                                                 
136 Italy made real reductions in its main army vehicles between 2004 and 2005. The large decline in Czech military 
equipment resulted from cuts in AT MSL and artillery between 2011 and 2012. Hungary made significant 
reductions in main army vehicles, artillery and ATGW between the years 2004-2005 and in main army vehicles 
and artillery between 2008 and 2009. Sweden significantly increased its main army vehicle and total artillery count 
between 2007 and 2008. Bulgaria reported significant reductions in main army vehicles and artillery between 2009 
and 2011. The aggregated increase in Cyprus’s equipment resulted from a real increase in artillery between 2000 
and 2002, while the decline during the second DSCP resulted from real reductions in RL. In Slovakia, the 
aggregated decline in equipment resulted from cuts in main army vehicles and artillery between 2011 and 2012.  
137 Hungary stopped reporting recce in 2005, but this entailed only 104 recce equipment pieces per year. If we 
assumed consistent recce numbers throughout the DSCP, adjusted aggregated equipment total during DSCP 
would still be -48%, compared to the currently recorded -57%. In terms of the analysis, the outcome remains the 
same. When similar adjustments are made in the 4 other cases of observed inconsistencies in reporting, the 
original outcomes remain unchanged for the purpose of the analysis. Bulgaria stopped reporting recce between 
2011 and 2012, but this inconsistency accounts for less than 1% difference against adjusted numbers. In Slovenia, 
inclusion of recce reporting in 2012 accounts for a 2.1% difference in the military equipment outcome, which is 
not large enough to change the original record of an aggregate decline in equipment. Netherlands omitted RL 
from its reports in 2009, but consistently reported RL’s in the rest of the DSCP. This omission does not change 
the original measurement of an aggregate decline because of the significant real reductions in AT MSL and MBT 
during the DSCP. In case of Spain, the discontinuation of RL reporting in 2011-2012 could mean an 
inconsistency or a real decline in RL. In either case, the adjusted outcome would still mean an aggregated decline 
in military capacity, but only about 1% as opposed to the original 9%. 
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Denmark’s DSCP represents only 3.3% of all DSCP’s, which means that the recorded 
inconsistency falls within an acceptable margin of error. 
Measurement of large but real increases in military capacity results from the equipment 
categories that are part of the analysis. Apart from main military tanks and vehicles, the 
equipment data entails the totals of reported artillery, anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW), 
rocket launchers (RL), recoilless launchers (RCL, i.e. Carl Gustav). On average, main vehicles, 
artillery and RL count relate to some of the larger categories within the military equipment 
totals: 33%, 20% and 20% respectively. A larger shift in these military assets can result in a 
relatively large percent change in aggregate military capacity. These changes capture an actual 
change in military equipment stock within a country over time.  
Data on manpower entails all servicemen and women on full-time duty including 
conscripts and long-term assignments from the reserves. A larger change in aggregated 
measure of manpower could result from larger changes in the number of conscripts, which 
are not disaggregated and therefore ‘invisible’ within the active forces total. However, 
conscripts or reservists on long-term assignments are included in active forces totals only when 
they are on active duty. Therefore, changes in active duty servicemen and women measure a 
real change in active military personnel within a country over time.  
Even large changes in military manpower do not relate to inconsistent reporting. The 
significant increase in Italian manpower resulted from an activation of over 107,000 carabinieri 
between 2009 and 2010. The relatively large decline in Hungarian manpower resulted from 
consistently reported changes in the joint services. Lastly, the relatively large changes in 
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aggregated manpower numbers in Austria, UK, Denmark, Sweden, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Netherlands, Lithuania and Malta result from consistently reported data. 
In principle, both larger and smaller increases in military manpower make sense during 
periods of defense spending cuts. States choose to reduce their manpower numbers as a cost-
saving measure implemented at times of austerity; alternatively, they can counter economic 
decline by boosting the number of active manpower forces. Number of reported active armed 
forces could also reflect country’s expeditionary involvement, where reported manpower 
forces increase with increasing preparedness or actual engagement of forces abroad.  
My measurement of military capacity is not perfect or exhaustive, but it is the closest 
estimate of fundamental patterns that are available. Even large changes in capacity are not 
entirely problematic. A change in military capacity relates only to reported military assets, not 
something else and therefore captures what I intend to measure: change in military capacity. 
Large as well as small increases measure potentially non-detrimental relationships, which are 
further scrutinized by examining presence of the three mechanisms that theoretically explain 
non-detrimental outcomes in military capacity during periods of declining defense spending. 
In addition, process-tracing of select case studies explores in greater detail whether the 
empirical measures are valid, correcting for any potential measurement problems. 
IV. Independent Variable: Defense Spending Cut Period (DSCP) 
A defense spending cut period is a continuous quantitative decline in national defense 
spending over a period of at least three fiscal years.138  The data on national defense 
                                                 
138 A singular cut between two consecutive years is too short of a period to show correlation with intentionality 
of more durable nature, and long-term patterns and trajectories spanning the entire 2000-20012 period would 
mask important intended variations occurring within a shorter time frame. 
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expenditure of the 27 EU member states comes from The Military Balance139 publications 
covering the years 2000 through 2012.  
Military expenditure is based on NATO’s definition and relates to cash outlays of 
central or federal governments to meet the costs of national armed forces. The term ‘armed 
forces’ includes strategic, land, naval, air, command, administration and support forces. It also 
includes other forces if these forces are trained, structured and equipped to support defense 
forces and are realistically deployable. Defense expenditures entail four categories: operating 
costs, procurement and construction, research and development, and other expenditures.140 
Military expenditures are reported in aggregate, not disaggregated by these categories and a 
sustained decline in defense spending is calculated in constant 2012 USD (Table 5.A).141  
Analysis of variation in defense spending cuts examines the assumption that decline in 
defense spending proportionally diminishes military capacity. Small and short cuts in defense 
spending are expected to diminish military capacity to a small extent. Larger and protracted 
cuts anticipate more robust decline in military capacity. National, country-level, variation in 
cut periods consists of: timing (pre-/post-2008), duration (short, medium, and long), and 
relative size (% change). Timing considers the years in which sustained decrease in national 
                                                 
139The Military Balance is a periodical of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) containing up-to-
date figures and information on defence budgets, procurement totals, equipment holdings, and military 
deployments: http://www.iiss.org/publications/military-balance/about-the-military-balance/ 
140 Operating Costs: salaries and pensions for military and civilian personnel, the cost of maintaining and training 
units, service organizations, headquarters and support elements, the cost of servicing and repairing military 
equipment and infrastructure. Procurement and Construction: national equipment and infrastructure spending, 
as well as common infrastructure programs. Research and Development (R&D): defense expenditure up to the 
point at which new equipment can be put in service, regardless of whether new equipment is actually procured. 
Foreign Military Aid contributions are also noted.  
141 Streamlining of the data required adjusting defense spending for inflation by using Consumer Price Index 
(CPI-U). 
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defense spending occurs. Duration means the number of years a cut period lasts. A cut period 
cannot be shorter than two cut events nor longer than eleven cut events in the 2000-2012 
period. Short duration spans 3 fiscal years (FY), medium 4 FY, and long at least 5FY of defense 
spending cuts. The size of the cut measures the dollar decrease during the cut period (minimal, 
small, medium, and large).142  
A defense spending cut period succinctly captures the actual period of a sustained 
decline in national defense expenditures spanning at least three subsequent calendar years, or 
two biennial cut events. While this approach ignores singular year-to-year reductions in 
defense spending, it captures downward patterns sustained over a course of at least three fiscal 
years. Sustained reductions prevent generalizations associated with average trends, which 
either overlook or exaggerate absolute and sustained decline in defense spending.143  
 
V. Findings: Defense Spending Cut Periods 
All 27 states with the exception of Belgium, Luxembourg, Poland and Finland made 
sustained defense spending cuts between 2000 and 2012. The analysis results in 30 national 
                                                 
142 This is expressed as a percentage relative to the prior year. Minimal cuts are greater than 0% but smaller 
than 15.1%, small cuts are greater than 15% but smaller than 25.1%, medium cuts are greater than 25% but 
smaller than 50.1%, and large cuts are greater than 50%. 
143 For example, throughout the first decade of the 2000s average military spending as percent of GDP was on 
decline, individual European countries actually increased their aggregate defense spending in absolute terms 
between the late 1990s and the end of the first decade of the 21st Century. In fact, European governments 
incrementally increased their aggregated military expenditure each year between 2000 and 2006 albeit a sustained 
annual decline in their average spending as % GDP. It was not until 2008, in the wake of the 2008 global financial 
crisis that European governments were spending less and less on defense both in terms of absolute and relative 
numbers (%GDP). 
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defense spending cut periods (Table 6.A).144 About a quarter of the states reduced their 
spending in two cut periods,145 and the second cut usually commenced after 2008.146 
I find that most of the reductions occurred after the 2008 global financial crisis.147 
Eight of the 30 DSCP’s took place before the 2008 global financial crisis and 73.3% of all the 
DSCP’s occurred afterwards. Almost half of the DSCP’s were of short duration, consisting of 
the minimum 2 biennial reductions in national defense spending. Ten of the 30 spending cuts 
entailed 4 subsequent biennial cuts, and 20% of the DSCP’s consisted of 3 subsequent biennial 
cuts in defense spending.  
I find that on average net defense spending declined by 31.9%, which is a medium-
size reduction. Net decline in defense spending represents a percent sum of all the annualized 
cuts within the DSCP. Therefore, even a large net decline in defense spending consists of a 
series of much smaller biennial reductions, typically not exceeding a 20% decline (Table 7.A). 
This number is consistent with published reports on the declining trends within Europe.148 I 
find that some of the larger biennial cuts occurred immediately after the 2008 global financial 
crisis,149 potentially a function of declining economic performance.150  
 
                                                 
144 All cut periods consist only of sequences of biennial cuts in defense expenditure. 
145 Italy, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus, Lithuania, Hungary, and Austria 
146 Germany recorded only one cut period between 2004 and 2006, and experienced two isolated defense 
spending cut events after the year 2008. 
147 A total of eight cut period country cases (26.7%) took place before the year 2008 and twenty-two cases (73.3%) 
occurred in the post-2008 period. one case of defense spending cut period occurring only before 2008 (DE), 7 
cases of cut periods taking place before and after 2008 (IT, PT, MT, CY, LT, HU, AT), and 15 cases of cut periods 
occurring only after 2008 (DK, EE, SE, RO, LV, EL, IT, IE, NL, ES, FR, CZ, SK, SI, BG). 
148 O’Donnell (2012: 29)  
149 This relates to a 19% cut between 2008 and 2009 in France, a 21% cut in Italy (2007-2008), a 20% cut in 
Hungary (2008-2009), a 20% cut in Sweden (2008-2009), a 30% cut in Bulgaria (2008-2009). Over 20% cuts in 
the Baltics between 2008-2010 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), or a 25% cut in Romania (2008-2009).  
150 For example, cuts in Greece (2009-2011), Portugal (2011-2012), Spain (2011-2012), or Cyprus (2010-2011). 
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VI. Findings: Change in Military Capacity during Defense Spending Cut Periods  
Conventional wisdom expects that reductions in spending decline national military 
capacity. Only an aggregated decline in military capacity derived from reductions in both its 
indicators potentially implies a detrimental intent behind the observed reductions. Evidence 
of an aggregated or disaggregated increase in key indicators of military capacity implies 
potentially non-detrimental relationship between defense spending cuts and military capacity. 
I find that 70% of DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline in military capacity. This 
does not, however, necessarily mean that cuts occurred in both military manpower and 
equipment. Only in 46.7% of the 30 DSCP’s did the aggregated decline in military capacity 
result from a decline in both military manpower and equipment stock (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. – Change in Aggregate Military Capacity over Defense Spending Cut Period (DSCP) 
DSCP Country Period % Change 
Equipment 
% Change 
Manpower 
Aggregate 
Change in 
Military 
Capacity 
1 Denmark 2010-2012 -76.6% -29.9%  Decline 
2 France 2008-2012 -13.7% -6.4% Decline 
3 Germany 2004-2006 -2.2% 0.0% Decline 
4 Greece 2008-2011 -3.5% -11.3% Decline 
5 Italy 2004-2006 -17.0% -1.5% Decline 
6 Italy 2007-2010 +2.8% +53.4% Increase 
7 Netherlands 2008-2012 -9.0% -18.1% Decline 
8 Portugal 2002-2004 -6.4% +3.0% Decline 
9 Portugal 2008-2012 -10.1% -0.6% Decline 
10 Spain 2008-2012 -4.8% -4.1% Decline 
11 United Kingdom 2007-2009 +9.1% -16.1% Decline 
12 Czech Republic 2008-2012 -40.1% +10.1% Decline 
13 Hungary 2003-2006 -57.4% -3.3% Decline 
14 Hungary 2008-2012 -61.2% -30.1% Decline 
15 Austria 2003-2005 -8.5% +15.3% Increase 
16 Austria 2007-2010 -6.5% -31.1% Decline 
17 Ireland 2008-2011 -3.6% 0.0% Decline 
18 Sweden 2007-2009 +40% -38.8% Increase 
19 Bulgaria 2008-2012 -58.0% -23.1% Decline 
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20 Cyprus 2000-2002 +21.1% 0.0% Increase 
21 Cyprus 2010-2012 -25.7% +19.4% Decline 
22 Estonia 2008-2010 +15.3% +15.9% Increase 
23 Latvia 2008-2010 +7.1% +0.9% Increase 
24 Lithuania 2003-2005 +0.1% -36.1% Decline 
25 Lithuania 2008-2010 +0.6% +6.4% Increase 
26 Malta 2003-2007 +na 0.0% Increase 
27 Malta 2009-2012 +11.1% -24.8% Decline 
28 Romania 2008-2010 -8.8% -1.2% Decline 
29 Slovakia 2008-2012 -37.4% -7.8% Decline 
30 Slovenia 2008-2012 -17.1% +27.2% Increase 
  
Therefore, most observations challenge the conventionally expected decline in military 
capacity. In 53.3% of the 30 DSCP’s, declining defense spending related to increases in both 
or one of the military capacity indicators. As many as 30% of all cut periods directly challenge 
conventional expectations about how cuts in defense spending relate to military capacity: 
declining defense spending resulted in an aggregated increase in military capacity. In additional 
23.3% of all defense spending cuts, increases one key indicator were obscured by aggregated 
decline in military capacity: the increase in one indicator failed to overcome the decline in the 
other indicator of military capacity (Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2. – Relationship between Military Spending and Military Capacity 
Change in Aggregate Military Capacity: Conventional 
Expectations 
Total 
(30 DSCP) 
Decline (Both Indicators) Confirmed 46.7% 
Decline (One Indicator but not the Other) Disconfirmed 23.3% 
Increase (Both Indicators) Disconfirmed 13.3% 
Increase (One Indicator) Disconfirmed 17.7% 
 
These findings illustrate that DSCP’s potentially affect individual indicators of military 
capacity differently. I find that military capacity outcomes resulted from changes in military 
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equipment stock about twice as often as from changes in manpower. In 66.7% of DSCP’s 
reductions in military equipment related to an aggregated decline in military capacity. In 56% 
of the cases, a rise in equipment stock led to an aggregated increase in military capacity. 
Declining manpower led to an aggregated decline in military capacity in 28.6% of the cut 
periods. This finding compares to 22.2% of DSCP’s in which aggregated increase in military 
capacity was driven by an increase in military manpower (Figure 1.A).  
Furthermore, the analysis of the size of defense spending cuts and change in military 
capacity challenges linear assumptions about direct proportionality. I find that smaller cuts in 
military expenditure can be more damaging to military capacity than larger cuts. Large cuts in 
defense spending (over 50%) increased military capacity about twice as often as did minimal 
spending reductions (below 15%). Small cuts (below 25%) declined aggregated military 
capacity about 16% more frequently than did large spending reductions (Table 3).151  
Although counterintuitive, these relationships are plausible. Deep cuts in aggregate 
defense spending can result from reduced operational expenditures as countries withdraw their 
military forces from operations abroad.152 Reduced spending on operations does not have to 
                                                 
151 Relative the pre-2008 period, the size of cut in defense spending was leveled as a predictor of military capacity 
decline after 2008: all types of cuts resulted in an aggregate decline in military capacity. Cuts larger than 25% 
meant an aggregate military capacity decline about 32% more often than an aggregate increase. However, even 
in the post-2008 period, less defense money sometimes led to military capacity increase: over a quarter of the 
defense spending cut periods related to an aggregate increase in military capacity. 
152 Decrease in operational readiness or conflict drawdown provide potential explanations for these cuts but I 
could not effectively control for them in the empirical portion of the analysis. To my knowledge operational 
expenditures for the 27 European states are either unavailable or limited. NATO source on financial and 
economic data related to NATO defense refers to defense spending categories that do not directly identify 
operational expenditures. These categories relate to percent of defense spending devoted to personnel, 
equipment, infrastructure, and ‘other.’  EDA’s data on national defense expenditures begin reporting on 
‘Operation Costs’ only in 2006, accounting for less than half of the biannual differentials between 2000 and 2012. 
Regarding crisis drawdown, I explore patterns of foreign deployment of military forces in Chapter 6 on buck-
passing. Where possible, issues of operational expenditures and crisis drawdown are addressed in case studies.   
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significantly diminish states’ existing military force structures or equipment stock: when a 
fraction of the savings from diminishing operations is invested in military equipment 
acquisition, aggregated equipment stock can increase despite a large cut in defense spending. 
Large reductions in defense spending related to small changes in military capacity can mean 
that cuts in spending affected other aspects of the defense sector, rather than manpower or 
equipment. For example, primarily under pressure from austerity measures after the 2008 
global financial crisis, Slovakia decided to reduce all non-essential expenditures to prevent 
significant cuts in manpower and essential equipment. 
Table 3. – Size of Spending Cuts and Military Capacity Outcomes 
Size of Defense 
Spending Cuts 
during DSCP 
Aggregate Decline in 
Military Capacity 
Aggregate Increase 
in Military Capacity 
Large Cuts 10.0% 6.7% 
Medium Cuts 33.3% 20.0% 
Small Cuts 13.3% - 
Minimal Cuts 13.3% 3.3% 
Post-2008 DSCP   
Large Cuts 13.6% 4.5% 
Medium Cuts 45.5% 22.7% 
Small Cuts 9.1% - 
Minimal Cuts 4.5% - 
Pre-2008 DSCP   
Large Cuts - 12.5% 
Medium Cuts - 12.5% 
Small Cuts 25.0% - 
Minimal Cuts 37.5% 12.5% 
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VII. Case Selection 
Out of the 46.7% of cases in which defense spending cuts relate to a decline in military 
equipment and manpower, Ireland appears to be a crucial case153 in support of the assumption 
that a decline in military spending is detrimental to military capacity. There are two strategic 
reasons for why the aggregated decline in military capacity is most likely detrimental. First, 
Ireland is strategically neutral and decisions to deploy military personnel abroad are subject to 
a Triple Lock mechanism and UN mandate. Therefore, incentives for military modernization 
in the context of expeditionary operations appear to be relatively weak. Second, Ireland is not 
a NATO member. Therefore, even the small reductions in military capacity make a more 
convincing case of detrimental cuts in military capacity than do for example large reductions 
in central European states. Theoretically, the latter could be a function of defense 
transformation to NATO standards rather than detrimental cuts in military capacity.  
 
VIII. Case Study: Ireland (2008-2011) 
Ireland154 presents empirical evidence of a crucial case with respect to the potentially 
detrimental relationship between defense spending cuts and military capacity. However, to 
understand whether these cuts relate to the strategic intent to diminish Ireland’s military 
capacity – the intent to embark on a process of demilitarization, further evidence is necessary: 
absence of policies related to modernization, enlargement, or maintenane of Irish defence 
                                                 
153 Gerring (2007: 89) 
154 Denmark presents less compelling empirical evidence as it did not consistently report RL stock. This 
resulted in a 4200 drop in total military equipment count in a category that on average accounts for 86% of the 
total equipment stock total. 
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forces,155 or presence of policies that strategically diminish the role of Irish military in the 
global context.  
Military neutrality has defined Ireland’s foreign and security policy since the end of 
World War II. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brian Cowen, made it clear that “Ireland’s policy 
of military neutrality will continue to be relevant in the 21st Century.”156 In the last decade, 
however, its meaning has morphed into “something more ambivalent and pragmatic.”157 
Neutrality has taken a form that permits Ireland to engage militarily under NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace as well as in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Contemporary neutrality also enables Ireland’s military engagement in international 
peacekeeping operations under the UN mandate.158  
Commitment to neturality affects whether and how Irish Permanent Defence Forces 
are deployed. Irish government constrains militatary deployments aboad primarily by defering 
to the Triple Lock principle.159 Triple Lock requires that all overseas military deployments160 
are subject to triple authorization provided by a UN mandate in the form of authorization by 
the Security Council or General Assembly of the UN, formal government deicison and an 
                                                 
155 I look for evidence in various sources: governing parties’ election manifestos, political leadership speeches, 
Defence Department announcements, and strategic security documents such as the White Paper on Defence, 
or Green Paper on Defence. 
156 Jesse (2007:81) 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid., pp.73-74  
159 The legislative basis for overseas deployment of Irish Permanent Defence Forces was originally provided for 
in “the Defence (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1960. The legal provisions were updated in 1993 to permit 
participation in Chapter VII3 missions and again in 2006 to take account of developments in peace support 
including the UN’s increased reliance on regional organizations, such as the EU, NATO and the African Union 
(AU). The requirements of the “triple lock” were formally set out in Ireland’s national declaration associated with 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty,”(see Ireland’s Green Paper, p.9) 
160 Minister of Defence Willie O’Tea confirmed that Irish participation in the EU Battlegroup concept falls 
under the triple lock decision-making mechanism. Ireland has particpated in the Nordic Battlegroup by being 
on standby in 2008 and 2011. 
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approval of Dail Eireann.161 Triple Lock coincides with the Irish preference for ‘comprehensive 
approach’ to international crisis management operations under the EU’s Common Security 
and Defence Policy. Comprehensive approach requires a holistic management of security 
challenges through deployment of wide range of political, diplomatic, economic and military 
instruments162 – where military instruments can be de-emphasized.163  
Neutrality notwithstanding, both governing parties have supported Ireland’s 
continued and improved participation in international crisis-management. Fianna Fail, a 
republican party, has  a legacy of supporting defense modernization. Before 2007, it doubled 
defense spending, implemented an unprecedented and sustained investment program and 
sanctioned continued deployment of Irish troops in some of the most dangerous spots in the 
world.164 In its 2007 general elections manifesto, Fianna Fail highlighted Ireland’s international 
role as a “model UN State, a world leader in rapid humanitarian assistance and conflict 
resolution.”165 It also introduced its vision for the future development of Ireland’s defense. 
The White Paper on Defence 2011-2020 envisioned an  expanded role of Irish Air Corps and 
                                                 
161 “There is no requirement for Dáil approval where, the international United Nations Force is unarmed, where 
the size of the Permanent Defence Force contingent does and will not exceed twelve members, or if the 
contingent is intended to replace in whole or in part or reinforce a contingent of the PDF serving outside of the 
State already serving as part of an International United Nations Force,” (see Ireland’s Green Paper, p.9) 
162 Ireland’s Green Paper on Defence, p.6 Ireland is an avid supporter of the holistic approach under the EU’s 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives and an active supporter of Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) processes uner the EU aegis (e.g. in Liberia, Indonesia and Somalia). 
163 Some have argued that the Irish guidelines for military deployments are “very broad and imprecise, so much 
so that it could be said that all peacekeeping forces established will fall foul of at least one or more of them, and 
they could thus be used to avoid participation in, or even to deny the legitimacy or raison d’être of certain 
operations.” [Murphy, Ray, Submission – Green Paper on Defence, p.6]  
164 “Now, the Next Steps,” Fianna Fail, General Election Manifesto 2007, Defence, p. 14 
165 Ibid., Foreign Affairs, p. 13  
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the Naval Service, ensuring participation of Irish troops in overseas peace support mission 
and increasing investment in defense and continued recruitment in the military.166  
Fianna Fail has not, however, shown strong support for European Security and 
Defense. In its European Election Manifesto (2009) titled “Europe, we are better working 
together,” Fianna Fail emphasized civilian rather than military instruments of crisis-
management. It has supported establishment of the Maritime Analysis and Operations Center 
(M.A.O.C. - N Initiative) in Lisbon, implementation of EU program on economic 
development and good governance in Afghanistan, or the Middle East Peace Process.167 The 
party’s primary concern has been with achieving economic growth and recovery in the EU as 
well as promoting strong social justice. Security concerns related to combating international 
drug trafficking, promoting European enlargement process, as well as supporting EU’s 
cooperation with the UN and the U.S. These security concerns require primarily civilian or 
diplomatic solutions rather than direct military engagement.   
The incumbent Fine Gael (FG) party has been openly pro-European with regard to 
defense matters. Party leadership has been interested in getting Ireland more involved in the 
European-wide common defense policy, “so we can join and influence it on our terms.”168 
Fine Gael has supported Irish participation in EU defence and security operations on the basis 
of a modified Triple Lock principle. It is in FG’s interets to ensure that Irish troops can rapidly 
respond to humanitarian crises – and not necessarily only under the UN mandate.169 The FG 
                                                 
166 Ibid., Defence, p. 15 
167 “Europe, we are better working together,” Fianna Fail, European Election Manifesto 2009 
168 “Let’s Get Ireland Working,” Fine Gael Manifesto 2011, p.31  
169 “Fine Gael Government would ‘end Irish neutrality,’” Irish Echo, February 16, 2011,  
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party has aspired to “broaden the defense industry to supply hardware and IT to police, civil 
aviation, emergency services and the defence sector.”170 This broadening is pursued primarily 
through the framework of the European Security and Innovation Forum (Esrif). 
On the other hand, FG has preferred strict controls on the defense industry. These 
controls primarily pertain to what “can be manufactured and the markets to which it can be 
sold.”171 FG has also been committed to puruing universal nuclear and biological disarmament 
(and a promise never to use either type of a weapon) as well as to securing the right of Ireland 
to opt-in but also to opt-out of aspects of mutual defence and security system on a case-by-
case basis.172 The party also favors prohibiting certain types of weaponry such as cluster 
munitions, depleted uranium weaponry, anti-personnel landmines and nuclear weapons, for 
the use by the Irish Defence Forces.173  
Ireland’s strategic security documents clearly indicate defense reform efforts. Ireland’s 
both White Paper on Defense (2000) and Green Paper (2013)174 prioritize modernization of 
the Irish armed forces. The language in both documents emphasizes revitalization, 
restructuring and development of the Defence Forces, while ensuring effective and efficient 
use of resources. Military restructuring has focused on building light infantry, securing 
sufficient forces and capabilities to make significant contributions abroad. It means building 
                                                 
170 Ibid. 
171 “Let’s Get Ireland Working,” Fine Gael Manifesto 2011, p.31 
172 Ibid.   
173 Ibid. 
174 The Green Paper was published under the tutelage of Fine Gael’s Defense Minister Alan Shatter in July 
2013.  
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more cohesive and better equipped armed forces in the future, and ensures significant 
additional resources for equipment and infrastructure.175  
Ireland has decided that savings from structural reorganization be reinvested back into 
defence. In late 2008, Defense Minister Willie O’Dea indicated that the closure of obsolete 
barracks “will yield savings in administration and personnel costs,” which should “progress 
ongoig modernization process in the Defence Force; their eventual sale should, in the longer 
term, produce substantial resources for the modernization process in the Defence 
organization.”176 Revitalization has also meant investment in personnel qualifications, training 
and readiness, and added emphasis on joint and combined exercises to buttress 
interoperability, procedures and doctrine.177 
Ireland has pursued an active role in UN peace support operations and security 
cooperation to underpin the political, economic and social well-being of the EU. This support 
for active military engagement has included pursuit of a full range of EU policy priorities in 
security and defence.178 Strategic documents establish Ireland as an active contributor to 
European collective security through “proactive engagement in the collective security 
response through the UN, the EU and NATO Partnerhsip for Peace (PfP).”179 At the 50th 
Anniversary of Ireland’s UN Peacekeeping in the summer of 2008, Defense Minister Willie 
O’Dea emphasized that “particpation in overseas peacekeeping missions is a key element of 
                                                 
175 Ireland’s White Paper on Defence, Section 4.3.19 on Defence Forces Organisational Structure  
176 Defence Department (October 2008), Press Release, Statement by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Willlie 
O’Dea TD on Defence Budget 2009  
177 Ireland’s White Paper on Defence, Section 4.6.2 on Training and Development 
178 Ireland’s Green Paper on Dfence, p. 7 
179 Ibid., p.6  
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Ireland’s foreign policy and … an important dimension in meeting Ireland’s international 
obligations as a member of the UN and the EU.”180  
In the summer of 2009, Fianna Fail’s Defense Minister O’Dea, secured Cabinet’s 
approval for the continued the long-term deployment of Irish troops serving in KFOR, 
Kosovo (since August 1999) and in ISAF, Afghanistan (since July 2002).181 About six months 
later, the government decided to maintain Ireland’s presence in the UN mission in Chad 
(MINURCAT),182 and approved deployment of 440 Irish troops for the Uninted Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in December 2010.183 In the summer of 2011, the 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence, Mr. Alan Shatter, TD, “approved the nomination 
of Colonel Michael Beary to the post of Mission Commander for EUTM Somalia, the EU 
mission to train Somlai Security Forces in Uganda.184  
Irish participation in overseas missions has however been met with public critcism: 
deployments do not always coincide with Irish national interest and the reasons for military 
engagement are often not clearly communitcated. Despite government’s official reassurances 
of Ireland’s military neutrality embedded in the Seville Declaration (2002),185 the concerns are 
                                                 
180 Defence Department (June 26, 2008), Press Release, “O’Dea celebrates 50 Years of Ireland’s UN 
Peacekeeping – Statement by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Willie O’Dea TD  
181 Department of Defence (June 2009), Press Release, Troops Remain in Kosovo and Afghanistan – O’Dea  
182 Department of Defence (December 2009), Press Release, “Statement by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Wilie 
O’Dea TD on Defence Budget 2010.  
183 These troops were scheduled to deploy by mid-2011 in cooperation with the Finnish Armed Forces. Defence 
Department (December 2010), Press Release, “Minister Killeen announces Lebanon mission.”  
184 Defence Department (July 2, 2011), Press Release, “Ireland to take on the Role of Mission Commander in 
EU Training Mission Somalia.”  
185 At the Seville European Council in June 2002, the Irish Government made a National Declaration. This 
stated, inter alia, that the Treaty of Nice does not affect Ireland’s policy of military neutrality, and that a 
referendum will be held in Ireland on joining any future common defence. It provides that Ireland reiterates 
that the participation of contingents of the Irish Defence Forces in overseas operations, including those carried 
out under European security and defence policy, requires (a) the authorization of the operation by the Security 
Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, (b) the agreement of the Irish Government and (c) 
  
 
62 
 
whether there could be a  potential conflict of interest for Ireland if  its EU partners, “owing 
to deadlock in the Security Council, decide to operate outside the framework of the UN,”186 
or that “the blank-cheque nature of the mandate for EU military action [will mean that] “we 
have little or no idea of what EU, including Irish, troops are actually likely to get up to.”187  
The problem seems to be that Irish political leadership downplays the risk to Irish 
troops serving in UN mandated peacekeeping missions. The government has been criticized 
that by increasing military deployments (e.g. to Central African Republic under the ageis of 
Article 42.7188 of the Lisbon Treaty), Ireland may not serve its national interest but the colonial 
interests of the bigger EU powers.189 Instead of military particpation, Ireland has other options 
to pursue, more in line with its military neutrality clause: sending the Defence Forces to 
support ongoing border checks in Europe, intelligence sharing, and providing any required 
material or humanitarian aide.”190 Contemporary intra-state conflicts endanger all 
peacekeepers, and “while there is general support from the Irish public for participation in 
                                                 
the approval of Dáil Eireann, in accordance with Irish law. A similar national declaration was associated with 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. [Murphy, Ray “Submission – Green Paper on Defence,” p.12: 
http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/WP_sub106  
186 Ibid., p.15 
187 Storey, Andy (2005). “Informed discussion on Ireland’s role in EU’s military force is vital,” The Irish Times, 
Feb.3: http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/informed-discussion-on-ireland-s-role-in-eu-s-military-force-is-
vital-1.411890 
188 The article 42.7 states that “If member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other 
member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power.” The article 
contains the provision that it “shall not prejudice the special character of the security and defence policy of 
certain member states.” [Article 42.7: An Explainer, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_article_427_an_explainer5019]  
189 McCarrel, Ryan (2015) “Are we willing to risk Irish lives by sending troops to Mali or Lebanon?” The 
Journal (Nov 25th): http://www.thejournal.ie/readme/mali-irish-defence-forces-neutrality-column-2465696-
Nov2015/ 
190 Ibid. 
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such operations, it is not prepared to accept any significant casualties or unnecessary exposure 
to risk.”191 
Despite such public concerns, Ireland has pursued modernization of its military 
capabilites. Current security threats – terrorism, drug smuggling and organized crime are not 
only intelligence-led but admittedly require modernization of military equipment, in 
compliance with NATO capabilty standards.192 A key policy priority for the Permanent 
Defence Forces is to maintain and develop capabilities to “effectively employ and particpate 
in a broad range of multinational peace support and humanitarian relief operations, …and to 
appropriately contribute to regional security missions authorized by the UN.”193 To this end, 
Ireland has invseted in military equipment acquisition. In the 2000-2010 investment program, 
government approved acquisition of a broad range of equipment to increase operational 
capacity throughout the Defence Forces.”194 In July 2010, the Defense Minister Tony Killeen, 
TD, announced Cabinet approval of “the Department of Defence and the Naval Service to 
enter into discussions with UK based ship builder Babcock Marine… to finalize purchase of 
the two new Naval Service Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs).”195 
                                                 
191 Murphy, Ray “Submission – Green Paper on Defence,” p.3 
192 This policy priority strategically aims to safeguard Ireland’s interoperability with sophisticated security 
partners. Ireland’s Green Paper on Defence, pp.7-8 
193 Ireland’s Green Paper on Defence, p. 13 
194 Ireland’s White Book on Defence, Section 4.9.5 on Equipment. Further details can be found in the Long-
Term Defensive Equipment Plan for the decade 1999-2009. 
195 “A vessel replacement strategy for the Naval Service has been in progress since 2007 when Government 
approval to proceed with a tender competition was granted. In 2009 Babcock Marine, was selected for the 
purchase of two Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) with an option on a third. Following some discussions with 
Babcock the cost of the two OPVs was set at just under €100m. This price was agreed in principle last summer 
and was based on the execution of a contract at that time and with delivery of the vessels in 2011 and 2012. 
Agreement has now been reached between the Minister of Finance, Mr. Brian Lenihan, TD and Minister Killeen 
in the context of the 2011 Estimates for the funding arrangements for the vessel replacement programme. The 
proposed contract will provide for delivery of two OPVs, one in 2014 and the other 2015 with payment extending 
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The 2008 global financial crisis diminished but did not eliminate modernziation plans. 
Irish government prioritized resources for the front-line operational capability even “within 
the reduced resource envelope,”196 and equipment platforms were expected to depreciate in 
the normal manner. However declining defence expenditure presented serious funding 
constraints for some aspects of equipment procurement and modernization.197 Defence 
Minister Tony Killeen confirmed further reductions in the Defense Department alone (106m 
Euro between 2010-2014). Reductions of this scale significantly challenged the ability of the 
Irish Defence Forces to deliver effective services across all of the roles assigned by the 
Government.198 More importantly, though, the Defence Minister also emphasized that defense 
spending cuts will not deter from the government’s intention to “seek to maintain the 
capability of the defence forces to the highest standard during this difficult period.”199  
Austerity also seemingly prompted Ireland to increase its participation in European 
collective defense collaboration. At the strategic level, the problem of shrinking defense 
resources was to be solved by advancing multinational cooperation within the EU, or “pooling 
and sharing of equipment platforms, joint development partnerships with industry and new 
modes of procurement.”200  
The analysis implies that Ireland’s reduction in national defense expenditures between 
2008 and 2011 did not stem from strategies detrimental to the development of Ireland’s 
                                                 
out to 2017.” Defence Department (July 2010), Press Releases, “Minister Killeen announces Government 
approval to finalize negotiations for the purchase of Two New Naval Service Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs).  
196 Ireland’s Green Paper on Defence, p. 8 
197 Ibid. 
198 Department of Defence, Press Releases, “Four-year plan provides a blueprint for growth” – Minister 
Killeen 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ireland’s Green Paper on Defence, p. 8 
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military capacity. Despite evidence and strategic culture that imply a detrimental relationship 
between defense spending cuts and military capacity outcomes, Ireland modernized and 
maitained deployability of its military forces as well as interoperability with NATO countries. 
Ireland modernized in spite of the economic downturn of 2007-2009. Reductions in military 
resources were not associated with strategic renouncing of an active role for the Irish defence 
forces despite Ireland’s neutrality and Triple Lock principles.  
 
IX. Discussion of the Findings 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine evidence in the context of the 
conventional IR expectations that cuts in defense spending always reduce military capacity. 
The pattern of decline in military capacity potentially indicates the nature of strategic 
intentions. Potentially detrimental intentions require evidence of a decline in military 
manpower as well as equipment during a DSCP. Potentially non-detrimental intentions require 
evidence of an aggregated increase or an increase in one of the key indicators despite an 
aggregated decline in military capacity.  
I find that in most cases, evidence challenges the assumption that declining defense 
spending declines military capacity. In 46.7% of the 30 cases DSCP’s, cuts in defense spending 
diminished both military manpower and equipment. However, 53.3% of the cases challenge 
the structural realist IR claim or the theory of retrenchment according to which reductions in 
defense spending decline military capacity. In 23.3% of the cases, a net reduction in military 
capacity did not occur in both manpower and equipment. In addition, in 30% of the cases, 
decline in defense spending related to an aggregated increase in military capacity.  
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By implication, these findings challenge normative claims about the transformation of 
Europe into a ‘soft power’: there is no sweeping evidence of a broad decline in military capacity 
and military spending. By implication, factors such as strategic intentions might be reversing 
the declining trends. The Irish case study also reveals that even the most compelling case of a 
potentially detrimental decline in military capacity entailed the intent to improve and 
modernize Irish armed forces. Ireland’s modernization and defense reform policies intended 
to improve, not degrade its national military potential. Evidence of such continued military 
modernization contradicts the soft power assumption about the growing and strategic 
irrelevance of military instruments of Europe. 
Furthermore, this preliminary analysis suggests that strategic choices and intentions 
matter to military capacity outcomes: increases in military capacity during periods of declining 
defense spending could relate to qualitative improvements, such as reorganization, 
reinvestment or transformation of the existing military resources and structures. Such strategic 
and policy choices can potentially sustain or improve military potential of states even at times 
of declining defense spending.  
Although scholars have not yet explicitly theorized how cuts in defense spending affect 
specific aspects of military potential, this analysis establishes that under declining expenditures, 
changes in military capacity are primarily determined by fluctuation in equipment stock, not 
manpower. Regardless of when and why defense spending cuts occurred, the outcomes in 
military capacity resulted from changes in military equipment stock about twice as often as 
they were caused by military manpower. This might mean that the post-Cold War dismantling 
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of standing armies is a mostly concluded process in Europe, in so far as changes in manpower 
in most cases no longer exceed the size of changes in military equipment.  
The analysis also confirms the theoretical expectation that reductions in defense 
spending in austere times diminish aggregated military capacity of states more often than in 
absence of exogenous financial shocks. In times of austerity, governments reduced their 
defense spending more frequently and the reductions were on average 15% deeper. Military 
capacity declined more frequently after than before 2008 reductions in defense spending: on 
average, military equipment decreased by 11.8% and military manpower by 2.2% more after 
than before 2008.  
Despite these reductions, the findings indicate a potential upper limit to the size of 
defense spending cuts regardless of why and how they occur. As many as 83.3% of the 30 
sustained spending reductions201 meant a cut smaller than 50% of defense spending levels prior 
to the beginning of the cut period. Even in the context of austere environment emerging after 
the 2008 global financial crisis, about 66% of defense spending cuts were of medium size and 
none of the cuts exceeded 60% in the 2000-2012 period. In theory, this makes sense in so far 
as it indicates a limit on defense decline to ensure basic functioning of national armed forces 
and furnish them with the ability to execute their defense responsibilities and provide security 
for their citizens.  
                                                 
201 Most defense spending cuts between 2000 and 2012 were either medium in size (between 25% and 50%) or 
entailed some of the least profound reductions, smaller than 25% of the defense spending levels in the year 
immediately preceding the cut period. As many as 30% of the cut periods constituted the least profound 
reductions in spending and additional 37% of cuts meant reductions of medium size over a medium or longer 
period. Duration and size of defense spending cuts were not positively and linearly related: longest execution of 
cuts did not mean the deepest nor the slightest reductions in spending. 
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Chapter 3: Non-Detrimental Relationships between Defense Spending Cuts and 
Military Capacity 
 
Increases in key indicators of military capacity during DSCP’s challenge conventional 
theories predicting a detrimental effect of spending reductions on national military potential. 
The analysis in Chapter 2 demonstrates that 30% of cuts in defense spending related to an 
aggregated increase and 23.3% entailed an increase in one key indicator of military capacity 
despite its aggregated decline. Because these findings contradict conventional wisdom they 
demand further investigation into what explains the inverse relationship between declining 
defense spending and increases in material indicators of military capacity.  
In this chapter, I build on the existing literature to generate hypotheses about 
mechanisms that relate defense spending cuts to non-detrimental military capacity outcomes. 
I review three mechanisms. These mechanisms are defense reform, increased defense 
collaboration within alliances, and buck-passing of military engagements abroad. 
I argue that spending cuts that enhance military capacity through defense reform are 
non-detrimental when they entail reinvestment of savings, modernization and targeted 
procurement of military equipment, or increased investment in military research and 
development (R&D). Reductions in defense spending accompanied by increased collective 
collaboration can increase national military capacity through pooling and sharing of existing 
resources between allies. Reductions in defense spending of buck-passing states can result 
from diminished operational expenditures alongside continued investment in military 
capabilities. 
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I. Defense Reform  
Defense reform is “a coordinated series of actions designed to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of a state’s armed forces,”202 to “respond to perceived threats.”203 Defense 
reform policies aim to maintain or enhance state’s military posture.204 The intended outcome 
of reforms is an increase in military capability or effectiveness as an “objective improvement 
in the defense forces’ ability to field and support its armed forces.”205  Sometimes, defense 
reform is not accompanied by cost reductions.206 Often, however, reforms maximize 
capabilities and military effectiveness at minimal cost. Emerging research even understands 
declining defense spending as a necessary condition of defense reform: “To maximize power 
and capabilities in the long term, reformers minimize cost and sacrifice capability and flexibility 
in the short to medium term.”207  
                                                 
202 DCAF Backgrounder. Defence Reform. 10/2009, p. 1 
203 NATO “Tackling Challenges on Defence Reform” 
http://www.nato.int/docu/defence_reform/defense_reform-e.pdf 
204 Defense reform is: “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through 
new combination of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit [a] nation’s advantages and 
protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain [the nation’s] strategic position… .” Farrell, Terriff and 
Osinga (2010:3).  
205 Young, Thomas-Durell (2006). “Measuring Defense Reform: A Proposed Methodology to Measure Efforts 
to Achieve the Objectives of PAP-DIB.” The Quarterly Journal, Spring-Summer, p. 82 
206 Increasing costs related to defense reform effort may occur when governments prioritize military innovation 
to improve troop readiness to conduct operations and combat emerging security threats, transformation to a 
higher military standard, or the demand to rapidly upgrade existing weapons systems. [For further details, please 
see: SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE COMPLETES MARKUP OF THE NATIONAL 
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017. Lanham: Federal Information & News 
Dispatch, Inc, 2016. ProQuest. Web. 22 June 2016; Bugriy, Maksym. (2016) "Ukraine's New Concept Paper on 
Security and Defense Reform." Ukrainian Weekly: 3. May 01 2016. ProQuest. Web. 22 June; “THE 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION HOLDS A DISCUSSION ON NEW DEMANDS ON THE MILITARY 
AND THE 2017 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT." Political Transcript Wire, May 20 2016. 
ProQuest. Web. 22 June 2016.] In the absence of budget pressures, military transformations often relate to 
Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs). RMAs are a “discontinuous increase in military capability and 
effectiveness arising from simultaneous and mutually supportive change in technology, systems, operational 
methods, and military organizations.” [Steven Metz and James Kievit, “Strategy and the Revolution in Military 
Affairs: from theory to policy,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 27, 1995, p. v.]  
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Defense reform can therefore relate to cost-reductions, savings and elimination of 
redundancies. Lower military expenditures related to reform result from “a coordinated208 
series of actions designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of a state’s armed 
forces.”209 NATO defense reform guidance specifies that such initiatives must increase the 
readiness of the armed forces, incorporated into training materials and military education 
systems, and produce fiscal savings for further reinvestment in defense capabilities.210 
Reforms associated with declining defense spending inherently involve economic and 
political tradeoffs, usually in favor of investing in advanced technologies at the cost of base 
closures, military downsizing, and force reductions.211 Under these conditions, reform can 
maximize capabilities and military effectiveness while minimizing cost.212 In practice, reform 
has meant consolidation - streamlining organizations to remove redundancy and maximize 
synergy; competition – application of market mechanisms to improve quality, reduction of 
                                                 
208 Coordinated actions include 1) strategic threat assessment, 2) review of the roles of the armed forces and 
civilian institutions (either through institutionalized or ad hoc defense review process), 3) a planned 
reorganization of the defense sector or the relationship between the defense and other sectors, 4) implementation 
of action plans or reforms (NATO “Tackling Challenges on Defence Reform”). Reforms can be material, 
ideational, and organizational in nature. Material elements can include weapons systems, logistics and defense 
infrastructure, force size and structure, or efforts to adopt advanced technologies (defense transformation). They 
can also be in military doctrine, rules of engagement and operating procedures, management and budgeting 
practices, personnel policies such as recruitment, training and professionalization. Reform of relationships 
between organizations relates to jointness, interoperability with allies, and contractual relationship with private 
or commercial sectors (Schilde and Wieluns, “European Defense Budget Cuts: Undercutting European Power 
and Military Capabilities?”, ISA Conference, February 2015, pp.19-20).   
209 DCAF Backgrounder. Defence Reform. 10/2009, p. 1.   
210 Young, Thomas-Durell, “Measuring Defense Reform: A Proposed Methodology to Measure Efforts to 
Achieve the Objectives of PAP-DIB.”  The Quarterly Journal, Spring-Summer 2006, p. 83. 
211 NATO “Tackling Challenges of Defence Reform” 
http://www.nato.int/docu/defence_reform/defence_reform-e.pdf 
212 Reforms can affect broad changes in the defense apparatus. They can mean changes in the material size and 
structures of the military, or changes in military doctrine or organizational structures and inter-organizational 
relations. 
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costs and improving response to customer needs; and elimination – reduction of excess 
support structures to free-up resources and focus on core competencies.213  
Modernization under budgetary pressure is possible if accompanied by reorganization 
of spending at the line-item level in support of acquisition of military technology, equipment 
and capabilities necessary for expeditionary operations. Transformation toward expeditionary 
capabilities aims at building more modern, light, and agile structures and capabilities necessary 
for expeditionary missions.214 This transformation inherently involves economic and political 
tradeoffs, usually in favor of investing in advanced technologies at the cost of base closures, 
military downsizing, and force reductions.215 O’Hanlon (2013) argues that despite declining 
military expenditure and sequestration plans, the U.S. could conceivably maintain its grand 
strategy and basic military policy of international presence, deterrence and engagement if it 
creates additional savings through further cuts in weapons, forces and compensation levels 
and administrative reforms and reinvest these into equipment upgrades.216 
Modernization can mean buying cheaper and more effective military equipment. The 
use of drones over the last decade has been bolstered by the prospect of savings in defense 
expenditures. Firstly, new drone technology diminishes expenses related to saving pilots’ lives: 
“military personnel, especially pilots, are expensive to train and are not fungible assets in the 
                                                 
213 Cohen, W. S. (1997). Defense reform initiative report. Department of Defense Washington DC., p. iii. 
214 Adrian Hyde-Price (2006:230)  
215 Through the NATO PfP, state management of reform externalities has been supplemented by alliance 
resources, as well, such as a NATO reconversion project in Similti, Bulgaria, where the closure of an infantry 
base resulted in a 70% unemployment rate. (See NATO “Tackling Challenges of Defence Reform” 
http://www.nato.int/docu/defence_reform/defence_reform-e.pdf) In the US in the 1990s, the acceleration of 
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), transforming US force structure towards more advanced technology, 
was partially funded by force reductions and base closures, but also by reductions to major procurement 
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way they were in earlier wars.”217 Drones keep pilots thousands of miles away from the plane 
and therefore safe from harm and by extension protect human investment. Secondly, at $5 
million each, Predator drones are “cheaper than aircraft and much cheaper than F-16s, B-1s, 
Warthogs, or the Joint Strike Fighter, which are now estimated to cost over $150 million per 
plane.”218  
Modernization under budgetary pressure can happen through recapitalization of 
savings (Steber (2006), Shrout (2006)). At the 2002 Prague Summit, despite the declining 
military expenditures NATO member states committed to transform their military capabilities 
as well as their approach to military operations to improve preparedness for the new and 
largely asymmetric threats. These efforts have centered on exploiting new information 
technologies in combination with new concepts for ‘networked organizations’219 and ‘effects-
based operations’ (EBO),220 or transitioning militaries to achieve operational preparedness for 
counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations.221  
 Moreover, it is possible for states to improve their military capabilities under declining 
budges if they continue to invest in military R&D. This non-linear dynamic is achieved through 
                                                 
217 Evangelista and Shue (2014:195). 
218 Ibid. 
219 This could mean network-enabled capacity (NEC), an innovation that originated in the USA. It is a notion 
that a ‘system of system,’ connecting sensors, information processing centers, and shooters operating as one 
network across the whole of the battlespace, will replace platform-centric warfare conducted by large, self-
contained military units. The Europeans prefer the term ‘network-enabled capability’ (NEC), with ‘enabled’ 
intentionally replacing ‘centric’; this indicates the more modest expectations (and more modest resources) of the 
Europeans in terms of transformative effect of networking on military organization. In Farrell, Terriff and Osinga 
(2010:5).  
220 In its original formulation, EBO was about reconsidering how operational effects could be most efficiently 
produced through air strikes, placing preference on disabling rather than destroying targets. In the 1990s, 
however, EBO was redefined more broadly in terms of focusing military operations on the campaign objective 
– that is, strategic effect. In Farrell, Terriff and Osinga (2010:6) 
221 In Farrell, Terriff and Osinga (2010:2) 
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targeted readjustment of defense spending where less is spent on obsolete technology and 
more on equipment modernization, research and development (R&D). Middleton, Bowns, 
Hartley and Reid (2006) evaluated the relationship between defense R&D and equipment 
capability in 10 nations from 1971 to 2005. They determined that these countries “’got what 
they paid for,’ with their R&D expenditure positively correlated with equipment capability.”222 
This finding aligns with UK’s policy findings that most R&D supports assessment and 
demonstration phases of the equipment acquisition cycle and enables through-life technology 
insertion. Increased investment in R&D thus provides the armed forces with vital military 
edge, underpinning competitiveness and innovation of defense industries.223 Increased R&D 
investment was also found to enhance state’s military capability to fight terrorism, advancing 
technological means for intelligence, a key aspect of war against terrorism (Trajtenberg 
(2004)).224  
Defense reform of procurement can also reduce military expenditures. Procurement 
reform often means “putting controls in place to reduce ‘waste, fraud, and abuse’ (both real 
and perceived) in transactions with contractors.”225 Alternatively, it aspires to make the 
acquisition process more ‘responsive, effective and efficient’ or ‘faster, better, and cheaper.’226 
Acquisition reform initiatives in the U.S. in the 1990s streamlined the procurement process, 
administratively reduced required review procedures, and opened-up to greater use of 
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commercial practices as well as to cooperation with the private sector.227 Towards the end of 
the 1990s it was evident that “even a modest acquisition reform effort serves to rationalize 
spending and ensure greater accountability, flexibility and agility.228  
Procurement reform has also resulted in licensing standardization within the EU. Such 
standardization has aimed to “substantially reduce administrative burdens for intra-EU cross-
border transactions” as well as to “facilitate and simplify the creation of cross-border supply 
chain.” 229 These steps, together with greater cross-national integration of common acquisition 
systems, are expected to save time and money, and enhance technical interoperability at a 
lower cost.230 
Defense reform can also mean savings due to improved budgeting and personnel 
management procedures. Friedman and Preble (2010) argue that savings can be obtained from 
reductions in “administrative overhead and intelligence spending, cuts in military construction 
costs, cancellations of several weapons systems, and reformed provision of military pay and 
benefits.”231 A U.S. case study from 2013 expected that a series of steps to achieve more 
efficient personnel management and budgeting practices (e.g. modernization of the military 
retirement plan, curtailment of the pool of health care beneficiaries, or pegging the pay to 
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specialization in high-demand areas) will save between $155 and $300 billion in over 10 
years.232  
 Reform of military organizations can also improve military potential despite reduced 
military expenditures. Military doctrine translates resources into power. While all states may 
have similar degrees of access to the technology that can be purchased with military spending, 
military effectiveness and power have more to do with the softer organizational side of 
innovation in adopting and training forces.233 Absorbing new equipment into outdated 
doctrine and failing to modernize military forces and their organization has been found to 
have a detrimental effect on military power.234 
Under defense reform, decline in defense spending can improve military capacity. Such 
improvements occur when states save military expenditures by increasing efficiencies or 
reducing waste, and in turn reinvest savings or reshuffle their spending to support 
modernization of the armed forces. Reform can improve military capacity if it leads to 
financially manageable upgrades or acquisition of relatively cheap but efficient equipment, 
increasing the quality of military capacity. I therefore probe the hypothetical explanation that 
defense spending cuts are not detrimental to military capacity when they relate to defense 
reform.  
Mechanism 1: Spending Cuts Are Not Detrimental to Military Capacity if Related to Defense Reform 
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II. Collective Defense Cooperation within Alliances 
Cooperation within security alliances has reduced military costs incurred by the allied 
states. At the very core, alliances reduce cost of having access to military capabilities without 
necessarily demanding increased spending to acquire them. The cost-saving235 idea rests on the 
capability aggregation model, in which alliances serve as substitutes236 for internal sources of 
power (Kaplan (1957), Morgenthau (1973), Walt (1987), and Waltz (1979)). Cost-saving 
rationale of alliances has been explained by cooperative game theories. These rest on the logic 
that alliances decrease transaction costs, or the cost of collective product, services or activity 
of cooperating states (Young, 1994).237 Alternatively, scholars applying a resource-based view 
of the firm to strategic alliance formation determine that states can conserve their resources 
                                                 
235 Sometimes, however, alliance cooperation has been associated with increased military expenditures. Mancur 
Olson (1971 (1965)] offered the first theoretical explanation for the allies’ varying contributions to collective 
security. In The Logic of Collective Action, he explained why groups providing a public good will experience ‘a 
surprising tendency for the ‘exploitation of the great by the small.’” [Oneal, John R. and Paul F. Diehl (June 
1994), “Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests,” Political Research 
Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 373-396, pp.373-374]. A number of subsequent studies found that NATO 
members’ defense burdens increased with state’s economic size (van Ypersele de Strihou (1967, Pryor (1969), 
and Beer (1972), Oneal and Diehl (1994)). Others determined that free-riding in alliances is not a function only 
of small countries. Smaller and medium size states were found to free-ride in military alliances: while a vast 
majority of smaller NATO allies were found to be free-riders between 1956 and 1988, “relatively larger of the 
smaller states [did] not free-ride any less than the relatively even smaller alliance members.” [Sandler, Todd and 
Keith Hartley (2001).  “Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action.” Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 39, No.3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 869-896, pp.871-872]. However, Russett (1970) demonstrated that the 
explanatory power of the theory of collective action declined over time. Subsequent studies in fact demonstrated 
that the association between defense burden and GDP was not statistically significant in any year after 1968 in 
NATO members (Sandler and Forbes (1980), Oneal and Elrod (1989)), [Oneal and Diehl (1994), pp. 375]. 
236 However, sometimes alliances do not serve as substitutes for internal sources of power. Reduction in free-
riding within alliances has been attributed to the need to project credibility of extended deterrence [Oneal and 
Diehl (1994: 391). Recently, Turkey, a NATO member, has announced its decision to pursue self-sufficiency in 
defense. Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik said that “reducing dependence on foreign arms is a key goal of the 
Turkish defense industry.” [Bekdil, Burak Ege (June 21, 2016) “Turkey Launches 3rd Corvette, Vous Self-
Sufficiency in Defense,” Defense News Online:   
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and reduce their costs through closer cooperation and creation of strategic partnerships to 
overcome existing disadvantages. 
In the transaction cost approach to alliance formation, underlying cooperative 
strategies are driven by economic motivation to reduce costs (Hennart (1988, 1991), Pisano 
and Teece (1989), Shan (1990), Williamson (1991)).238 The primary reason for pursuing 
cooperation within strategic alliances is to gain a comparative advantage. In this context, 
alliances are formed because they offer “significant advantages for [actors] that are lacking in 
particular competencies or resources to secure through links with others possessing 
complementary skills or assets; it may also offer… opportunities for mutual synergy and 
learning.”239  
To explain how cooperation leads to cost-cutting measures, some scholars developed 
a resource-based view of the firm and established a resource-based theory of strategic alliances. 
The key premise rests on the value-creation potential of resources that are pooled together.240 
The model predicts that cooperation conserves resources and shares the cost of risks (e.g. 
Hamel et al. 1989, Ohmae 1989), signals legitimacy (Baum and Oliver (1991)), offers 
opportunities for gaining new competencies (Hagedoorn (1993(, Hamel et al. (1989), Hennart 
(1991)), or simply enhances power (Hagedoorn (1993)).  Das and Tang (2000) found that 
greatest value and savings are expected when inter-partner resources are supplementary or 
complementary, but not wasteful.241 Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) used the resource-
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view model to expand on the traditional theory, arguing that strategic alliances form when 
“firms are in a vulnerable strategic position.”242  
Literature on military alliances has recognized that the optimal functioning of alliances 
leads to mutual economic gains through comparative advantage. Mutual gains come from 
economic specialization of defense industries among allied states (Hitch & McKean, 1960). 
Economic specialization commits states to collectively fund those weapons and forces that 
provide pure public goods.243 Whether specialization actually occurs depends on mutual 
gains.244 Mutual economic gains arise from collaboration in producing costly high-technology 
weapons, or costly transport and manufacturing of large quantities of relatively cheap 
weapons, or economies of scale through cooperative defense industrial policies (Hitch & 
McKean (1960), Hartley, (2006)).  Efficient defense industrial policies have led to gains from 
trade, scale and learning, reducing duplication of costly R&D, or from competition.245 
Cost analysis of cooperation dynamics within NATO has demonstrated that members 
of an alliance take advantage of economies of scope and “lower cost per linkage assigned to 
each activity.”246 Similarly, investigation of the effect of cost advantage on allied states’ 
spending behavior determined that allied states would reap only benefits – such as cost-sharing 
savings – if it were to expand to include new entrants (Sandler and Hartley, 2001).247  
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Military capacity of states can improve even under declining defense spending if 
countries cooperate. Actors seek strategic partners in alliances to gain competitive advantage 
and access to desired military capabilities: “Valued competencies and resources are often 
available only from a partner or from sharing their development with a partner. Alliances 
enable firms to gain access to partners’ advanced technology or to share the high cost of 
developing new capabilities through research and development (R&D).”248  
This claim aligns with the argument that in the absence of common imminent threat 
(like the one NATO members faced during the Cold War), sustaining military alliances in the 
21st century requires a degree of convergence of economic, political and security interests and 
activities among the allied nations (Brattberg and Varga (2012)). Defense cooperation leads to 
power projection and preserves military capabilities as countries share and pool materials and 
equipment, build joint facilities, and cooperate in industrial and technological spheres (Jones 
(2011)). 
Collective cooperation can put off a military crisis arising out of declining military 
expenditures for a generation or more.249 Pooled capabilities reverse the rising ratio of 
overhead costs to capability affects as nations reduce their front-line forces, avoid duplications 
and increase coordination. Cooperation with allies implies improved military capability at a 
lower cost: the number of people needed decreases, cost of manpower support decreases, and 
further savings result from outsourcing of larger contracts.250 Pooling of military forces reduce 
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unit prices, leaving governments both “challenged and assisted by peer pressure and by the 
difficulty of escaping from binding international organizations.”251 
This overview demonstrates that states can generate more defense capability for less 
money if they pool their resources and increase their collective collaboration. By combining 
their resources and sharing their joint products, programs or services, countries achieve 
comparative advantages at a lower cost. Increased collective collaboration can coincide with 
national defense reform, in which governments intentionally reduce the total size of their 
military manpower and jettison outdated military equipment, making resources available to 
finance collaborative projects. This can lead to a decline in national military capacity in 
aggregate, but simultaneously an increase in collective investment in R&D. I therefore probe 
the hypothesis that defense spending cuts are not detrimental to European military capacity if 
they are associated with pooling and sharing of states’ resources at a collective EU level. 
Mechanism 2: Spending Cuts Are Not Detrimental to Military Capacity when States Collaborate 
 
III. Buck-Passing in Alliances  
Buck-passing can also explain non-detrimental outcomes in military capacity under 
declining military spending. Realists explain buck-passing as states’ free-riding on the balancing 
efforts of other states.252 Defense realists view buck-passing as an attractive policy choice for 
those states that are relatively secure, have powerful allies capable of containing foreseeable 
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threats and are geographically and technologically less vulnerable to immediate invasion.253 
Offensive realists argue that states choose to buck-pass in the presence of a wealthy ally willing 
to pay the costs of containing a threat.254 Others see buck-passing possibility in the presence 
of a credible ally.255  
I use buck-passing as a term that relates to the states’ choice to “adopt strategies that 
transfer the costs of containing a threat onto others.”256 It is a ‘waiting’ strategy of those states 
that understand their military capabilities to be limited,257 or act as ‘defensive positionalists’ 
rather than power maximizers, while seeking to maintain their position within the system.258 
States may choose to abstain from aggressively maximizing power because they may not be 
strong enough to do so, lack the opportunity due to their geographical location, or fear 
provoking a hostile counter-balancing coalition or pre-emptive strike on the part of the rival.259 
The threat typically means a rise of a hegemon and buck-passing a shifting of burden 
of war to others.260 Buck-passing strategies may lead to diminished defense expenditures if 
                                                 
253 Lind (2004: 104). Also see Mearsheimer (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Snyder (1990) “Chain 
Gangs and Passed Bucks”; Robert Jervis (1978) “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma“; and Van Evera 
(1998) “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War.”  
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Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle. 
255 See Press (2005) Calculating Credibility: How leaders assess military threats.  
256 “Both offensive and defensive realists note that buck-passing is the most common in multi-polar system. 
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states choose to pass the buck “because they expect their relative position to be strengthened 
by standing aloof from the mutual bloodletting of the other powers.”261  Waltz has described 
some European states during World War II as buck-passers: “As the German threat grew, 
some British and French leaders could hope that if their countries remained aloof, Russia and 
Germany would balance each other off or fight to the finish.”262 Barry Posen has argued that 
the defensive military postures adopted by both France and Britain in the context of the 
German threat were “designed to pass the cost of fighting Germany to other allies.”263 Buck-
passing implied Japan’s decline in defense spending and military posture in general in the 1950s 
through the 1970s, when Japan did not face a Soviet threat. The U.S. was found pursuing a 
buck-passing strategy vis-à-vis Europe until the early 1960s, in hope of providing an impulse 
for European countries to become an independent pole of power, capable of balancing the 
Soviet Union largely without the assistance of the United States.264 As a consequence, U.S. 
withdrew some military troops, reducing its military presence in the European theater and with 
it also the need of additional defense expenditures. 
In the contemporary European security context, I understand ‘threat’ it terms of 
instability that states decide to address through out-of-area military missions, or international 
crisis-management operations. Recently, scholars have argued that because Europeans benefit 
from the US security hegemony and find themselves militarily weaker, they leave it up to 
(buck-pass) the US to deal with “hard” security threats. This relative weakness vis-à-vis the 
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US motivates European civilian over military power as a way to “soft” balance the US,265 or 
to let the US deal with global security while Europe can “focus on trade and economic 
issues.”266  
In this context, buck-passing relates to a rational choice of a state to abstain or 
withdraw from actual military action, transferring the cost of containing threats to other states. 
Buck-passing thus relates to free-riding within alliances when states make independent 
decisions to withdraw from military deployments agreed to by the alliance, effectively placing 
the burden of crisis-management on others. Free-riding states spend less as they shirk on 
preparations for potential military action and buck-passing states spend less because they 
abstain from actual participation in military operations (Snyder, 2007).267 Scholars of economic 
theory of alliances found that alliance members share spending burdens disproportionately 
(Olson 1965, Olson and Zeckhauser 1966).268 This means that alliance dynamics leads to cuts 
in defense spending in some countries, but prompts other governments to increase their 
defense expenditures.269   
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Relinquishing of balancing responsibilities can mean declining military expenditures. 
Balancing is often costly and may in fact undermine national long-term security through 
depletion of state’s manpower and wealth.270 Joining a coalition of states in an effective military 
alliance typically requires converting economic wealth into military power. To be able to 
contribute to an alliance, a state “must be able to defend itself as well as offer additional forces 
to assist its prospective allies.”271 This logic signals continued investment in military capacity, 
even if an allied state buck-passes on foreign deployments.  
Reductions in overseas deployments related to buck-passing strategies can reduce 
aggregate defense spending. However, if buck-passing countries continue to modernize, invest 
in their military equipment and in the preparedness of their personnel, the cuts in defense 
spending do not have to be detrimental to military capacity. I therefore probe the possibility 
that defense spending cuts are not detrimental to military capacity if spending reductions stem 
from reduced operational engagement abroad, not reduced investment in national military and 
defense. 
Mechanism 3: Spending Cuts Are Not Detrimental to Military Capacity when States Buck-Pass 
 
  
                                                 
Theory of Alliances: A Survey,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 446-483, p. 447] This means that 
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Chapter 4: Defense Reform 
 
Evidence presented in Chapter 2 suggests that defense spending cuts do not always 
decrease military capacity. In 30% of all cases, cuts in defense spending related to increases in 
national military manpower and military equipment stock. Such increases imply that countries 
attempt to improve their military potential even when their aggregate defense spending and 
military capacity decline.  
The inverse relationship between a decline in defense spending and increase in military 
capacity is possible when governments implement defense reform policies. States can keep 
certain military capabilities or improve elements of national military potential even under 
budgetary pressure. In practice, states have implemented reforms by cutting some programs 
but simultaneously reinvesting in others, or by cutting some defense spending line-items (such 
as Operation and Maintenance) in favor of other line-items (such as RD&E and 
procurement).272 
In this chapter, I probe whether cuts in defense spending are non-detrimental to 
military capacity because they relate to defense reform. I do so by examining evidence of the 
necessary conditions of potential defense reform mechanism. First, I evaluate whether DSCP’s 
were accompanied by increases in service-level military manpower and military equipment as 
                                                 
272 Eaglen, Mackenzie(2011). “Taking a Scalpel to the Defense Budget.” The Heritage Foundation. For example, 
the US defense reform in the 1990s initially cut Procurement as a way to accelerate RMA. [Cordesman, Anthony 
(1998). “Trends in US Defense Spending, Procurement, and Readiness: The Growing Gap Between Strategy, 
Force Plans, and Resources,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. 30.] And investing in RDT&E 
and Procurement while reducing waste and excess capacity in operations, maintenance, and personnel was part 
of the explicit strategy behind US defense transformation efforts in the late 1990s. [Neal (2006: 87)].  
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well as line-item spending on R&D. I identify sustained and non-sustained increases in these 
variables during DSCP’s. When DSCP’s relate to an aggregated decline in military capacity 
only sustained service-level increases in military equipment, manpower, or line-item increases 
in R&D spending indicate potential defense reform.  
Second, I evaluate strong and weak cases of potential defense reform. This evaluation 
requires an aggregated analysis of service-level and line-item increases across all three 
indicators of potential defense reform. Strong cases of reform entail increases that are fully 
sustained through the DSCP. Weak cases mean increases that are only partially sustained or 
not sustained during a DSCP and may entail any one of the three indicators of defense reform.  
Third, I evaluate how DSCP’s associated with specific types of defense reform relate 
to changes in military capacity. I expect to see evidence of potential defense reform in all 
DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase in military capacity. I then compare these findings 
with evidence of potential defense reform in the 21 DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline 
in military capacity. Greater evidence of defense reform in the former DSCP’s supports the 
defense reform hypothesis.  
Last, I process-trace three cases of potential defense reform: Sweden (2007-2009), 
Bulgaria (2008-2012), and Slovakia (2008-2012). Sweden and Bulgaria present the most 
dissimilar cases of the same type of potential defense reform. Bulgaria and Slovakia present 
the most similar cases with opposite defense reform outcomes. 
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I. Measuring Defense Reform   
Defense reform policies can translate declining defense spending to non-detrimental 
military capacity outcomes. I use three indicators to evaluate potential presence of the defense 
reform mechanism during a DSCP: service-level data on military manpower and military 
equipment and line-item data on military R&D spending. Service-level data on military 
manpower273 and military equipment stock274 comes from The Military Balance publications and 
relates to three service branches of the national Armed Forces: Army, Navy and Air Force. 
Line-item data on R&D spending involves NATO data on the percent of national defense 
expenditure spent on R&D.275 Increases in these indicators model potentially non-detrimental 
changes in the military potential of states.  
Evidence of any service-level or line-item increase during a DSCP sufficiently indicates 
potential defense reform only in those DSCP’s that relate to an aggregated increase in military 
                                                 
273 Service-level data on military manpower and military equipment comes from The Military Balance publications 
from 2000 to 2012. Manpower data includes all servicemen and women on full-time duty including conscripts 
and long-term assignments from the reserves. Paramilitary forces whose training, organization, equipment and 
control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces are not normally included in the 
totals. [Source: The Military Balance 2001, 101:1, 4-11, p.5] 
274 The information on military equipment comes from The Military Balance. In case of Army it entails annual total 
of the following military equipment: main vehicles (main battle tank (MBT), armoured personnel carrier (APC), 
armoured infantry fighting vehicle (AIFV), assault amphibious vehicle (AAV), exclusive of 'look alike' types), 
RECCE, total artillery, anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW), rocket launchers (RL), recoilless launchers (RCL, i.e. 
Carl Gustav), attack/assault helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and surface-to-air missile launchers 
(SAM). Naval totals include: subs, principle surface combatants (carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes), 
patrol and coastal combatants, mine countermeasures (countermeasures and/or warfare), amphibious 
(equipment and/or craft), support and miscellaneous. Information on Air Force equipment consists of combat 
aircraft, attack helicopters and UAVs. 
275 The line-item data on R&D covers only NATO EU member states in the period from 2000 to 2012. The 
figures come from NATO’s information on national defense expenditures by category, where each category 
represents the percent share of the annual national defense expenditure. I track two categories that contain 
spending devoted to R&D: equipment and ‘other.’ Equipment category entails % of defense expenditure spent 
on major equipment and R&D devoted to major equipment. The category of ‘other’ includes spending on 
operations and maintenance expenditures, other R&D expenditures and other expenditures not included 
elsewhere. [source: NATO Information on Defence expenditures 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm]  
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capacity. In such cases, a net increase in capacity during a DSCP in itself signals potential 
improvement of the armed forces. Improvements may be achieved by a reshuffle of resources, 
reorganization of force structures or procurement of additional equipment to improve the 
armed forces.  
However, evidence of any increase in service-level manpower, equipment or line-item 
spending on R&D is not sufficient in the DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline in military 
capacity. To avoid potential confounders related to random and isolated service-level or line-
item increases in the three indicators of potential defense reform, it is necessary that these 
increases are sustained.276 Only sustained increases capture the nature of reforms, which 
typically take more than one calendar year to implement and may affect improvements in 
different aspects of the armed forces. Examining data for evidence of sustained increases 
evaluates defense reform as a process, affecting increases in different indicators at different 
times.277  
Evidence of sustained increases requires disaggregated and aggregated analyses of 
biennial changes in the indicators of defense reform. Disaggregated analysis evaluates 
                                                 
276 The problem (specific to NATO data collection) is that these increases involve spending devoted to R&D but 
also to other items, such as expenditure on major military equipment and operations and maintenance. Although 
the data on R&D is conflated with other spending categories, a rise in the percent of defense expenditure devoted 
to major equipment supports the defense reform hypothesis. Increase in expenditure on major equipment at 
times of defense spending cuts suggests potential modernization. Rise in expenditures associated with operations 
and maintenance during defense spending cut periods also suggest targeted support of those areas that are aimed 
at maintaining the functioning of the military. If this does not provide clear evidence in support of potential 
defense reform, it does not contradict it. Qualitative analysis will determine whether these periods of potential 
defense reform are indeed intended or not. Discounting these periods would prematurely eliminate potential 
cases of defense reform. 
277 For example, during a period of sustained defense spending cut between 2008 and 2011 we might see a growth 
in military equipment stock between 2008 and 2009, followed only by increase in R&D spending between 2009 
and 2010, followed by combined growth in both R&D and equipment between 2010 and 2011. This leads to 
fully sustained increases despite the lack of such evidence per individual defense reform indicator.   
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sustained increases in each of the three indicators of defense reform. Sustained increases mean 
at least two subsequent biennial increases in military equipment, manpower, or R&D 
investment.278 Increases can be sustained throughout the DSCP fully or partially. Fully 
sustained (SF) increases cover the entire DSCP. Partially sustained (SP) increases fall short of 
covering the entire DSCP. Partially sustained increases are also more frequent than a singular 
increase event in DSCP’s that span at least 4 years, or entail single biennial increase in DSCP’s 
that span 3 years.279  
Aggregated analysis examines increases in service-level manpower and equipment, and 
line-item R&D in aggregate. It evaluates not only whether increases are sustained throughout 
the DSCP, but also whether they are sustained across the three indicators of potential defense 
reform. An aggregated truth table summarizes annualized patterns of change across the three 
variables, within each DSCP. This table reveals the scope of increases: their duration280 within 
the DSCP and overlap281 across the three indicators of defense reform.  
In sum, aggregated analysis differentiates between strong and weak cases of defense 
reform. Strong cases require evidence of increases that are in aggregate sustained fully through 
                                                 
278 Evidence of a sustained increase is determined by Boolean logic. I code biennial increases as ‘1’ and other 
observations as ‘0’, and summarize findings in truth tables. I use this method for each of the three indicators of 
military capacity. 
279 Non-sustained increases entail evidence of one biennial increase during DSCP’s spanning at least 4 years, or 
entail more than one biennial increase in no direct succession. No evidence of increases between any subsequent 
calendar years during DSCP indicates their absence (A). 
280 Duration of increases can be sustained through a DSCP fully or partially, or be sporadic. Fully sustained 
increases cover the entire defense spending cut period, partial increases cover the cut period only partially: they 
fall short of covering the entire DSCP but at minimum entail a sequence of two biennial increases within a DSCP. 
Sporadic increases indicate increases that do not occur in immediate succession during the defense spending cut 
period. 
281 Overlap between the indicators of military capacity can be broad, partial and singular. Broad overlap means 
increases in all line-item and service level indicators of military capacity. Partial overlap indicates increases only 
in two indicators. Increases that occur only in one line-item or service level indicator of defense reform indicate 
no overlap. 
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the DSCP. Fully sustained increases can entail increases in all 3 indicators (broad defense 
reform), 2 indicators (dual defense reform), or only in one indicator of defense reform 
(singular defense reform).  
Weak cases of defense reform rest on evidence of increases that are not fully sustained 
during a DSCP, but consist of more than an isolated biennial increase event. When increases 
are partially sustained through a DSCP, potential defense reform can be dispersed (across 3 
indicators), targeted dually (involving 2 indicators), or targeted singularly (involving 1 
indicator). When increases are not sustained through a DSCP, they mean haphazard defense 
reform, whether they entail increases in one, two or all three indicators of defense reform. No 
evidence of increases means potential absence of defense reform (Table 4).  
 
Table 4. - Types of Potential Defense Reform 
Aggregate Analysis of Defense Reform 
Indicators 
Spatial Coverage of Lower-Level Increases Across Defense 
Reform Indicators 
Temporal Coverage of DSCP’s Three Indicators Two Indicators One Indicator 
Sustained Fully Broad Dual Singular 
Sustained Partially Dispersed  Targeted Dually Targeted Singularly 
Not Sustained Haphazard 
Absent Absent 
 
To validate the defense reform hypothesis, however, further evidence is necessary. 
Reduced defense spending is not detrimental to military capacity if – in addition to empirical 
data - there is evidence that governments endorsed defense reform policies. These entail 
evidence of modernization, transitioning to expeditionary forces, or targeted procurement of 
new military equipment. In the follow-on case study, I evaluate foreign and security policy 
documents, legislative acts, political party election manifestos, or political statements. 
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II. Sustained Service-Level and Line-Item Increases during DSCP’s 
In this section, I evaluate whether DSCP’s are accompanied by sustained increases in 
service-level equipment and manpower or line-item spending on R&D. This disaggregated 
analysis is the first step in evaluating whether cuts in defense spending may be non-detrimental 
to military capacity because they relate to defense reform. Sustained increases – especially 
under an aggregated decline in military capacity – imply potential presence of defense reform.  
To examine service-level increases, I recorded biennial changes in military manpower 
and equipment at the level of the Army, Navy and the Air Force.282 I assigned value of ‘1’ to a 
biennial increase, and value of ‘0’ to the remaining observations. Next, I combined service-
level observations within a ‘summary truth table’ for equipment (Table 14.A) and manpower 
(Table 15.A). In these truth tables, service-level increases can range from 1 to 3, indicating the 
number of services in which the service-level increase in military capacity indicators occurred. 
No evidence of service-level increase is assigned zero value (Table 16.A).283   
To evaluate line-item increases in R&D spending, I recorded all biennial changes in 
line-item R&D spending during each DSCP. Line-item increase in R&D in one of these 
categories is coded 1, increase in both R&D categories is coded 2 (Table 17.A). A decline or 
no change in R&D spending is coded 0. Service-level and line-item patterns are summarized 
per indicator of potential defense reform in Table 5.    
 
                                                 
282Service-level data on military equipment stock and military manpower numbers are available in the Appendix: 
Army Equipment Stock (Table 8.A), Naval Equipment Stock (Table 9.A), Air Force Equipment (Table 10.A), 
Army Manpower (Table 11.A), Naval Manpower (Table 12.A), Air Force Manpower (Table 13.A). 
283 This includes those observations for which data was unavailable, or instances in which states do not have 
Naval or Air Force services. 
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Table 5. – Service-Level or Line-Item Increases during DSCP’s 
No.  
 
Country Period Aggregated 
Military 
Capacity 
Outcome 
Assessment of Increases during DSCP’s 
Line-Item 
R&D 
Spending 
Service-
Level 
Equipment 
Stock 
Service-
Level 
Manpower 
1 Denmark 2010-2012  Decreased SF A A 
2 France 2008-2012 Decreased SF SF NS 
3 Germany 2004-2006 Decreased SF SF A 
4 Greece 2008-2011 Decreased SF SF A 
5 Italy 2004-2006 Decreased SP SP A 
6 Italy 2007-2010 Increased NS SP NS 
7 Netherlands 2008-2012 Decreased NS SP SP 
8 Portugal 2002-2004 Decreased SF A SP 
9 Portugal 2008-2012 Decreased SP SP SP 
10 Spain 2008-2012 Decreased SP NS SP 
11 United Kingdom 2007-2009 Decreased SP SF A 
12 Czech Republic 2008-2012 Decreased SF NS NS 
13 Hungary 2003-2006 Decreased SF NS NS 
14 Hungary 2008-2012 Decreased SP NS NS 
15 Austria 2003-2005 Increased - SF SP 
16 Austria 2007-2010 Decreased - SP NS 
17 Ireland 2008-2011 Decreased - A A 
18 Sweden 2007-2009 Increased - SF A 
19 Bulgaria 2008-2012 Decreased SP SP NS 
20 Cyprus 2000-2002 Increased - SF A 
21 Cyprus 2010-2012 Decreased - A SP 
22 Estonia 2008-2010 Increased SF SF SP 
23 Latvia 2008-2010 Increased SF SF SP 
24 Lithuania 2003-2005 Decreased SP SP SP 
25 Lithuania 2008-2010 Increased SP SF SP 
26 Malta 2003-2007 Increased - NS NS 
27 Malta 2009-2012 Decreased - NS A 
28 Romania 2008-2010 Decreased SP A SF 
29 Slovakia 2008-2012 Decreased NS NS NS 
30 Slovenia 2008-2012 Increased SP SP NS 
Note: SF = sustained fully; SP = sustained partially; NS = not sustained; A = absent 
I find that sustained increases in the three indicators of defense reform occur 
frequently. In 53.3% of the 90 observations,284 decline in defense spending was accompanied 
by sustained increases in service-level military manpower, equipment, or line-item spending 
                                                 
284 The 90 observations summarize the 30 line-item summary patterns in R&D spending, 30 service-level 
summary patterns in manpower and 30 service-level summary patterns in equipment stock during DSCP’s. 
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on R&D. Out of these 90 observations, decline in defense spending correlated with fully 
sustained increases in 22.2% of the cases and by partially sustained increases in 31.1% of the 
cases. In 22.2% of the 90 observations, declining defense spending correlated with service-
level or line-item increases that were not sustained through DSCP’s. In 15.6% of the 
observations, defense spending cuts were not accompanied by any service-level or line-item 
increases (Figure 1). 
 
 
Furthermore, I find that sustained increases associated with potential defense reform 
were more present in those DSCP’s that relate to an aggregated increase in military capacity 
than in those related to an aggregated decline. When military capacity increased in aggregate, 
decline in defense spending was accompanied by sustained service or line-item increases in 
59.3% of the cases. In 29.6% of the cases, the increases were sustained fully and in 29.6% of 
the cases they were sustained partially throughout the DSCP’s.285 These reductions in defense 
                                                 
285 In Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, decline in defense spending was accompanied by a 
sustained increase in all key indicators (in case of Austria the sustained increases related only to military equipment 
and manpower, as data on R&D spending is unavailable in the NATO source). In Italy, Sweden and Cyprus, 
Figure 1. - Service-Level and Line-Item Increases during DSCP's 
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spending were most frequently (88.9%) accompanied by service-level increases in equipment 
stock and less frequently (44.4%) by service-level increases in manpower or line-item spending 
on R&D.  
When defense spending cut periods correlated with an aggregated decrease in military 
capacity, most DSCP’s (51%) also related to sustained service or line-item increases: 19% were 
sustained fully and 31.7% were sustained partially throughout the DSCP’s (Table 6).286 Even 
when states experienced a net decline in defense spending and military capacity, most of the 
time (71.4%) they continued to increase their investment in R&D in a sustained manner. 
Sustained increases in service-level equipment occurred 47.6% of the time and sustained 
increases in service-level manpower occurred 33.3% of the time (Table 19.A). 
 
Table 6.- Type of Service-Level and Line-Item Increases during DSCP's 
Service-Level or Line-
Item Level Increases 
during DSCP’s 
Aggregated Military Capacity 
Decreased 
Aggregated Military Capacity 
Increased 
Total 
Observations 
Total observations 63   27   90 
Sustained Fully 12 19.0% 8 29.6% 22.2% 
Sustained Partially 20 31.7% 8 29.6% 31.1% 
Not Sustained 15 23.8% 5 18.5% 22.2% 
Absent 12 19.0% 2 7.4% 15.6% 
n/a 4 6.3% 4 14.8% 8.9% 
 
I find that states sustained increases in line-item spending on R&D and equipment 
most frequently. In 63.3% of the 30 DSCP’s, cuts in defense spending correlated with fully 
(30%) or partially (33.3%) sustained increases in R&D. In 60% of the 30 DSCP’s, declining 
                                                 
increases were sustained only in one of the key indicators, and in Malta (3.3%), the decline in defense spending 
correlated with non-sustained increases in military equipment and manpower. In 18.5% of the cases, the decline 
in defense spending related to non-sustained increases and in 7.4% to no service-level or line-item increases. 
286 I find that in 23.8% of the 63 observations, the decline in defense spending was accompanied by increases 
that were not sustained throughout the DSCP’s. In 19% of the observations, the cut in defense spending was 
not accompanied by service-level or line-item increases. 
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defense spending related to fully (33.3%) and partially (26.7%) sustained service-level increases 
in equipment stock. Service-level increases in manpower were sustained through DSCP’s in 
36.6% of the cases, but were fully sustained only in 3.3% of the 30 DSCP’s (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
In sum, sustained investment especially in R&D or acquisition of additional military 
equipment287 during DSCP’s indicates potential investment in military capacity of states, not 
its deterioration. There is evidence that such increases accompany DSCP’s in all but four 
country cases of DSCP’s: Ireland (2008-2011), Cyprus (2010-2012), Malta (2009-2012) and 
Slovakia (2008-2012). In these four cases, an aggregated decline in military capacity during a 
DSCP was not supported by sustained increases either in R&D spending or service-level 
                                                 
287 I find that in 27% cases, decline in defense spending is accompanied only by increases in military equipment 
stock. In additional 20% of the cases, decline in defense spending is accompanied by increases in both equipment 
stock and R&D spending. In another 20% of the cases, cuts in defense spending relate only to increases in R&D 
investment. Cuts in defense spending are only occasionally accompanied by increases in manpower, or by 
simultaneous increases in all three indicators (Figure 2.A). 
Figure 2. - Service-Level and Line-Item Increases during DSCP's by Indicator 
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
sustained not sustained absent n/a
R&D Spending Equipment Stock Manpower
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equipment stock.288 These cases potentially align with the mainstream assumption that 
declining defense spending is detrimental to military capacity. 
These findings imply greater evidence of defense in those DSCP’s that relate to an 
aggregated increase in military capacity. However, DSCP’s in 76% of the 21 cases related to 
an aggregated decline in military capacity also seem non-detrimental because of the potential 
presence of defense reform mechanism.  
 
III. Strong and Weak Cases of Potential Defense Reform  
 In order to account for the possibility that defense reform is a staggered process, 
effecting change in different indicators at different times, I next analyze data in aggregate. An 
aggregate analysis evaluates whether increases occurred in all three indicators of defense 
reform and whether they were sustained throughout a DSCP. This means evaluating service-
level of line-item increases occurring across the three indicators throughout the defense 
spending cut period.289 Aggregated analysis leads to distinguishing between strong and weak 
cases of potential defense reform.  
I proceeded by evaluating service-level and line-item increases across the three 
indicators by producing an aggregated truth table. This truth table summarizes biennial 
changes across the three individual summary truth tables on line-item R&D, service-level 
                                                 
288 Although service-level increases in military equipment and military manpower were not sustained in case of 
Malta’s DSCP, they do not indicate lack of potential defense reform because a decline in defense spending was 
accompanied by an aggregated increase in military capacity. 
289 Strongest defense reform cases mean a fully sustained effort to improve military capacity over time and across 
all indicators. Strong cases of potential defense reform relate to broad, dual, and singular increases occurring at a 
service-level or line-item level during DSCP’s. Weak cases of potential defense reform entail evidence of 
dispersed, targeted (dually or singularly), or haphazard service-level or line-item increases. 
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manpower, and service-level equipment stock (Table 18.A).  I use the same definition of 
sustained increase in the aggregated analysis as I did for the analysis of individual indicators. 
Findings are summarized in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. -  Aggregated Analysis of Service-Level and Line-Item Increases during DSCP’s 
No.  
DSCP 
 
Country  DSCP Aggregated 
Military 
Capacity 
Outcomes 
during 
DSCP 
Aggregated 
Service-
Level and 
Line-Item 
Increases 
during 
DSCP 
Aggregated 
Service-
Level and 
Line-Item 
Increases 
Across the 3 
Variables 
Type of 
Potential 
Defense 
Reform 
1 Denmark 2010-2012 Decreased SF 1 Singular 
2 France 2008-2012 Decreased SF 3 Broad 
3 Germany 2004-2006 Decreased SF 2 Dual 
4 Greece 2008-2011 Decreased SF 2 Dual 
5 Italy 2004-2006 Decreased SF 2 Dual 
6 Italy 2007-2010 Increased SF 3 Broad 
7 Netherlands 2008-2012 Decreased SF 3 Broad 
8 Portugal 2002-2004 Decreased SF 2 Dual 
9 Portugal 2008-2012 Decreased SF 3 Broad 
10 Spain 2008-2012 Decreased SF 3 Broad 
11 United Kingdom 2007-2009 Decreased SF 2 Dual 
12 Czech Republic 2008-2012 Decreased SF 3 Broad 
13 Hungary 2003-2006 Decreased SF 3 Broad 
14 Hungary 2008-2012 Decreased SP 3 Dispersed 
15 Austria 2003-2005 Increased SF 2 Dual 
16 Austria 2007-2010 Decreased SF 2 Dual 
17 Ireland 2008-2011 Decreased A 0 Absent 
18 Sweden 2007-2009 Increased SF 1 Singular 
19 Bulgaria 2008-2012 Decreased SF 2 Dual 
20 Cyprus 2000-2002 Increased SF 1 Singular 
21 Cyprus 2010-2012 Decreased NS 1 Haphazard 
22 Estonia 2008-2010 Increased SF 3 Broad 
23 Latvia 2008-2010 Increased SF 3 Broad 
24 Lithuania 2003-2005 Decreased SF 3 Broad 
25 Lithuania 2008-2010 Increased SF 3 Broad 
26 Malta 2003-2007 Increased NS 2 Haphazard 
27 Malta 2009-2012 Decreased NS 1 Haphazard 
28 Romania 2008-2010 Decreased SF 2 Dual 
29 Slovakia 2008-2012 Decreased NS 3 Haphazard 
30 Slovenia 2008-2012 Increased SF 3 Broad 
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 I find that 80% of DSCP’s relate to potentially strong cases and only 16.6% to weak 
cases of defense reform. Potential defense reform is broad in 40% of the cases, involving fully 
sustained increases throughout the DSCP and across all three indicators. Dual defense reform 
occurred in 30% of the cases, in which increases were sustained throughout the entire DSCP 
but occurred only in two indicators. Singular defense reform occurred in 10% of the cases, 
entailing fully sustained increases throughout the DSCP only in one indicator. About 16% of 
defense spending cuts relate to evidence of potentially weak defense reform: 3.3% indicating 
dispersed defense reform and 13.3% haphazard defense reform.  Only the case of Ireland 
(3.3%) suggests possible evidence of no defense reform (Table 8).  
 
Table 8. – Strong and Weak Cases of Potential Defense Reform 
Potential Defense 
Reform 
Broad Dual Singular Dispersed Haphazard 
40% 30% 10% 3.3% 13.3% 
Strong Cases Pre-2008 HU, 
LT, Post-2008 
IT, EE, LV, 
FR, NL, PT, 
ES, CZ 
Pre-2008 AT, 
DE, IT, PT, 
Post-2008 
EL, UK, AT, 
BG, RO 
Pre-2008 CY, 
Post-2008 SE, 
DK 
  
Weak Cases    Post-2008 HU Pre-2008 MT, 
Post-2008 CY, 
MT, SK 
Not a Case Post-2008 IE 
 
IV. Types of Defense Reform and Aggregated Military Capacity Outcomes 
The aggregated analysis strongly supports the conclusion that most sustained 
reductions in military spending were potentially related to defense reforms, intending to 
improve military capacity: 80% of DSCP’s relate to strong cases of potential defense reform. 
In these cases, countries sustained service-level and line-item increases in key indicators of 
defense reform throughout the entire DSCP.  
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More specifically, I find that the 9 DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase in military 
capacity entail greater evidence of defense reform mechanism than do the 21 DSCP’s related 
to an aggregated decline in military capacity. All former DSCP’s entail evidence of some degree 
of increases, with 89% of the cases potentially related to strong defense reform. Those DSCP’s 
that relate to an aggregated increase in military capacity entail strong cases of potential defense 
reform 13% more often than do the other 21 DSCP’s. The former also relate to potentially 
weak defense reform 8% less often than the latter DSCP’s (Figure 3).   
However, the findings also imply that defense reform mechanism possibly mediates a 
non-detrimental relationship in many (76%) DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline in 
military capacity. These findings further support the argument that declining defense spending 
may not detrimental to military capacity when cuts are mediated through defense reform. 
 
Figure 3. – Comparison of Potential Defense Reform during Detrimental and Non-Detrimental DSCP’s 
 
Furthermore, I find that out of the 12 cases of broad defense reform, 58.3% relate to 
an aggregated decline in military capacity. Declining defense spending accompanied by an 
aggregated decline in military capacity thus describes more than half of the strongest cases of 
defense reform. Contrary to conventional expectations, an aggregated decline in military assets 
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of pre-2008 Hungary and Lithuania and post-2008 France, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
Czech Republic was potentially non-detrimental (Figure 4).  
As many as 88.9% of dual cases of potential defense reform relate to an aggregated 
decrease in military capacity. This finding directly contradicts the assumption that diminishing 
defense spending is always detrimental do military capacity. Governments increased two out 
of three key indicators of military capacity throughout the entire period of declining defense 
expenditures despite the aggregated drawdown in military capacity and defense spending. 
Defense spending cuts in pre-2008 Germany, Italy, Portugal, and post-2008 Greece, UK, 
Austria, Bulgaria and Romania might therefore possibly relate to a non-detrimental decline in 
aggregated military capacity. 
Contrary to the mainstream policy assumptions that the post-2008 decline in military 
spending was particularly detrimental to European military capacity, I find that 10 out of 12 
cases of broad defense reform occurred in potentially austere economic environment after the 
2008 global financial crisis. In half of these post-2008 DSCP’s cases of broad defense reform, 
declining defense spending related to an aggregated increase in military capacity: Italy, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. Furthermore, cases of broad defense reform associated with 
an aggregated decline in military capacity about twice as often after than before 2008.  
The three cases of haphazard defense reform related to an aggregated decline in 
military capacity indicate the possibility that defense reform effort to improve military capacity 
was present but not sustained. This relates DSCP’s in post-2008 Slovakia, Cyprus, and Malta, 
empirically weak cases of defense reform. 
  
 
101 
 
Only the case of Ireland presents empirical evidence in support of the assumption that 
declining defense spending relates to detrimental military capacity outcomes: the analysis 
reveals potential absence of defense reform. This constitutes only 3.3% of all cases in which 
sustained decline in military expenditure was potentially detrimental to military capacity of a 
state. 
 
 
V. Case Selection  
 Empirical analyses establish which periods of declining defense spending were 
potentially related to defense reform, and thus to potentially non-detrimental intentions 
mediating the relationship between cuts and military capacity outcomes. In this section, I 
analyze security and defense policies, political manifestos, or speeches of leading political 
figures to ascertain whether the observed service-level or line-item increases causally related 
to defense reform policies. Evidence that governments endorse defense reform policies during 
58.3%
88.9%
33.3%
100.0%
75.0%
100.0%
41.7%
11.1%
66.7%
0.0%
25.0%
0.0%
Broad (12) Dual (9) Singular (3) Dispersed (1) Haphazard (4) Absent (1)
Aggregated Military Capacity Decline (21) Aggregated Military Capacity Increase (9)
Figure 4. - Potential Defense Reform Related to Aggregated Military Capacity Outcomes 
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DSCP’s establishes a causal link between declining defense spending and non-detrimental 
outcomes in military capacity of states.290 
I process-trace three country cases of potential defense reform: Bulgaria (2008-2012), 
Sweden (2007-2009) and Slovakia (2008-2012). Reductions in military spending of Bulgaria 
and Sweden present empirically strong291 cases of potential defense reform. However, these 
cases are most dissimilar in several aspects: Sweden is a Nordic non-NATO EU member since 
1995, while Bulgaria is a South-East relative newcomer to the union (2007) and a member of 
NATO since 2004. Bulgaria’s spending reductions led to an aggregate military capacity decline, 
while Swedish spending decline resulted in an aggregate increase in military capacity. The most 
sustained lower-level increase in Bulgaria occurred in R&D spending, but involved military 
equipment stock in the Swedish case. These differences shed more light on additional factors 
that translate decreasing military expenditures into opposite military capacity outcomes within 
a population of strong cases of defense reform. 
                                                 
290 Establishing causality relates largely to evidence of defense reform legitimation: whether it is used as a 
legitimate explanation for reduced defense spending. It is difficult to ascertain whether defense reform discourse 
establishes defense reform as a prior cause of defense spending cuts or as a necessary response to defense 
spending reductions. However, political discourse that legitimizes defense reform policies in relation to declining 
defense spending establishes a direct link between empirical patterns and political intentions. This argument relies 
on the logic behind critical discursive analysis (CDA). The CDA perspective analyzes political aspects of 
legitimation (Chilton and Schaffner (1997); Van Dijk (1998); Van Leeuwen (2007), how political actors legitimize 
their decisions by using discourse to create a sense of positive, beneficial, necessary or otherwise acceptable 
actions or overall state of affairs (Rojo and Van Dijk (1997); Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999)). Rationalization 
strategies legitimize political decisions by referring to knowledge claims or arguments; authorization legitimizes 
through references to authority (a person, tradition, custom or law); moral evaluation legitimizes political choices 
by referring to value systems, and mythopoiesis legitimizes through constructed narratives about the past and the 
future. Strategic texts or political speeches thus provide ‘meta-narratives’ of the political choices and actions. 
Defense reform ‘meta-narratives’ can be legitimized during DSCP’s through authorization or rationalization 
strategies: as a logical or necessary decision to increase efficiencies or tackle budgetary pressures that result in 
declining defense spending.  [Vaara (2014: 503] 
291 Bulgaria presents a potential case of dual defense reform and Sweden a potential case of singular defense 
reform. 
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Slovakia’s declining defense spending presents an empirically weak case of potential 
defense reform. Even when aggregated, Slovakia’s lower-level increases are haphazard and 
associated with an aggregate decline in military capacity. Slovakia and Bulgaria are similar in 
some key aspects, which establishes a degree of ceteris paribus conditions when comparing 
their periods of defense spending cuts. Both countries are relatively small and faced post-Cold 
War legacies of transforming their militaries from robust standing armies into more 
expeditionary forces as they vied for NATO membership. They both attained membership in 
the Alliance in 2004 and were EU members after 2008. Both are Eastern frontier countries in 
NATO and the EU. However, Bulgaria and Slovakia differ in the strength of empirical 
evidence supporting the defense reform hypothesis: Bulgaria being a strong case of potential 
defense reform, Slovakia a weak case. 
 
V.A. Sweden (2007-2009) 
Evidence implies that cuts in Swedish defense spending led to an aggregate increase in 
military capacity and thus were potentially non-detrimental. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether 
these patterns stemmed from implementation of defense reform policies designed to improve 
Sweden’s military posture. In this section, I evaluate whether Sweden subscribed to defense 
reform between 2007 and 2009, and whether the government intended to increase territorial 
defense capabilities as part of this reform. 
Sweden has a history of neutrality. Howerver, neturality today does not mean the same 
thing as it did in the past. Sweden’s neutrality remained intact during the two world wars and 
after the end of the WWII, Sweden was to become “non-aligned during peacetime and aiming 
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to be neutral during wartime.”292 After the Second World war, Sweden was one of the best 
militarily equipped nations in Europe and the “tanks, fighter jets, and submarines developed 
by Sweden’s own arms industry reinforced the credibility of the country’s armed neutrality.”293 
During the Cold War, Sweden required credible miliary forces and capabilities for self-defense. 
Despite Sweden’s official neutrality, it was also implicitely assumed that “although Sweden 
intended to be neutral in the event of war, it would be so ‘on NATO’s side.”294  
However, after the end of the Cold War, Sweden fundamentally changed its strategic 
security culture from national defense to international crisis-management. At the core, this 
strategic shift reduced Sweden’s armed neturality to a status of militarily non-aligned 
country.295 Military non-alignment gave Sweden the “option of neutrality in case of war in its 
vicinity. … The formula represented remnants of the Policy of 1812, striving to avoid a 
conflict with Russia.”296 This shift politically set up the parameters for a drastic change in 
Sweden’s security strategy and the gradual internationalization of Sweden’s military posture. 
                                                 
292 Kunz, Barbara (2015). “Sweden’s NATO Workaround: Swedish security and defense policy against the 
backdrop of Russian revisionism,” Focus strategique, No. 64, November, pp.1-49, p.9 Swedish neutrality was to be 
“backed up with an autonomous defense apparatus, building on a relatively strong draft army, a significant 
defense industry, and until the late 1960’s, the ambition to develop a Swedish nuclear bomb.” [Ibid.] 
293 “The Struggle for Sweden’s Defence Policy,” CSS Analysis in Security Policy, No. 138, July 2013, CSS ETH 
Zurich, p. 1  
294 Kunz (2015). A study written by former ambassador Rolf Ekeus (2002) concluded that there were no 
significant preparations for operative cooperation with foreign powers between 1969 and 1989. However, more 
recent publications and testimonials (e.g. defense journalist Mikael Holmstrom – The hidden alliance (2011)) argued 
that “based on 140 interviews with military officers, diplomats, politicians and others, and an analysis of until 
then unknown documents … cooperation and preparations for cooperation between Sweden and NATO …in 
case of war with the Soviet Union went much farther than officially acknowledged.” [Ibid., p.10] 
295 “The Struggle for Sweden’s Defence Policy,” CSS Analysis in Security Policy, No. 138, July 2013, CSS ETH 
Zurich, p.2 
296 Dalsjo, Robert (2012). “From Self-Sufficiency to Solidarity: The Transformation of Sweden’s Defence and 
Security Policies,” Chapter 10, p. 148, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2012/E-10.pdf  
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The transformation of Swedish post-Cold War security culture started out with radical 
reductions of its military capabilities and related to the defeat of the Soviet Union. From the 
mid-1990s until 2009, numerous units were reduced and budgets cut, the slogan “leaner but 
sharper” becoming the order of the day.297  Russia was pereived as too week to present a threat 
for another decade: “The highest military leaders in the country were conviced that the threat 
of invasion was all in the past, and that the country’s defenses could therefore be shut 
down.”298 The decision to significantly reduce Swedish military forces originated in the 
Parliament, which decided to close-down defense installations and military bases and 
amalgamate military units.299 In 2004, additional military units were scrapped and 5,000 military 
personnel (25% of the total) were let go.300 Reductions effected combat units and local defense. 
Home Guard, airplanes and the naval forces were all cut in half. Reductions carried out over 
the past decade left the country with “almost the smallest forces and smallest army of any 
Nordic state – despite being twice as big as the other.” Members of Swedish political elite 
feared demilitarization. Owe Wictorin, the former Supreme Commander, asserted that Sweden 
resigned on its military ambitions in the post-Cold War era out of ideological conviction: “The 
idea of defending Sweden as the most important thing was lost…”.  
Post-Cold War military reductions were, however, paralelled by the effort to 
internationalize Swedish engagement in peace operations. This effort demanded 
                                                 
297 Kunz (2015), p.11 
298 Carlqvist, Ingrid (2015). “Sweden: The Defense that Disappeared,” Gatestone Institute, International Policy 
Council, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6287/sweden-military  
299 “The Struggle for Sweden’s Defence Policy,” CSS Analysis in Security Policy, No. 138, July 2013, CSS ETH 
Zurich, p.2  
300 Carlqvist (2015)  
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modernization of Swedish military forces. Several push-factors contributed to Sweden’s 
developing interest in international security and defense collaboration. First, the Gulf War of 
1990/1991 and the carnage along the ‘Road of Death’ from Kuwait City to Basra 
demonstrated the advantages of modernized warfare: precision-guided weapons, night-vision 
devices and battle management systems stood out against the vulnerability of unprotected 
ground units.301  
Second, Sweden played a significant role in supporting the independence of the Baltic 
countries, providing them with “sovereingty support” assistance with military equipment and 
training. This also demonstrated the increasing inter-relatedness of Baltic security. Third, 
Swedes became stakeholders in European security, and their engagement in the dangerous and 
demanding international military operations in the Balkans did not only publicize the need to 
develop national military capacity but also to cooperate with others in this pursuit.  
Fourth, Sweden’s participation in NATO’s PfP program galvanized and sustained 
military transformation at home. This was done through cooperation with NATO countries.302  
It was in this context that the Bildt government initiated a program of modernization and 
mechanization of the Swedish armed forces: “Leopard 2 tanks were bought from Germany, 
new AIFV’s (CV 90) were ordered from the domestic suppliers Hagglunds and used APC’s 
were bought from ex-East German stores… [and] the new government intended to raise the 
defense budget.” 303 Althoug these efforts were initially hampered by a severe 1992 recession, 
                                                 
301 Dalsjo (2012: 149-150) 
302 Ibid., pp. 150-151  
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defense cuts were to be compensated by reform in favor of modern and flexible armed 
forces.304  
By 2000, Sweden not only continued to execute elements of further military 
transformation, but also moved to internationalize its security policy. In this effort, Sweden’s 
security policy moved the country away from its official non-aligned status, towared increased 
reliance on the EU and NATO.305 Sweden relied on both organizations for its security. Sweden 
premised its engagement in multilateral defense cooperation on the “assistance clause” in the 
EU’s Lisbon Treaty (Article 42) and on a unilateral solidarity with Norway, a NATO 
member.306 As a European Union member, Sweden gradually embraced practical defense 
cooperation that developed under the EU’s Security and Defence Policy and led to an 
adoption of Petersberg tasks for EU’s crisis-management operations.  
Since 2003, Sweden has actively participated in the EU’s overseas military missions, 
such as those in Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Georgia. Sweden supplied 1,500 troops to the EU Rapid Reaction Force and in 2008 provided 
1,100 troops to the Nordic Battlegroup under the framework of the EU.307 In 2009, the 
Swedish Parliament declared solidarity with the EU: “Sweden will not remain passive if a 
                                                 
304 Carlqvist (2015) 
305 “Beginning in 1948, the official policy of neutrality was complemented by secret agreements with the US and 
the UK on military cooperation with NATO in the case of a Soviet attack on Sweden. …Sweden undertook 
concrete preparations for cooperating with NATO: military runways were extended to be able to accommodate 
NATO bombers; a dedicated telex line from Sweden to the NATO air force command in Wiesbaden, Germany 
was established; plans were elaborated for joint airspace monitoring together with NATO members Norway and 
Denmark; and in case of war, high-ranking Swedish officials were to be embedded in NATO command staff.” 
Source: “The Struggle for Sweden’s Defence Policy,” CSS Analysis in Security Policy, No. 138, p. 2 
306 Ibid., p.1 
307 Ibid., p.2 
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disaster or attack should hit another member state, or Nordic country; … our country will 
thus give and receive support, civilian as well as military.”308 
One of the underlying Defence Commission reports of 2004 postulated that “the 
concrete objective for the Armed Forces’ activities in the short and medium term is to create 
usable and available expeditionary forces.”309 This expeditionary focus meant that territorial 
defense was “in essence abolished” and if the security situation was to deteriorate, “the 
Riksdag and the government would take decisions to allow the armed forces to develop 
capabilities in order to respond to larger-scale military operations that threatened Sweden’s 
peace and independence.”310 This bill led to “considerable cuts in terms of both funding and 
units, …[leaving] the island of Gotland with 14 tanks in a depot but no permanent military 
personnel beyond the Home Guard.”311 Participation in international operations thus became 
the raison d’etre for the remaining military units.  
The push for enhanced engagemement in expeditionary operations required further 
modernization and inter-operability with the militaries of the NATO and EU member states. 
Modernization focused on high-tech experimentation and streamlining of military 
procurement procedures. At the turn of the century, leading Swedish generals became 
convinced by US defense consultants to take “strategic time-out.” This meant abandoning 
military capabilities in the near term “in favor of drafting a high-tech defence for the future, 
based on the concepts of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Network-Centric 
                                                 
308 Carlqvist (2015) 
309 See Swedish Defence Commission, Forsvar for en ny tid, Report, 2004:30, Stockholm, June 2004, p.17 
310 Kunz (2015), p.13 
311 Ibid., p.14 
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Warfare (NCW).”312 Large portions of Swedish defense expenditure were allocated to high-
tech experiments and procurement reforms. The new Supreme Commander of Swedish 
Armed Forces Hakan Syren (2004) shifted procurement procedures from slow and costly 
practices to buying off the shelf, and abandoned the previous focus on fighters and ships in 
favor of acquisition of add-on weapons.313 He saw added benefit to bilateral and Nordic 
defense cooperation, mainly in terms of pooling resources in the area of logistics, training and 
procurement.  
The center-right coalition, dominated by the liberal-conservative Moderate Coalition 
Party,314 formed in 2006 and effectively improved the prospects of sustained defense reform 
despite the 2007-2009 decline in defense spending. Coalition parties formed a pre-electoral 
Alliance for Sweden, which reached common policy positions in six areas: economic growth, 
education, foreign policy, welfare state, the labor market, and justice.315 Parties also agreed to 
make some changes in the area of defense. The 2009 Defense bill ‘A deployable defense’ 
introduced last-minute changes in response to the 2008 Georgian war: initally planned 
shutdowns of certain units were retracted, territorial defense was brought back, and the idea 
of specific expeditionary forces was abandoned.316 However, in spite of perceived threats, air 
defense, heavy tanks and the number of jet fighters were to be drastically reduced and new 
                                                 
312 Dalsjo (2012: 152)  
313 Ibid., p. 153  
314 The Ministry of Defence was lead by two Moderate Party members: Mikael Odenberg (October 2006- 
September 2007) and Sten Tolgfors (September 2007 – March 2012). 
315 The parties also agreed to a Joint Alliance Manifesto More people in work -  more to hare out during the 2006 general 
elections. Bolin, Niklas and Nicholas Aylott (2006). Election Briefing No. 30: The Swedish Parliamentary 
Election of September 2006, European Parties Elections and Referendums Network (based on the article in West 
European Politics), p. 4 
316 Kunz (2015), p.14 
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organizational framework was meant to be implemented. These changes were “primarily 
economically driven, relegating security considerations to secondary relevance.”317 In 
hindsight, “the whole process was a matter of adjusting reality to budgetary frameworkks 
rather than vice versa.”318 
Despite these developments, the coalition government’s pursuit of a more traditional 
role of Swedish armed forces was principally concerned with ensuring greater capability for 
Swedish territorial defense. In its first report, the Commission emphasized the growing need 
for more traditional defense policy. This was to be pursued through increasing traditional 
defense cooperation with Swedish partners. The second report released in June 2008 
highlighted a more thorough structural reform of the armed forces (creating a system of single 
set of forces for all tasks manned by regulars and volunteer reservists akin the US National 
Guard). It introduced a revised regime of military equipment procurement and initiated 
streamlining of the training and support functions of the military. The proposed new military 
structure was designed to “deliver operational capability within days,” compared to the old 
structure which required months or year to prepare for combat.319 The 2008 report of the 
Defence Commission served as a basis for the development of the defence reform bill, with 
the political support of all parties in the government.  
The goal of the 2009 reform bill A functional defence was to provide a significantly 
stronger defence capability for Sweden.320 Reform aimed to enhance the operational effect of 
                                                 
317 Kunz (2015), p.15 
318 Ibid. 
319 Dalsjo (2012: 157) 
320 Defense Policy, Global Security Organization online: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/se-policy.htm  
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the Swedish military, ensuring that military units are fully manned, trained and equipped. The 
bill approved increased funding for operations (syphoned off from development, procurement 
and military support funds), and thriftier procurement principles with streamlined support 
structures.321 Focus on territorial defense was to ultimately lead to a stronger, better prepared 
and more robustly equipped Swedish armed forces: “While the number of units [declined] 
slightly as compared to the previous system, the new units would exist in reality, not just on 
paper, and the structure as a whole would be much more powerful, and more readily available 
for actual use.”322 However, the sequence of defense spending cuts became widely criticized 
by the defense establishement as well as the general public. Reduced units and defense 
spending had their own cost, which was widely underestimated. In the mid-term, the structural 
lack of funding prevented some new acquisitions and failed to preserve some existing 
capabilities.323 
The political push to re-build Swedish national defense capabilities responded 
primarily to the perception of increased exteral security threats. These were in particular posed 
by Russia. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and a 5-day war took place; “the Russian bear has 
awakened …and now, [the Swedes] had a stone in [their] shoe.”324 Swedish political 
establishement became increasingly concerned with Russian military activities in the Nordic- 
Baltic region, such as Russian “resumption of strategic bomber patrols over the Arctic, cyber-
                                                 
321 Dalsjo (2012: 158)  
322 Ibid.  
323 By 2013, then Supreme Commander Sverker Goranson “made the headlines when he explained that Sweden 
would only be able to defend itself for one week and in only one area” once the reforms are fully implemented. 
By 2014, the Swedish Audit Office concluded that the armed forces were unable to fulfill defined requirements, 
emphasizing the shortage of funding, personnel and equipment. However, by 2015 defense spending was to 
increase by additional 10.2 billion SEK over the next 5 years (11% increase). [Kunz (2015), pp.15-16, 21] 
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attacks against Estonia, …military operations using scenarios directed against the Baltic, and 
ambitions in the resource-rich Arctic,” as well as the sudden increase in the Russian defence 
budget and concomitant modernization.325 Gotland, a Baltic islands, presented a particular 
security concern to Swedish government. The islands were particularly vulnerable to potential 
Russian territorial impositions because they were inadequately protected. This security 
exposure fueled political ambitions to beef up Swedish military and reclaim national ability to 
defend Swedish lands against potential attacks of any other country.  
These events challenged the basis of Swedish assumptions about the external security 
environment, with clear political reprecussions.326 Swedish political elite understood that 
“[Swedes] need[ed] to have some kind of ability to defend [themselves], if [they] - against all 
odds - were to be threatened again.”327 In fact, the 2009 White Paper on Defense for the “first 
time assessed the protection of Sweden’s territorial integrity as being of equal importance as 
participation in global crisis-management operations.”328 Around the same time, defense policy 
spokesperson for the Sweden Democrats party clarified that Sweden needed to double its 
current defense budget to acquire the fiscal ability to defend itself. Although the decision to 
increase defense spending in 2015 was welcome, some have argued that it did not solve short-
                                                 
325 “The Struggle for Sweden’s Defence Policy,” CSS Analysis in Security Policy, No. 138, July 2013, CSS ETH 
Zurich, p.2 
326 By 2015, the combination of perceived threat from Russia and a discussion about the armed forces’ inability 
to carry out their tasks could possibly lead to more Swedes favoring NATO membership. The ruling coalition 
of Social Democrats and Greens remain opposed to NATO membership. The opposition is more in favor: 
Moderates and Liberals already support Sweden’s joining NATO and the Christian Democrats planned to 
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term or long-term challenges: “in a couple of years, we will face considerable and costly need 
for modernization as far as materiel is concerned.”329 Gen. Sverker Goranson remarks330 about 
capacity shrinkages triggered a politically charged debate that eventually resulted in the 
government’s commitment to “scale up military spending and modernize fighter aircraft, 
artillery and naval capacities, while re-establishing a military presence on Gotland, Sweden’s 
strategic island outpost in the Baltic Sea.”331 Sweden’s Democrats declared that the defense 
sector urgently needed to order new submarines, “to prevent the total number from dropping 
below eight, … new, modern, long-range air defense system so we can defend Stockholm, 
Gotland, and all our bases, increase the order of new SAAB 39 Gripen E to 100 planes.”332 
Supreme commander Micael Byden also declared that he wants to end the practice of the 
countries buying Gripen planes renting jets from the Swedish Air Force while they wait for 
their orders to be delivered.333  
What this analysis demonstrates is that despite actual reductions in national defense 
spending in the 2007-2009 period, Sweden was politically committed to improving its national 
armed forces – primarily because of the need to secure self-defense capability vis-à-vis the 
increasing threat posed by Russia. The empirical net increase in the size of Swedish military 
                                                 
329 The 120 tanks have only 42 personnel to operate them, the air defense systems are located over 1000km away 
from key areas such as Stockholm or Gothenburg, helicopters for hunting submarines were scrapped, and state 
of the art corvettes were not equipped with air-defense systems. [Kunz (2015), pp.24-25] 
330 In January 2013 Gen. Goranson declared that “capacity shirnkage and serial budget cuts had reduced the 
SAF’s operating capability to such a skeletal level that Sweden’s combined land, air and naval forces would be 
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capacity resulted primarily from a significant increase in Sweden’s main army vehicle and total 
artillery count between 2007 and 2008. Despite the economic pressures and declining capacity 
stock past the 2007-2009 DSCP, the defense reform between 2007 and 2009 focused on 
building smaller but better equipped, modern and – very importantly – interoperable armed 
forces ready to be deployed domestically and interantionally.  
The defense reform process was not, however, driven by investment in military 
research and development, due to “persistently eroding defence appropriations on the level of 
domestic research and development.”334 Instead, the efforts to improve – streamline, equip 
and modernize – the Swedish armed forces were driven by revisions of outdated and costly 
procedures (such as in the area of military equipment procurement). The aim of overall 
reorganization was to enable acquisition of ready-made military equipment at a lower cost, but 
the ongoing budget cuts also hampered some new acquisitions and failed to sustain some 
existing equipment. These trends were to be reversed by 2015 with government’s decision to 
increase not only military spending but also net investment in armed forces modernization 
and acquisition of new equipment and materiel.  
 
V.B. Bulgaria (2008-2012) 
Declining defense spending in Bulgaria presents a strong empirical case of potential 
defense reform, unrelated to intentional demilitarization of Bulgarian miltiary capacity. 
However, we need additional evidence to establish the causal link between lower-level 
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increases in Bulgarian military capacity and Bulgaria’s commitment to defense reform. I 
evaluate evidence in the context of strategic security documents,  political programes and 
statements from members of the political elites.  
There is convincing evidence that Bulgaria’s government implemented defense reform 
at time of declining defense spending between 2008 and 2012. The NDSV government signed 
Bulgaria’s accession treaty to NATO and started the final round of negotiations for EU 
accession. These initiatives provided political incentives to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of Bulgaria’s defense sector as well as its military posture. The pro-NATO and 
pro-EU leadership of Bulgarian President Georgi Sedefchov Parvanov (2002-2012)335 
supported transformation of the Bulgarian armed forces from a post-Cold War military 
defense posture into more modern expeditionary forces.336 NDSV’s pursuit337 of NATO and 
EU membership rested on modernization to fulfil Bulgaria’s interoperability requirements.  
After achieving NATO membership in 2004, Bulgarian government decided to 
conduct a Strategic Defense Review (SDR) to better meet the requirements of meeting new 
security challenges.338 The SDR resulted in a new long term plan of transformation of the 
Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF) over the next 10 years. Under the Plan for Organizational 
Development and Modernization of the Structures of the Armed Forces (2015), the 
government planned to phase out conscription, fully professionalizing the BAF to increase its 
                                                 
335 The Ministers of Defence were affiliated either with the party of National Movement of Stability and Progress 
(former National Movement Simeon the Second)-NDSV (Veselin Bliznakov, August 2005-April 2008 and 
Nikolai Tsonev, April 2008-July2009), or with the center-right Citizens for European development of Bulgaria 
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usability and effectiveness.339 In May 2004, the government also “approved 11 priority force 
modernization projects including purchasing of new equipment for the navy.”340 However, the 
development and modernization plan faced criticism for “failing to deliver modern, 
interoperable and well equipped Bulgarian military.”341 Budgetary constraints challenged the 
goal of overcoming existing capability shortfalls.342 The failure to quickly reduce the size of 
the costly defense sector restricted investments in combat training and new equipment, and 
increased uncertainty about how long term projects would be financed.343 The former Minister 
of Defense, Nickolay Mladenov declared this stage of reform a failure. 
In the context of the failure of the defense reforms of 2004, Bulgarian government 
initiated a Force Structure Review in 2009. The review process culminated in a new White 
Paper on Defence (2010), which addressed the needs of the BAF and what they “could actually 
afford, particularly in light of the [2008] economic crisis.”344 BAF were to reduce force size, 
revise command structures, implement anti-corruption practices and modernize the armed 
forces. The goal was to reduce the armed forces by 16% before 2014, 345 modernize command 
structures and establish and Joint Forces Command346 to increase the effectiveness of 
command and control, making strategic and operational levels of command more 
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compatible.347 However, the costly obligations for the product and delivery of armaments, 
technology and services made by the previous governments challenged modernization and 
reform efforts: “In 2010 the Bulgarian government had to use state reserves to pay for several 
military contracts, including transport helicopters and fixed wing aircraft, armored utility 
vehicles, frigates and mine hunters, which had run into financial difficulties.”348  
In the context of the austere post-2008 period, modernization of military equipment 
proved challenging. According to the 2010 White Paper: “A priority …is to keep the existing 
capabilities necessary to the Armed Forces, to develop capability components that do not 
require significant financial resources, …. to use a single set of forces and to provide an 
adequate contribution to Allied operations.”349 As a NATO member, Bulgaria acquired some 
new but limited military capabilities. In 2007, the government signed a contract for two 
second-hand frigates and one mine-hunter ship from Belgium. However, because of the high 
cost of previous procurement programs, the government was forced to “renegotiate, cancel 
or delay a number of major projects.”350 In 2009 the government contracted two more middle-
class and two smaller helicopters, but also downgraded its original contract with 
EUROCOPER in 2010 to acquire three instead of six Panther helicopters.351 In the same year, 
the government cancelled a deal (dated four years back) to buy four French Gowind corvettes 
in the amount of US $900 million.352  
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The cancellation of equipment procurement has been primarily attributed to the 
decline of the Bulgaria’s defense budget below the recommended minimum of 1.5% of 
GDP.353 The decline of the defense budget to 1.42% in 2010 and to 1.24% in 2012 delayed 
planned refurbishment and modernization of Bulgaria’s maritime platforms as well as planned 
upgrades of the frigates.354 The government could not complete the planned purchase of the 
two submarines by 2012 and conceded the need to decommission several older Soviet missile 
boats and mine sweepers.355  
Despite these set-backs, the Defense Minister Anu Anguelov committed to three 
priorities to be pursued in the next 10 years: procurement of new multipurpose aircraft, 
infantry fighting vehicles and the modernization of the frigates including construction of deck 
helipads.356 The 2010 White Paper also called for eliminating unnecessary personnel and 
structures. The plan was to 5,700 military personnel, reduce the five Air Force bases to two 
and for Navy to maintain a single headquarters.357 By eliminating redundancies, Bulgarian 
government “aimed to free up financial resources to alleviate the massive obligations 
accumulated by the previous governments and to fund further transformation of the BAF.”358 
Defense spending on personnel, operations and maintenance, and investment was to change 
from 75:24:1 to 60:25:15, increasing per capita funding on military personnel as well as combat 
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readiness and efficiency.359 As a result of these measures, the government decided in 2012 to 
upgrade 18 of its helicopters to NATO standards,360 modernize available combat ships and 
develop coastal reconnaissance and navigation installations.361 
The 2010 White Paper also committed the government to uproot corruption in the 
defense sector. Corrupt defense spending practices marred fulfillment of NATO-guided Force 
Goals and seriously harmed actual NATO modernization efforts.362 Minimal parliamentary 
oversight gave Bulgarian Defense Ministers “wide independence,” and resulted in charges of 
fiscal misappropriation and extravagance.363 Endemic corruption problems required the 
institutionalization of greater transparency in all areas of defense procurement, mostly 
overseen by the MoD’s standing Committee on Anti-corruption and cross-ministerial Centre 
for Prevention and Combating Corruption and Organized Crime.364 The Law on Defence and 
Armed Forces (LDAFRB / З ОВС Р Б ), improved management oversight over the integrated 
ministry and prevented conflicts of interest.365 GERB defense reform prioritized transparency 
and accountability, institutional democratization and elimination of corruption and inefficient 
resource management even under increased budgetary pressures after 2008.366 
Bulgarian government felt politically compelled to sustain post-2009 defense reform 
efforts for additional reasons. Bulgaria needed to deepen its bilateral relationship with the U.S.. 
It needed to prove itself a reliable ally within NATO and increasingly also in the EU, and to 
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reconcile modernization of its armed forces with the instability troubling the Black Sea region 
as well as the anticipated security challenges.  
To sustain defense reforms and deepen relations with the U.S., Bulgaria committed to 
a concept of ‘shared responsibility for security.’367 Through this, the government declared itself 
to be a credible security contributor, but also interested in integrating Bulgaria’s national 
security with the security architecture of NATO and the EU. Bulgaria implemented a Strategic 
Defense Review in response to NATO reforms and the drafting of a New Strategic Concept, 
as well as Lisbon Treaty’s framework for Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU.368 
In practical military terms, however, the priority was to ensure adequate participation in 
NATO’s collective defense mechanisms, systematic development of defense capabilities and 
modernization of the Armed Forces. It also meant the development of Bulgarian armed forces 
into “a reliable and capable ally, doctrinally, organizationally and technologically compatible 
with the armies in NATO.”369  
Leading up to the 2008-2012 period, Bulgaria was especially interested in deepening 
bilateral cooperation with the U.S.. In the context of the U.S.- led global war on terror, the 
U.S. used regional facilities to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bulgaria’s strategic 
location within the Balkan and Black Sea areas and its proximity to the Greater Middle East 
proved advantageous to both American and Bulgarian security interests. Bulgaria proved a 
willing U.S. partner, interested in intensifying cooperation with the U.S. and hosting U.S. 
military forces: “Strengthened strategic alliance with the United States represented a valuable 
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asset to be cultivated,  ….testifying to Bulgaria’s own geostrategic importance.”370 Closer 
bilateral cooperation with the US provided additional security benefits: privileged access to 
advanced and reliable intelligence, access to supplemental resources for preventing and 
overcoming humanitarian disasters on Bulgaria’s soil, or bolstering of Bulgaria’s military 
capabilities through improved interoperability and the quality of installations, techniques, 
tactics and procedures used by the national forces.371  
Bulgarian government intended to use NATO’s Security Investment Program to 
modernize its existing installations such as airports, ports and communication and information 
systems.372 In 2009, “US upgraded one of the four military bases … used for multinational 
combined exercises at a cost of USD 6.5 million.”373 In view of the outstanding obligations 
from past acquisition projects, it was expected that Bulgarian modernization program would 
also benefit from donations of used equipment from its allies.374 
By 2010, Bulgarian government strategically relied on NATO (and the US) for its 
national defense. The Constitution stipulates the duty of the Bulgarian armed forces to 
“defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country with all available forces and 
means.”375 For Bulgaria, this means activation of article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
whereby the armed forces of Bulgaria carry out the defense of their country “with the joint 
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forces and means of NATO’s collective defence, according to NATO’s common defence 
planning system, [where] part of NATO’s forces would be temporarily deployed on Bulgarian 
territory.”376 In support of NATO’s action, Bulgarian armed forces would in such event 
provide land, naval and air forces of a predetermined set, negotiated in NATO’s defense 
planning framework, at its core supplied by the Land Forces’ mechanized brigade.377 
Retaining security benefits from the U.S. and NATO required Bulgarian government 
to prove a serious and a reliable ally, “able to offer things of value in return.”378 To advance 
its strategic pro-US orientation, Bulgaria opened its Burgas airfield for the use of U.S. tanker 
aircraft and agreed to re-open a nearby Camp Sarafovo, previously serving a small US task 
force for transporting supplies to Macedonia and Kosovo.379 By 2008, the Bulgarian 
government signed a “Big Bang” package of Implementing Agreements allowing deployment 
of U.S. troops on Bulgarian territory, which provided essential foundation for the JTFE 
operations in the country. Bulgarian defense industry (BDIA) stepped-up its exports to Middle 
Eastern countries, supplying light weapons and ammunition to aid the U.S.-led effort in 
Afghanistan.380 In 2011 alone, BDIA’s exports hit $380 million.381 The plan was to sustain 
major reforms through 2014. The government intended to approve a development plan for 
the armed forces and a long-term plan for investment by 2011, complete strategic and 
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operational level restructuring and transformation of its forces by 2012, and optimize 
allocations to personnel maintenance and investment and to legally ensure that savings from 
restructuring are reinvested in defense.382  
Reductions in Bulgaria’s national defense in the 2008-2012 period appear to have 
resulted from the 2008 global financial crisis. It was clear that Bulgarian defense and the armed 
forces had to be prepared to face potential threats, such as those posed by the 2008 Russian 
invasion of Georgia. The post-2008 austerity however put Bulgaria’s armed forces in an 
“exceptionally strenuous situation.”383 The Bulgarian Defense Ministry simply lacked resources 
to sustain defense reform to the fullest: “Modernization plans were not developed with 
optimal consideration to the state’s ability to guarantee the resources necessary for their 
practical implementation. Many decisions were taken without deep analysis, justifiability and 
secured resources … with fluctuating political will, underprepared professionalization of the 
armed forces, and arbitrary …purchasing [of] new equipment meant that …the gradual 
process of building-up capabilities …never took place.”384 As a way to cope with the financial 
pressure, Minister of Defense Angelov offered that “the country should reconsider some 
program contracts or … look at restructuring some payments.”385 The contracts that were to 
be possibly restructured or reduced involved Eurocopter for new transport helicopters, 
Daimler for new land vehicles and Alenia Aeronautica for new transport aircraft.386 
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In sum, the analysis establishes evidence that links Bulgarian decline in defense 
spending with defense reform and efforts to improve Bulgaria’s military capacity. Bulgaria’s 
policy between 2008 and 2012 was to build strong national defense based on viable and 
modern military force that can be employed to deal with conflicts requiring military 
engagement. Cuts in defense spending on one hand meant reduced military forces and delayed 
or cancelled procurement agreements or equipment upgrades, on the other hand involved 
restructuring of equipment payments, professionalization of the BAF and a degree of 
modernization of its military structures.387 Defense reform also initiated transformation of the 
legal and procedural environment to stall rampant corruption. Declining defense spending and 
reduced aggregate military capacity related to the intense post-2008 budgetary pressures. 
Austerity, not absence of strategic defense reform, stalled the scope and pace of strategically 
envisioned defense reform, preventing some force modernization and capability acquisitions 
and slowing down the fight against corruption in the defense sector.  
This analysis demonstrates that Bulgarian reductions in defense spending were not 
ideological. Bulgaria was interested to prove itself a reliable and engaged ally to the U.S., 
building on rather than distancing itself from the deepening bilateral cooperation with the U.S. 
that germinated in the period preceding the defense spending cuts. U.S. assistance and support 
was conditioned on Bulgarian continued defense reform. Bulgaria also needed to continue 
defense reform as a precaution against possible external threats, such as Russian military 
activism.  
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V.C. Slovakia (2008-2012) 
 Slovakia’s decline in defense speding was accompanied by lower-level trends in military 
capacity that imply only haphazard defense reform and potentially only a limited intent to 
improve military capacity. In order to ascertain the causal link between defense spending cuts 
and defense reform intentions, I evaluate whether Slovakia subscribed to and implemented 
defense reform between 2008 and 2012. To do so, I analyze country’s strategic security 
documents, political party programs, and political agreements for evidence of commitment to 
improve its military force.  
 The strategic political documents388 demonstrate consistent political interest of the 
Slovak government to transform, develop, or modernize the Slovak Armed Forces. This goal 
was pursued by the Prime Ministers as well as the four Defense Ministers in charge of the 
Armed Forces between 2008 and 2012.389  In the 2006-2010 period, Slovak foreign policy 
under the Prime Minister Robert Fico390 clearly committed Slovakia to being a reliable ally in 
NATO and the EU. This specifically meant a strategic decision to actively participate in the 
preparation and development of military capabilities under the European Security and Defense 
Policy, participation in the ongoing transformation of the NATO alliance and advocacy for 
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improved practical defense cooperation at the strategic and operational levels between NATO 
and the EU.391  
Prime Minister Robert Fico committed Slovakia’s defense to become an efficient 
military system and a credible contributor to the collective defense capabilities of NATO and 
military capabilities of the EU. He committed Slovakia to participate in the alliances’ rapid 
reaction forces and crisis-management operations.392 The political elites also intended to 
increase the effectiveness of the increasingly more complex defense sector, government’s 
ability to deploy and sustain forces in military operations, and the transformation of the Slovak 
Armed Forces.393 However, Fico envisioned a strategic trade-off between defense 
modernization and actual participation in international crisis-management. The manifesto 
clearly prioritized allocating resources to maintenance and development of the armed forces, 
even at the expense of Slovak participation in the rapid reaction forces or in actual military 
operations under the aegis of NATO or the EU.394 
Under the leadership of SDKU’s Prime Minister Iveta Radicova and in the aftermath 
of the 2008 global financial crisis, Slovak government initiated Strategic Defense Review.395 Its 
aim was to define a politico-strategic framework for long-term development of Slovak Armed 
Forces. The goal was to improve national defense capabilities by adopting more efficient 
resource management procedures and implement more transparent and effective use of 
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defense-related financial resources.396  Radicova’s government on one hand wanted to reduce 
the total number of military operations that Slovakia participated in. On the other hand, the 
goal was to improve the quality of deployed forces by transforming them into more compact 
and organically structured contingents for expeditionary military operations.397  
Radicova’s government then pursued modernization of the armed forces despite the 
underperforming economy after the 2008 global financial crisis. The government intended to 
apply the limited military resources toward “gradual and complex modernization”398 of the 
expeditionary military units and the development of required military capabilities. At the 
strategic level, the government preferred that Slovak defense engages in multi-national 
modernization and defense industry projects within NATO and European Defence Agency 
(EDA). This entailed increasing Slovak investment in defense research and development and 
military specialization.  
In 2012, Slovak government was again led by the Prime Minister of Robert Fico, who 
advocated policies designed to sustain Slovakia’s international role as a stable and reliable 
partner of NATO.399 By the end of the 2012, the government committed to a development 
plan for the defense sector, including the Armed Forces.400 The goal was to development 
military capabilities necessary for dealing with future security threats and to enable the Armed 
Forces to fulfill its international crisis-management obligations. Again, the onus was placed on 
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increasing effective use of NATO resources and military capacities (especially within the 
framework of Smart Defence) and fulfillment of Alliance’s collective defense obligations.401  
In the context of the EU security and defense, Slovakia committed to active planning 
and contribution within the framwork of the Common Security and Defense Policy. This 
meant effective participation in the multi-national collaboration in building military 
capabilities.402 In the first quarter of 2012, the Visegrad 4 (V4) Ministers of Defence expressed 
in their joint communique that they “remain committed to strengthening our national defence 
capabilities” and that they are “ready to contribute to international initiatives, such as Smart 
Defence under the auspices of NATO or pooling and sharing within the EU.”403  
The ministers also welcomed the progress in preparation of the V4 Battle group, 
offered for stand-by within the EU rapid reaction mechanism in 2016, and indicated a number 
of areas with potential for increased cooperation: air controller training (FAC/JTAC), 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRN), helicopter pilot training, 
logistical cooperation, medical treatment facilities, and training in counter improvised 
explosive devices (C-IED) and explosive ordnance devices (EOD).404 
With regard to the 2008 global financial crisis, defense ministers opposed negative 
consequences for the Slovak military: “continued decline in the level of preparedness and the 
fighting ability of the (Slovak) Armed Forces should not be allowed.”405 Defense Minister 
                                                 
401 Ibid., p. 5 
402 Ibid., p. 41 
403 Joint Communique of the Ministers of Defence of the Visegrad Group, Litomerice, May 4, 2012.  
404 Ibid. 
405 At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, Slovakia declared the intention to increasing defense expenditure. The 
2013 White Book on Defense declares that Slovakia does not resign from its long-term ambition to approach 
defense expenditures close to 2% of GDP. Original text of the citation: “Ani v zložitých podmienkach 
  
 
129 
 
Martin Glvac announced at the meeting of the NATO Ministers of Defense in April 2012 that 
in the upcoming years Slovakia must commit to fiscal consolidation to ensure its ability to 
carry out its international defense obligations, where continued decline in national defense 
expenditures is not sustainable in the long term.406 In his first year in office, Mr. Glvac 
prioritized re-allocation of resources to secure military capability development: “We are 
crossing-out all that we don’t need and revising all past contracts to increase effectiveness. We 
are trying to optimize all contract conditions and put all resources to meaningful projects.”407   
To avoid further decline in the defense sector, the government specifically committed 
to stabilization of the defense budget over multiple years at a level that could help overcome 
the period of continued decline in national defense expenditures and the resulting deficit in 
the development of the Armed Forces. In this effort, the government stabilized high-quality 
officers, carried out intelligence reform, and secured more effective performance of state-
owned defense industries.  
Mr. Glvac committed to Strategic Defense Review (2010). The review jump-started 
political discussions and eventual decision-making about the future role, ambition and 
sourcing of the Slovak Armed Forces. A number of review cycles led to the government’s 
approval of a 2013 White Book on Defence: Modern Defence, Modern Armed Forces.408 The White 
Book declares Slovakia’s interest to build modern, operationally ready, defensive, effective, 
                                                 
konsolidácie verejných financií nie je možné ďalšie zhoršovanie úrovne pripravenosti a bojaschopnosti 
ozbrojených síl.” Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic (2012-2016), p. 41 
406 Ministry of Defence: M. Glvac at the Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers, April 18, 2012, 
http://www.mosr.sk/mo-sr-mglvac-na-zasadnuti-ministrov-obrany-nato/  
407 “M. Glvac: It is going to be necessary to adopt new and brave solutions in the defense sector”, September 
2012, Ministry of Defense, http://www.mosr.sk/26340/mglvac-v-rezorte-obrany-bude-potrebne-prijat-nove-a-
aj-odvazne-riesenia/  
408 White Book on Defence of the Slovak Republic (2013)  
  
 
130 
 
relevant, NATO-interoperable and economically sustainable armed forces. To this end, the 
Ministry of Defense defined necessary requirements for improving the quality and 
effectiveness of Slovakia’s defense,409 and addressed long-term development of the Slovak 
Armed Forces.410  
Key requirements of defense modernization entailed acquisition of high-quality and 
reliable military capabilities and development of future capabilities of the Slovak Armed 
Forces. At the meeting with the US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel in January 2015, Slovak 
Minister of Defense indicated the aim to spend 20% of the defense budget on modernization 
by 2016.411 Modernization would require replacement of obsolete main military equipment, 
technologies and materiel, and acquisition of sufficient resources for training and for operation 
and maintenance of the Armed Forces.412 Future capability development would be carried out 
in two separate cycles. In phase 1 (2013-2015), the Ministry of Defense and the government 
aim to retain key personnel and an entire spectrum of current military capabilities, increase the 
level of fulfillment of international obligations, as well as the effectiveness and quality of crisis-
management mechanisms in the country.413 In phase 2 (2016-2024), Slovak Armed Forces 
should increase their fighting potential, improve tactical reconnaissance and intelligence 
capabilities, and ensure support for one mechanized brigade.414 
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As a matter of priority, Slovak Armed Forces now pursue acquisiton of new military 
equipment and weapons. This requires procurement of fully operationalized mobile 
communication systems (MOKYS) and battle communication radio systems (C4I), acquisition 
of 3D radiolocators to ensure air space defense, and continued replacement of automobile 
equipment to increase logistical effectiveness.415 The Ministry of Defence wants to develop 
and secure stationary communication and information systems against cyber-attacks.416  
Slovakia is also expected to make decision about acquiring new training aircraft, battle 
and multi-role helicopters, multi-role tactical aircraft and air defense system components. New 
tactical transport aircraft are to replace the increasingly redundant Antonov An-24 ‘Coke’ and 
An-26 ‘Curl’ transporters.417 Speaking at the Slovak International Air Fest (SIAF) 2014, 
Minister of Defence Martin Glvac indicated the goal to “finalize contract for the purchase of 
to Spartan aircraft” by the end of September 2014.418 Fico’s cabinet approved the Spartan deal 
a month later. The beginning of negotiations for the purchase of the planes dates back to 2008, 
and the sealing of the deal is perceived as  one of the “largest modernization project in the 
history of the Ministry of Defence.”419  
In the context of replacing Soviet-era military equipment, Slovakia also plans to retire 
its MiG-29 ‘Fulcrum’ fighter aircraft by 2017. According to the Slovak National Armament 
Office Director, these aircraft could be replaced by leased Saab Gripen multi-role fighters. By 
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2020, Slovakia intends to fully replace its Mi-17 ‘Hip’ utility helicopters with modern platforms 
as well as the BMP-1 armoured personnel carriers with the new 4x4 and 8x8 vehicles. 
Procurement of these carriers is to be finalized by 2020.420 
This analysis demonstrates that Slovakia’s defense spending reductions were - despite 
the haphazard empirical evidence - associated with consistent policy of defense reform. 
Reforms stabilized military force structures and secured increased spending on military R&D, 
equipment modernization and acqusition and intelligence reforms. On the other hand, they 
severely reduced equipment stock by eliminating obsolete Soviet-era military equipment. 
Modernization, transformation, and improvement of the Slovak Armed forces are consistent 
features of Slovak politics regardless of which political party is in power. It was because of the 
broad political support for defense reform, that the defense review process culminated in an 
adoption of Slovakia’s first White Book on Defense: Modern Defence, Modern Armed Forces in 
2013. 
 
VI. Discussion of the Findings 
The key finding of this analysis contradicts the mainstream expectation that reduced 
military spending is detrimental to military potential of states. Both - greater evidence of 
defense reform in DSCP’s that led to aggregated increase in military capacity as well as strong 
evidence of defense reform in DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline in military capacity 
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support the argument that cuts in defense spending were potentially non-detrimental to 
military capacity when mediated through defense reform.  
Empirical evidence of defense reform appears more frequently in those DSCP’s that 
relate to an aggregated increase in military capacity. In these cases, defense reform possibly 
related to acquisition of modern military equipment, or reorganization of military force 
structures. All 9 DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase in military capacity entail evidence 
of some degree of defense reform. In 89% of the 9 DSCP’s, cuts related to strong evidence 
of potential defense reform, 13% more frequently than evidence of strong defense reform in 
the 21 DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline in military capacity.  
However, I also find that in 76% of the 21 cases DSCP’s seem non-detrimental to 
military capacity because of the potential presence of defense reform mechanism. In these 
cases, aggregated decline in military capacity might have resulted from increased efficiencies 
in equipment maintenance or acquisition, where old equipment was possibly replaced by a 
smaller but updated equipment stock. In many cases, decline in military manpower under 
defense reform makes sense as states streamline their military force structures to make it leaner 
and more specialized for expeditionary operations.  
In sum, 97% of the 30 cases, declining defense spending was possibly not detrimental 
to military capacity because governments were making sustained increases in service-level 
numbers of military manpower, equipment stock or line-item spending on R&D during the 
DSCP’s. Even when states experienced a simultaneous decline in defense spending and 
military capacity, in 71.4% of the cases they continued to increase their investment in R&D - 
in a sustained manner. In 53.3% of the cases, decline in defense spending was accompanied 
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by sustained biennial increases in service-level military manpower numbers (36.6%), 
equipment stock (60%) or line-item spending on R&D (63.3%).  
Furthermore, I find that 80% of DSCP’s relate to potentially strong cases of defense 
reform. Merely 16.6% of the DSCP’s indicate empirically weak cases of defense reform and 
only the case of Ireland (3.3%) suggests potential lack of defense reform. These findings 
challenge the expectation that reductions in military expenditures always decline military 
capacity. Decline in defense spending relates to strong cases of potential defense reform 4-
times more frequently than to weak cases. The stronger the empirical case in support of 
defense reform, the greater the expectation of non-detrimental military capacity outcomes.  
My findings also challenge the mainstream theoretical expectation that the greater the 
decline in defense spending the more detrimental outcomes in military capacity. I find that the 
broadest and most sustained service-level or line-item increases in military manpower, 
equipment or R&D occurred during defense spending reductions in the aftermath of the 2008 
global financial crisis, not before. Almost two thirds of DSCP’s associated with an aggregated 
increase in military capacity after the 2008 global financial crisis were also the strongest cases 
of defense reform. And an aggregated decline in military capacity related to evidence of broad 
defense reform occurred twice as frequently after than before 2008.  
These findings imply that many European states intended to improve their military 
capacity through defense reform even in austere times. In some European countries, austerity-
related defense spending cuts created pressure to pursue greater efficiencies under defense 
reform policies: to get more defense for less money. Alternatively, European countries 
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possibly engaged in defense collaboration with their partners to counter the austerity-driven 
cuts in defense spending. 
Furthermore, the case analysis indicates that security and defense policy as well as 
external and domestic factors greatly affect why states commit to defense reform at times of 
declining defense spending. Empirically strong cases of defense reform can stem from very 
different political considerations and relate to weak or strong defense reform policies. And 
countries of similar security considerations can execute defense reform accompanied by 
dissimilar empirical patterns.  
Sweden and Bulgaria, empirically strong cases of defense reform, differ in the key 
considerations behind reform policies. Swedish defense reform policy was shaped by the 
decision to ‘return to enhanced territorial defense’ as well as immediate Russian military threat. 
This resulted in a de facto militarization despite budgetary pressures. In Sweden, defense reform 
primarily focused on territorial defense and military equipment acquisition, overturning the 
prior focus on expeditionary capabilities. This implies that states can militarize even during 
periods of declining, not only increasing, military spending. 
In Bulgaria, defense reform was motivated by the need to demonstrate its commitment 
to NATO-related military transformation, the need for continued US involvement, and a 
potential need to confront Russia’s involvement in the Black Sea region in the future. 
Austerity-related reductions in defense spending, together with persistent corruption, 
however, suppressed defense reform modernization and acquisition of military assets, 
declining Bulgaria’s aggregate military capacity. 
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Membership in NATO and the EU has been a key motivating factor behind sustained 
defense reform also in Slovakia. Unlike Bulgaria, Slovakia is an empirically weak case of 
defense reform. Slovak case demonstrates that weak empirical evidence should not be 
conflated with inconsistent policy of defense reform. Defense reform policy was embraced 
and pursued by all government coalitions in Slovakia between 2008 and 2012. Haphazard 
defense reform resulted not from a weak political commitment but because of austerity 
measures that created strong pressure to reduce non-essential military assets within the Slovak 
Armed Forces as well as to speed-up retirement of old Cold-War era military equipment. 
Acquisition of new equipment did not surpass the numbers of retired hardware.  
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Chapter 5: Collective Defense Collaboration 
 
The 2008 global financial crisis compelled policymakers to vigorously pursue defense 
collaboration among European states. Pooling and sharing of existing military equipment and 
capabilities or joint procurement of military capabilities was to enable European governments 
to afford (more) defense at a lower cost.421 As defense spending declines, states can bridge 
capability gaps through increased cooperation in armaments: “Joint procurement of the 
necessary equipment would offer savings through economies of scale and reduced 
duplication.”422 The logic is similar to that behind clustered defense cooperation,423 through 
which states maintain and modernize military capabilities424 especially at times of budgetary 
pressures. Not only can clustered cooperation425 reduce costs to individual nations, but it can 
also raise collective output of European defense. Collective collaboration can in principle 
prevent falling defense expenditures from damaging European military capacity. 
                                                 
421 Drent Margriet, Kees Homan and Dick Zandee (2013). “Bold Steps in Multinational Cooperation – Taking 
European Defence Forward,” Clingendael Report, based on a seminar organized by the Netherlands and the 
Netherlands Institute for International Relations, Clingendael and the Netherlands Ministry of Defence in 
January 23-24, 2013, The Hague, p. 28. 
422 Quille (2006: 124) 
423 Clustered defense cooperation is a structural form of defense cooperation that covers military capability 
development in a wider sense, covering cooperation in procurement of military equipment, common 
maintenance, training and education, increased sharing of infrastructure and a creation of joint operational units. 
[Drent, Homan and Zandee (2013: 10)] 
424 Drent, Homan and Zandee (2013: 10) 
425 Clustered defense cooperation in Europe has been mostly conducted within the framework of bilateral and 
multi-lateral regional cooperation. Examples include Belgian-Netherlands Navies (Benesam), British-French 
Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), German-Netherlands High Readiness Force HQ, or multi-national 
defense cooperation in the context of BENELUX, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and Norway, NORDEFCO, 
or Visegrad 4 framework. We can therefore expect to see that in some European countries, sustained cuts in 
defense spending are associated with increasing defense cooperation involving procurement and investment 
activities in a regional context. 
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In this chapter, I explore the proposition that states improve national military capacity 
despite the decline in defense expenditures because they step-up their defense collaboration. 
I start by evaluating whether governments spend more on collective rather than national 
procurement and research and technology (R&T). I analyze these two variables individually to 
determine the baseline patterns of defense collaboration (2005-2012). I then assess whether 
states increased the frequency of their collaborative spending on military equipment and R&T 
during DSCP’s relative to the baseline patterns.  
Secondly, I evaluate the patterns in aggregate. Aggregated analysis evaluates whether 
the decline in defense spending prompted states to increase defense collaboration across the 
two variables. Next, I evaluate whether a decline in defense spending associated with increased 
defense collaboration was also non-detrimental to military capacity.  
Lastly, I analyze whether the decline in defense spending was accompanied by 
increasing defense collaboration in case of the United Kingdom (2007-2009) and France 
(2008-2012). UK is a case that empirically supports the defense collaboration hypothesis, while 
France does not. 
 
I. Collective Defense Collaboration in the EU 
Theory of alliance cooperation and contemporary policy discourse suggest the 
possibility that states pursue collective defense collaboration to prevent negative military 
capability outcomes when they cut their defense spending. Some scholars argue that in the 
context of the economic Eurocrisis, European states no longer have an option but cooperate 
  
 
139 
 
to preserve their military capabilities (Larivé (2014)). According to this logic, defense cuts 
demand deeper cooperation.  
Recently, European states have strived to intensify collaboration under the EU’s 
Pooling and Sharing initiative or NATO’s Smart Defence.426  Smart Defense427  is a strategy to 
ensure “greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility.”428 Its focus 
on prioritization, specialization and cooperation is expected to lead to increasingly more 
efficient and effective spending by individual allies (Marrone (2012), Mockli (2012)). 
Pooling and Sharing should mitigate critical military capability shortfalls at a lower cost, 
ensure the effectiveness of national armed forces and preserve state military posture (Mockli 
(2012), Henius and McDonald (2012)). Under the Pooling and Sharing Initiative (2010) EU states 
identified six possible areas in which they can enhance cooperation: harmonization of military 
requirements, research and development, acquisition, training and exercises, command 
structures and procedures and operating costs.429  
European leaders have pursued closer cooperation under CSDP and under the aegis 
of the European Defence Agency (EDA). The goal is to enhance EU’s collaborative response 
to emerging capability shortfalls and potential security threats.430 Nick Witney, a former chief 
executive of the EDA, has recommended that Europeans do “not worry about spending 
                                                 
426 Major, Molling and Valasek (2012: 2)  
427 The concept of Smart Security was publicly introduced by Secretary General Rasmusen at the security policy 
conference in Munich, 2011. 
428 Larivé (2014: 97) 
429 Larivé (2014: 91) 
430 Watanabe, Lisa (2013). “France’s New Strategy: The 2013 White Paper.” CSS Analysis in Security Policy. 
No. 139. Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich.  
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more” but about spending “the resources we have more wisely” and avoid “wasting so many 
defense resources on duplicative and incompatible programs.”431  
Some of the more successful collective collaboration projects include: multinational 
command center - European Air Transport Command (EATC) – in Eindhoven, joint ICT 
European cooperation project Helios, management of airspace control under Single European 
Sky, Eurofighter, NH90, European UAVs, EU battle groups, as well as restructuring and 
reform of the European Defense and Technological Base. Contemporary European 
collaborative defense projects may in time develop into a European air defense force, 
integrated EU Battlegroups Plus, or a Common European UAV fleet.432 These developments 
support the defense collaboration hypothesis.  
 
II. Measuring Collective Defense Collaboration 
I probe the hypothesis that defense spending cuts are not detrimental to military 
capacity if states increase defense collaboration during DSCP’s. This hypothesis requires 
evidence that states increase collaborative spending433 more often than national spending on 
                                                 
431 Erlanger (2014).  
432 Drent, Homan and Zandee (2013: 10) 
433 Both indicators of collaborative spending that I use are existing and consistently reported EDA-source 
collaboration data indicators. 
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military equipment procurement434 and R&T435 during DSCP’s, relative to the baseline pattern 
between 2005 and 2012.436 It also requires evidence of increases (improvements) in service-
level manpower and equipment or line-item R&D, analyzed in the defense reform chapter. I 
use Boolean algebra and a difference-in-difference analysis to evaluate evidence in support of 
the defense collaboration hypothesis. 
First, I apply Boolean algebra to determine the baseline and DSCP frequency of 
increased collaborative procurement and collaborative R&T spending. Increased investment 
in collaborative procurement and R&T requires evidence of biennial increases in collaborative 
spending that are not accompanied by increases in national equipment procurement or R&T 
spending. This evidence is a necessary condition of increased defense collaboration because 
increases or decreases in national equipment procurement alone could indicate the same 
procurement trends at both collective and national levels rather than enhanced collective 
collaboration.  
                                                 
434 The data on military equipment procurement spending comes from the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) 
online Defence Data Portal and covers the years from 2005 to 2012. National patterns are based on data on ‘total 
defense equipment procurement,’ which entails equipment procurement expenditure for all major equipment 
categories per an EU state. The collaborative patterns are assessed through the analysis of data on ‘European 
collaborative defense equipment procurement,’ where collaboration is defined as an “agreement by at least two 
EU member states Ministries of Defence for project or programme contracts,” with possible non-EU 
participation lower than 50%. EDA defence documents, European Collaborative Defence Equipment 
Procurement in 2005, Slide 18.  
435 The data on R&T spending comes from the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) online Defence Data Portal 
and covers the years from 2005 to 2012. National R&T investment patterns are based on data under “R&T Spend 
in Europe,” where R&T entails expenditure for basic research, applied research and technology demonstration 
for defence purposes. Enhanced collaborative R&T spending is assessed on the basis of data under ‘European 
collaborative R&T Spend,’ where European collaboration is defined as an “agreement by at least two EU Member 
States Ministries of Defence for project or programme contracts,” and where possible non-EU partners’ share 
in such contracts is lower than 50%.  
436 Because the data is available only from 2005 onwards, the more complete analysis concerns the post-2008 
period. This is not detrimental to the analysis, as a large majority of the defense spending cut periods occur in 
the post-2008 period, a time frame that also offers EDA’s publically accessible data on European defense 
equipment procurement collaboration. 
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Therefore, increased collaboration (related either to procurement or R&T spending) 
requires evidence of any one of the following three patterns: 1) biennial increase in 
collaborative investment accompanied by a biennial decrease in national investment; 2) no 
change in collaborative spending accompanied by a decrease in national spending, or 3) a 
biennial increase in collaborative spending accompanied by no change in national spending. 
Observations in support of the collective collaboration hypothesis are coded ‘1’. Patterns that 
contradict the hypothesis indicate that states follow the same spending patterns at the 
collective and national levels (coded ‘2’), or that they spend more at a national than on 
collective level (coded ‘0’).437 
Second, evidence of increasing collective defense collaboration during DSCP’s 
requires more frequent defense collaboration during DSCP’s relative to the baseline 
cooperation pattern. Baseline frequency reflects the percent of biennial increases in 
collaborative procurement or R&T spending out of the total of eight biennial differentials 
between 2005 and 2012. Frequency of increased defense collaboration during DSCP’s reflects 
the percent of these observations out of the total biennial changes within each DSCP.  
To evaluate whether European states collaborated more frequently during DSCP’s, I 
also examine collaborative patterns in aggregate. A country can increase both collective R&T 
investment and collective procurement spending during a DSCP. Alternatively, defense 
                                                 
437 Observations in which spending on military equipment procurement or R&T at both collective and national 
levels moves in the same direction between two consecutive years are coded 2 and any other outcome is coded 
0, exhibiting neither enhanced collective collaboration nor the same procurement or R&T trends. Zero values 
include situations in which collective spending decreases while national spending increases between the same two 
fiscal years, or when collaborative spending does not change while national spending on equipment procurement 
or R&T increases. 
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collaboration may be ‘driven’ either by R&T or equipment procurement spending. In case of 
the former, collaborative R&T spending increases but collaborative procurement decreases or 
remains unchanged during a DSCP. In case of the latter, collaborative equipment procurement 
spending increases but collaborative R&T spending decreases or remains unchanged during a 
DSCP. 
Third, I evaluate whether DSCP’s potentially related to defense collaboration were 
also non-detrimental to national military capacity. I do so by examining quantitative change 
and qualitative improvements in military capacity. First, I compare evidence of increased 
defense collaboration in a group of DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase in military 
capacity to a group of DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline in military capacity. Next, I 
evaluate whether military capacity outcomes are possibly non-detrimental as states make 
qualitative improvements related to service-level or line-item increases concomitant with the 
analysis of defense reform in the preceding chapter. I examine how DSCP’s relate to evidence 
of potential defense reform in states that increased and those that did not increase their 
frequency of collective defense collaboration. Declining defense spending is not detrimental 
to military capacity in European states if defense reform related improvements occur more 
frequently in a set of countries that increased collective collaboration than in those countries 
that did not increase defense collaboration during DSCP’s. 
Lastly, QCA analysis demands that collective collaboration is further evaluated against 
evidence obtained through process-tracing: government’s execution of defense reform and a 
strategic decision to pursue collective collaboration based on government’s entry into political 
agreements with other European partners designed to pursue collaborative military projects 
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and programs. In the two case studies, I evaluate foreign and security policy documents, 
legislative acts, political party election manifestos, or political statements. 
 
III. Collaborative Procurement of Military Equipment 
Defense collaboration hypothesis is supported by evidence of greater frequency of 
increased spending on collaborative equipment procurement during DSCP’s, relative to the 
baseline patterns. In the following section I evaluate the baseline and then the DSCP frequency 
of key indicators of defense collaboration: collaborative procurement and collaborative R&T 
spending. 
 
III. A. Baseline Frequency of Investment in Collaborative Procurement (2005-2012) 
In this section I evaluate the baseline frequency of increasing collaborative 
procurement between 2005 and 2012. I compare biennial changes in spending on European 
collaborative defense equipment procurement (Table 20.A) with biennial changes in spending 
on national equipment procurement (Table 21.A). In a resulting truth table, I record all 
biennial observations between 2005 and 2012: evidence in support of increased collaborative 
procurement is coded ‘1’, same patterns of spending on collaborative and national level are 
coded ‘2’, other patterns are coded ‘0’ (Table 22.A).438 Frequency is expressed as percent of 
                                                 
438 This means an analysis of patterns in a population of 10 DSCP’s for which EDA data on collaborative 
spending on military equipment procurement is available. In the years 2006-2009, EDA does not provide 
information on national equipment procurement alone. This is determined by subtracting national spending on 
“R&D” from national spending on “Equipment procurement and R&D”.  
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biennial increases in collective procurement out of the total of 8 year-to-year differentials 
between 2005 and 2012. 
I find evidence that only 8 of the 23 European states with DSCP’s (34.8%) increased 
their spending on collaborative equipment procurement between 2005 and 2012. States 
increased spending on collaborative procurement only infrequently. Half of the states made 
such increases only 12.5% of the time. None of the states increased their spending on 
collaborative procurement more often than 37.5% of the time, and two out of the 10 states 
(20%) did not increase their spending on collaborative procurement at all (Table 9). 
 
Table 9. – Baseline Frequency of Increased Collaborative Procurement (2005-2012) 
Frequency of 
Occurrence 
(2005-2012) 
Increased Collective European 
Equipment Procurement 
Same Patterns of Equipment 
Procurement at National and 
Collective Levels 
% of 10 cases of 
DSCP 
List of Country-
Cases 
% of 10 cases of 
DSCP 
List of Country-
Cases 
87.5% - -  10%  IT 
75% - -  10%  ES 
62.5% - -  10%  FR 
50% - -  30%  DE, UK, LT 
37.5% 10%  NL  20%  PT, SE 
25% 30%  DE, PT, UK  10%  NL 
12.5% 40%  FR, IT, SE, EE  10%  EE 
0% 20%  ES, LT - - 
 
More consistently, these states synchronized patterns of spending between collective 
and national levels. Out of the 10 DSCP’s, 80% of countries frequently exhibited the same 
procurement patterns at the collaborative and national levels, ranging between 37.5% and 
87.5% of the time. Such high frequency of synchronized procurement spending significantly 
surpasses the frequency of increased collaborative spending on military equipment 
procurement (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. - Baseline Frequency of Spending on Equipment Procurement: Collaborative vs. National Patterns 
 
III.B. DSCP Frequency of Investment in Collaborative Procurement  
Next, I evaluate the frequency of increasing spending on collaborative procurement 
during 10 DSCP’s occurring between 2005 and 2012. Frequency is calculated as percent of 
observations of increased collaborative procurement out of the total year-to-year differentials 
comprising each DSCP (Table 22.A). 
I find that in 50% of the 10 cases, states decreased their defense spending but did not 
simultaneously increase their spending on collaborative procurement. When states increased 
collaborative procurement spending during DSCP’s, 40% of them did so less frequently than 
synchronizing it with national spending patterns. In additional 40% of the cases, states 
increased their collaborative procurement as frequently as synchronizing it with national 
spending patterns (Figure 6). 
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When DSCP’s did not lead to increased collaborative procurement, states frequently 
(France, Sweden, Lithuania) if not always (Italy, Spain) synchronized their procurement 
spending patterns between national and collaborative levels. In Germany, declining defense 
spending related to increased national spending rather than collaborative spending or 
synchronized patterns of equipment procurement spending. Sweden, Portugal, Netherlands, 
Estonia and the UK increased their collaborative procurement spending 25% or 50% of the 
time during a DSCP. Netherlands and Estonia increased collective defense collaboration as 
often as they synchronized biennial changes in defense equipment procurement between the 
collective and national levels. In the UK’s DSCP, government increased collective 
procurement as often as it did national procurement spending (Table 10). 
 
Table 10. - DSCP Frequency of Increased Collaborative Procurement (2005-2012) 
Frequency of 
Occurrence 
during DSCP’s 
(2005-2012) 
Increased Collective European 
Equipment Procurement 
Same Patterns of Equipment 
Procurement at National and 
Collective Levels 
% of 10 cases 
of DSCP 
List of Country-
Cases 
% of 10 cases of 
DSCP 
List of Country-
Cases 
100% -  20% IT, ES 
75% -  20% FR, SE 
66.7% -  10% LT 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
No Evidence 25% of the time 50% of the time
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
D
SC
P
's
Frequency of Biennial Increases
Figure 6. - DSCP Frequency of Increased Collaborative Procurement 
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50% 30% NL, UK, EE 30% NL, PT, EE 
37.5% -  -  
25% 20% PT, SE -  
12.5% -  -  
0% 50% FR, DE, IT, ES, LT 20% DE, UK 
 
III.C. Increased Collaborative Procurement Spending during DSCP 
I find that sustained reductions in military spending did not provide an overwhelming 
impetus for European states to increase their collaboration in procuring military equipment.439 
However, in as many as 40% of the DSCP’s, declining defense spending did mean more 
frequent increases in collaborative procurement spending: Sweden, Netherlands, Estonia and 
the UK. Estonia tripled the frequency of collaborative spending during defense spending cuts. 
Sweden and the UK doubled their baseline frequency of spending on collaborative 
procurement during DSCP’s. The Netherlands increased its spending on collaborative 
procurement least frequently during a DSCP (Table 11).  
 
 
Table 11. – Change in Frequency of Increased Collaborative Procurement Spending during DSCP 
Frequency of 
Increased 
Collaborative 
Procurement 
Spending  
2005-2012 
Pattern 
Defense Spending Cut Periods Comparison 
Baseline 
Frequency of 
Increases in 
Collaborative 
Procurement 
Frequency of 
Increases in 
Collaborative 
Procurement 
Same 
Collective-
Level and 
National-Level 
Patterns 
Increased 
National 
Procurement 
Baseline 
Frequency of 
Increased 
Collaboration to 
DSCP Frequency 
France 12.5% 0% 75% 25% Decreased 
Italy 12.5% 0% 100% 0% Decreased 
Spain 0% 0% 100% 0% Unaffected 
                                                 
439 I compare baseline collaborative procurement patterns with defense spending cut period patterns. Increased 
spending on collaborative procurement requires evidence that states increased collaborative procurement more 
frequently during a period of defense spending decline than in general. These findings, however, concern only 
that set of cases for which collaborative procurement data was available. Therefore, out of the pool of 27 cases 
of EU member states, the five country cases in which governments increase their collaborative defense equipment 
procurement spending present only 16.7% of all cases of country-specific defense spending cut periods. 
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Lithuania 0% 0% 66.7% 33.3% Unaffected 
Germany 25.0% 0% 0% 100% Decreased 
Sweden 12.5% 25% 75% 0% Increased 
Portugal 25.0% 25% 50% 25% Unaffected 
Netherlands 37.5% 50% 50% 0% Increased 
Estonia 12.5% 50% 50% 0% Increased 
UK 25% 50% 0% 50% Increased 
 
These findings also mean that in 60% of the 10 cases, countries did not decide to 
collaborate more frequently during DSCP’s. Countries never spent more on collective 
procurement in 30% of the 6 cases and declined their collaborative cooperation in the other 
30% of the cases.440 France, Italy and Germany increased their procurement collaboration only 
in the absence of budgetary pressures. This means that in 50% of the 6 cases (Spain, Lithuania, 
and Portugal), declining defense spending did not compel governments to start spending more 
on collaborative procurement projects. These countries continued to synchronize their 
national and collective spending patterns on equipment procurement most or half of the time 
during DSCP’s (Figure 7). 
 
                                                 
440 In 30% of the cases, countries increased their collaborative procurement less often during a period of defense 
spending decline (France, Italy and Germany). In additional 30% of the cases, declining defense spending did 
not change the baseline frequency of increased collective collaboration (Spain, Lithuania and Portugal). 
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Figure 7. -  Change in Frequency of Increased Collaborative Procurement Relative to Baseline Patterns 
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IV. Collaborative R&T Spending 
In this section, I evaluate whether states increase their collaborative R&T spending 
more frequently during DSCP’s. I evaluate national and collaborative spending patterns in 19 
periods of defense spending cuts for which R&T data is available. When countries increase 
their collaborative R&T spending more frequently during a DSCP relative to the baseline 
patterns, it is plausible that declining defense spending was not detrimental to national military 
capacity. 
 
IV.A. Baseline Investment in Collaborative R&T (2005-2012) 
In this section I evaluate the baseline frequency of biennial increases in collaborative 
R&T spending between 2005 and 2012. I do so by comparing biennial changes in spending 
on collaborative R&T (Table 23.A) with biennial changes in spending on national R&T (Table 
24.A) within the same year differentials. In a resulting truth table, I record all biennial 
observations between 2005 and 2012: evidence in support of increased collaborative R&T is 
coded ‘1’, same patterns of spending on collaborative and national level are coded ‘2’, other 
patterns are coded ‘0’ (Table 25.A).441 Frequency is presented as percent of biennial increases 
in collective R&T spending out of the total of 8 year-to-year differentials between 2005 and 
2012. 
I find that 19 of the 30 DSCP’s (63.3%) relate to biennial increases in collaborative 
R&T spending between 2005 and 2012. However, increasing collaborative R&T spending was 
                                                 
441 This means an analysis of patterns in a population of 19 DSCP’s for which EDA data on collaborative 
spending on military equipment procurement is available.  
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infrequent, never occurring more than half the time in the 2005-2012 period. In most of the 
19 cases (68.4%), governments enhanced their collaborative R&T at the most only 25% of the 
time. Only Netherlands increased its collaborative R&T spending half of the time. More 
frequently, European states shadowed collaborative and national R&T spending patterns: 
42.1% of the 19 EU members were cutting or increasing their R&T spending simultaneously 
at national and collective levels 50% of the time (Table 12). 
 
Table 12. – European Collaborative R&T Spending 
Frequency of 
Occurrence 
Increased Collaborative R&T Same R&T Spending Patterns 
Country Cases Percentage 
of 19 DSCP 
Country Cases Percentage 
of 19 DSCP 
87.5% - - FR, ES 10.5% 
75% - - LV, LT 10.5% 
62.5% - - EL, UK, HU, SE 21.1% 
50% NL 5.3% PT, BG, SK, SI 21.1% 
37.5% IT, AT, SE, EE, RO 26.3% DE, IT, CZ 15.8% 
25% EL, PT, UK, CZ, BG, SK, SI 36.8% NL, AT, EE 15.8% 
12.5% DE, ES, HU, LV, LT 26.3% RO 5.3% 
0% FR 5.3% - 0% 
 
I find that bigger European security players increased investment in collaborative R&T 
less frequently than smaller players. The UK increased investment in collaborative R&T only 
25% of the time, and France – a staunch proponent of European defense collaboration, never 
increased its investment in collaborative R&T spending over national R&T spending. 
Germany increased its collaborative R&T over national R&T spending only 12.5% of the time.  
Smaller European security players such as Austria, Sweden, Estonia, Romania, Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia (34.7% of the 23 countries) increased their 
collaborative R&T spending more frequently: between 25% and 37.5% of the time. Only 
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Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg (17.4% of the 23 countries) increased 
collaborative R&T less frequently, 12.5% of the time. 
 
IV.B. Collaborative R&T Spending During Defense Spending Cut Periods  
In this section, I examine the frequency of biennial increases in collaborative R&T 
during 19 DSCP’s.442 Frequency is expressed as percentage of biennial increases (relative to 
the national R&T spending patterns) out of the total biennial differentials within a DSCP.  
I find that biennial increases443 in collaborative R&T occurred in 57.9% of the 19 
DSCP: Sweden, Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Estonia, Romania, Italy, Greece, Spain, 
Bulgaria and Slovenia. In 42.1% of the 19 DSCP’s, I find no evidence of biennial increases in 
collaborative R&T. This entails DSCP’s in France, Germany, UK, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia (Table 13).  
Out of the eleven countries that increased their investment in collaborative R&T at 
least once during a DSCP, more than half (54.4%) did so at least 50% of the time (Sweden, 
Netherlands, Austria, Estonia, Romania, and Portugal). This represents about 31% of the 19 
DSCP’s, and 5% more cases than the five cases related to infrequent (25%) biennial increases 
in collaborative R&T.  
 
 
                                                 
442 The 19 DSCP’s are indicated in Table 24.A. They are highlighted in gray.  
443 This means evidence of at least one biennial increase in collaborative R&T relative to the national R&T 
spending patterns in eleven countries. 
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I find more robust evidence in support of synchronized patterns of biennial change in 
collaborative and national R&T spending. In 58% of the 19 DSCP’s, I find biennial patterns 
in R&T spending to be synchronized between collective and national levels. In 21% of the 
cases, R&T spending was synchronized between these two levels during the entire DSCP. In 
additional 21% of the cases, states synchronized their collaborative and national R&T 
spending patterns between 66.7% and 75% of the time (Table 13). This means that during 
DSCP’s countries changed their collaborative and national R&T investments in the same 
direction more frequently than they increased their collaborative over national R&T spending.  
 
Table 13. - DSCP Frequency of Increases in Collaborative R&T 
Frequency of 
Occurrence 
during DSCP’s 
(2005-2012) 
Increased Collaborative R&T 
Spending 
Same Patterns of R&T Spending at 
National and Collective Levels 
% of 19 cases 
of DSCP 
List of Country-
Cases 
% of 19 cases 
of DSCP 
List of Country-
Cases 
100% 5.3% SE 21.1% UK, LV, LT, SK 
75% -  15.8% ES, HU, BG 
66.7% 5.3% AT 5.3% FR 
50% 21.1% NL, PT, EE, RO 15.8% NL, CZ, SI 
40% -  5.3% IT 
Figure 8. - DSCP Frequency of Biennial Increases in R&T 
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33.3% 10.5% EL, IT 5.3% EL 
25% 15.8% ES, BG, SI 10.5% PT, AT 
0% 42.1% FR, DE, UK, CZ, 
HU, LV, LT, SK 
21.1% DE, SE, EE, RO 
 
IV.C. Increased Collaborative R&T Spending during DSCP  
In this section, I evaluate a potential link between defense spending cuts and increased 
collaborative R&T spending. I do so by examining how the frequency of collaborative R&T 
investment changed during DSCP relative to the baseline pattern. More frequent increases in 
collaborative R&T during DSCP’s indicate that DSCP’s were potentially related to increased 
collaboration.  
I find that in 7 of the 19 DSCP cases 36.8%, frequency of biennial increases in R&T 
collaboration increased relative to the baseline patterns. This finding complies with the 
theoretical expectation that a detrimental effect of reductions in military spending on military 
capacity could be countered by increasing investment in collaborative projects. In 21.1% of 
the cases, declining defense spending was not accompanied by any increases in collaborative 
R&T investment. In 42.1% of the cases, cuts in defense spending meant a decline in the 
frequency of increased spending on collaborative R&T (Table 14).  
 
Table 14. – European Collaborative R&T Spending During Defense Spending Cut Periods 
Frequency of 
Increased 
Collaborative 
R&T Spending 
Increased 
Collaborative 
R&T  
(2005-2012) 
Frequency During Defense Spending Cut Periods  Comparison 
Increased 
Collaborative 
R&T 
Same 
Collective-
Level and 
National-Level 
Patterns 
Increased 
National 
R&T 
DSCP Pattern 
to Baseline 
Pattern of 
Increased 
Collaboration 
France 0% 0% 66.7% 33.3% Unaffected 
Germany 12.5% 0% 0% 100% Decreased 
UK 25% 0% 100% 0% Decreased 
Czech Republic 25% 0% 50% 50% Decreased 
Hungary 12.5% 0% 75% 25% Decreased 
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Latvia 12.5% 0% 100% 0% Decreased 
Lithuania 12.5% 0% 100% 0% Decreased 
Slovakia 25% 0% 100% 0% Decreased 
Netherlands 50% 50% 50% 0% Unaffected 
Sweden 37.5% 100% 0% 0% Increased 
Austria 37.5% 66.7% 0% 33.3% Increased 
Estonia 37.5% 50% 0% 50% Increased 
Romania 37.5% 50% 0% 50% Increased 
Italy 37.5% 33.3% 66.7% 0% Decreased 
Greece 25% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% Increased 
Portugal 25% 50% 25% 25% Increased 
Bulgaria 25% 25% 75% 0% Unaffected 
Slovenia 25% 25% 50% 25% Unaffected 
Spain 12.5% 25% 75% 0% Increased 
 
V. Increased Defense Collaboration during DSCP and Change in Military Capacity 
The defense collaboration hypothesis expects non-detrimental military capacity 
outcomes. I evaluate whether increased defense collaboration was non-detrimental to states’ 
military capacity as follows. First, I determine the aggregated frequency of increased defense 
collaboration during DSCP’s. Second, I evaluate how evidence of increased defense 
collaboration in a group of DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase in military capacity 
compares to a group of DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline in military capacity. Third, I 
examine how increasing defense collaboration potentially relates to qualitative improvements 
in military capacity. Qualitative improvements in military capacity are proxied by defense 
reform related increases in service-level manpower, equipment and line-item spending on 
R&D.444 Fourth, I compare whether DSCP’s that relate to increased defense collaboration 
entail evidence of defense reform more often than those DSCP’s with no evidence of increased 
                                                 
444 Such outcomes can be approximated by evidence of defense reform, which relates to service-level increases 
in manpower or equipment, or line-item increases in R&D spending. 
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defense collaboration. DSCP’s related to increased defense collaboration are not detrimental 
to military capacity if accompanied by greater presence of defense reform drivers.   
 
V.A. Collective Defense Collaboration during DSCP 
Evidence of defense collaboration requires an aggregated analysis of increasing 
investment in collaborative equipment procurement and collaborative R&T. This means an 
evaluation of changes in the DSCP frequency of spending on collaborative procurement and 
collaborative R&T relative to the baseline patterns. In aggregate, defense collaboration 
increases during a DSCP when states more frequently invest either in collaborative 
procurement of equipment or in collaborative R&T, or in both. Patterns in the two key 
indicators of defense collaboration are reported either as an increase (Y) or no increase (N) in 
the frequency of increased spending on collaborative procurement/R&T during DSCP.445 
Increased frequency in spending on collaborative procurement or R&T therefore defines a 
driver of defense collaboration. A driver of defense collaboration is defined by any one or 
both indicators of potential defense collaboration.  
 I find that in nine out of 19 DSCP’s (47.3%), states increased the frequency either of 
collaborative procurement or R&T spending. Post-2008 Sweden, Estonia, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, and Romania more frequently increased 
investment in defense collaboration when faced with declining defense spending. Pre-2008 
Germany and post-2008 France, Italy, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
                                                 
445 I choose binary coding rather than percentage reporting of the findings because absence of increased spending 
on one indicator of collaborative activities does not detract from the presence of increases in the other. 
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Slovakia and Slovenia failed to pursue more frequent defense collaboration during DSCP’s 
(Table 15). This finding indicates that declining defense spending prompted 5.3% more 
countries not to increase their defense collaboration.446  
Furthermore, I find that in 55.5% of the 9 cases, increased defense collaboration 
resulted from collaborative spending on R&T: Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria and Romania. 
In additional 22.2% of the cases, increased defense collaboration resulted from both increased 
spending on collaborative R&T and equipment procurement: Sweden and Estonia. In the 
remaining 22.2%, defense collaboration stemmed from increased investment in collaborative 
procurement of military equipment: Netherlands and the UK. These findings imply that 
detrimental outcomes in military capacity related to declining defense spending in European 
states are potentially countered by collaborative investment in the future improvement of 
military capabilities rather than by immediate procurement of new military capabilities.447 
 
Table 15. – Analysis of Increased Defense Collaboration during DSCP 
No. Country Period 
Increased Frequency of Defense Collaboration during 
DSCP, Relative to Baseline Patterns 
Procurement R&T 
Aggregated 
Analysis 
Driver 
1 France 2008-2012 No No No - 
2 Germany 2004-2006 No No No - 
3 Greece 2008-2011 - Yes Yes R&T 
4 Italy 2007-2010 No No No - 
5 Netherlands 2008-2012 Yes No Yes Procure 
6 Portugal 2008-2012 No Yes Yes R&T 
7 Spain 2008-2012 No Yes Yes R&T 
                                                 
446 This outcome is measured on a population of 19 cases of defense spending cut periods for which collaborative 
data is available. Data is not available for the remaining 11 cases of defense spending cut periods, or for 36.7% 
of the total 30 defense spending cut periods. 
447 Estonia and Sweden increased their investment in defense collaboration broadly, presenting empirically strong 
evidence of increasing defense collaboration during periods of declining defense spending. Increased investment 
in collaborative equipment procurement in UK and the Netherlands implies an effort to improve military capacity 
more immediately, in terms of investing in additional hardware. 
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8 United Kingdom 2007-2009 Yes No Yes Procure 
9 Czech Republic 2008-2012 - No No - 
10 Hungary 2008-2012 - No No - 
11 Austria 2007-2010 - Yes Yes R&T 
12 Sweden 2007-2009 Yes Yes Yes Both 
13 Bulgaria 2008-2012 - No No - 
14 Estonia 2008-2010 Yes Yes Yes Both 
15 Latvia 2008-2010 - No No - 
16 Lithuania 2008-2010 No No No - 
17 Romania 2008-2010 - Yes Yes R&T 
18 Slovakia 2008-2012 - No No - 
19 Slovenia 2008-2012 - No No - 
Frequency of Increased Collaboration 
(out of 30 DSCP’s) 
13.3% 23.3% 30%  
V.B. Defense Collaboration and Aggregated Change in Military Capacity 
The hypothesis on defense collaboration requires evidence that DSCP’s related to 
increased frequency of defense collaboration are simultaneously accompanied by potential 
improvements in military capacity. One way to evaluate whether defense collaboration during 
DSCP’s explains non-detrimental military capacity outcomes is to evaluate how evidence of 
increased defense collaboration during DSCP’s compares between a group of spending cuts 
related to an aggregated increase and an aggregated decline in military capacity.  
I proceed with the analysis by recording an aggregated change in military capacity in 
each of the 19 DSCP’s and whether the DSCP was potentially related to increased defense 
collaboration. The former comes from the analysis in Chapter 2. The latter refers to the sixth 
column in Table 15. An increase in the frequency of defense collaboration during DSCP 
relative to the baseline frequency of defense collaboration implies that a DSCP possibly related 
to increased defense collaboration. Out of the 19 DSCP’s, 13 related to an aggregated decline 
in military capacity and 6 to an aggregated increase in military capacity. 
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I find that 53.8% of DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline in military capacity were 
also potentially related to increased defense collaboration. In 33.3% of the 6 DSCP’s related 
to an aggregated increase in military capacity were cuts also possibly related to defense 
collaboration. This finding implies greater evidence of defense collaboration in potentially 
detrimental relationship between defense spending cuts and military capacity outcomes. A 
portion of the DSCP’s potentially related to defense collaboration when cuts in defense 
spending resulted in an aggregated decline in military capacity exceeds a portion of DSCP’s 
related to defense collaboration when cuts in spending resulted in an aggregated increase in 
military capacity by 20.5% (Table 16). 
 
 
Table 16. - Increased Defense Collaboration during DSCP's and Aggregated Change in Military Capacity 
No. Country Period Aggregated 
Change in Military 
Capacity 
Increased Defense 
Collaboration 
(Aggregate 
Analysis) 
1 France 2008-2012 Decline No 
2 Germany 2004-2006 Decline No 
3 Greece 2008-2011 Decline Yes 
4 Italy 2007-2010 Increase No 
5 Netherlands 2008-2012 Decline Yes 
6 Portugal 2008-2012 Decline Yes 
7 Spain 2008-2012 Decline Yes 
8 United Kingdom 2007-2009 Decline Yes 
9 Czech Republic 2008-2012 Decline No 
10 Hungary 2008-2012 Decline No 
11 Austria 2007-2010 Decline Yes 
12 Sweden 2007-2009 Increase Yes 
13 Bulgaria 2008-2012 Decline No 
14 Estonia 2008-2010 Increase Yes 
15 Latvia 2008-2010 Increase No 
16 Lithuania 2008-2010 Increase No 
17 Romania 2008-2010 Decline Yes 
18 Slovakia 2008-2012 Decline No 
19 Slovenia 2008-2012 Increase No 
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V.C. Defense Collaboration and Drivers of Defense Reform 
Another way to gauge non-detrimental outcomes in military capacity is to cross-
reference the collective defense findings with drivers of defense reform. Defense reform 
drivers characterize the prevailing character of potential improvements under defense reform. 
Defense reform drivers relate to predominant increases in service-level military equipment 
stock or manpower, or line-item R&D spending during a DSCP. Decline in defense spending 
related to defense collaboration is not detrimental to European military capacity if the DSCP’s 
possibly related to increased defense collaboration entail greater evidence of defense reform 
than those DSCP’s that do not relate to increased defense collaboration.448 In this section, I 
compare evidence of increased defense collaboration during DSCP against presence of drivers 
of defense reform (Table 26.A).449  
I find that equipment and manpower-driven defense reform occurred more frequently 
during DSCP’s related to increased defense collaboration than in those that are not related to 
it (7.7% and 23.1%, respectively). This finding suggests a potentially non-detrimental 
relationship between declining defense spending related to increased defense collaboration 
and military capacity in European states. 
On the other hand, R&D-driven defense reform occurred 23% more frequently in 
DSCP’s unrelated to increased defense collaboration. I find that 53.8% of the 11 cases of 
R&D-driven defense reform related to DSCP’s unrelated to increased defense collaboration, 
                                                 
448 To evaluate these relationships, I count drivers of defense reform individually. This means disaggregating 
multiple drivers of defense and counting each towards the total observations of individual drivers of defense 
reform. 
449 In the 19 DSCP’s, I find a total of 13 equipment related drivers of defense reform, 11 R&D related drivers 
and 5 manpower drivers of defense reform. 
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and 30.8% occurred in those DSCP’s relate to increased defense collaboration. This finding 
suggests a potential trade-off between national and collective-level investment in military 
research and development (Figure 9). 
 
 
Cases in which DSCP’s were accompanied by increased defense collaboration and 
increased service-level equipment stock or military force numbers support the defense 
collaboration hypothesis. Such cases imply that increased defense collaboration during 
DSCP’s potentially results in acquisition and procurement of additional military hardware at 
national level. Some of the potential savings from this process could then be reinvested in 
hiring new military personnel. On the other hand, these findings imply that when countries do 
not increase their defense collaboration, they still invest in R&D: lack of greater defense 
collaboration during DSCP’s does not appear to be detrimental to continued increase in 
national R&D investment.  
In sum, I find that in all 9 cases of 19 DSCP’s related to increased defense collaboration 
(47.4%), states also potentially engaged in defense reform-related improvements of military 
capacity. Decline in defense spending potentially related to defense collaboration in Greece, 
53.8%
30.8% 30.8%
46.2%
53.8%
7.7%
Equipment R&D Manpower
Defence Collaboration Increased Defense Collaboration Did Not Increase
Figure 9. – DSCP’s, Collective Defense Collaboration and Drivers of Defense Reform 
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Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK, Austria, Sweden, Estonia and Romania appears non-
detrimental to military capacity primarily because it entails evidence of increases in service-
level manpower, equipment, or line-item R&D.  
However, in 52.6% of the 19 DSCP’s, decline in defense spending does not appear to 
relate to increased defense collaboration. Declining defense spending in France, Germany, 
Italy, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia therefore 
potentially challenges the defense collaboration hypothesis.  
 
VI. Case Selection  
 This chapter addresses the hypothesis that declining defense spending is not 
detrimental to military capacity if states collaborate more in defense matters. Non-detrimental 
outcomes require evidence that states increase defense collaboration as well as entail service-
level or line-item investment in military capacity. To establish whether this hypothesis is valid, 
I examine qualitative evidence relating to collective collaboration and defense reform during 
a period of defense spending cuts in two countries: UK and France.  
Empirically, UK strongly supports the defense collaboration hypothesis. I compare 
the UK’s case to the period of defense spending cuts in France. France demonstrates strong 
empirical evidence against the defense collaboration hypothesis. UK and France constitute 
opposite cases in terms of defense collaboration outcomes, but are similar in some other key 
considerations: they are both established Western European security powers, EU and NATO 
members, and key players in defining the scope of European defense cooperation.  
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VI. A. United Kingdom (2007-2009) 
 UK presents strong empirical evidence in support of the defense collaboration 
hypothesis. I examine whether the UK government combated cuts in defense spending by 
becoming more engaged in European defense collaboration as a way to safeguard access to 
military capabilities. To do so, I examine strategic and political sources for evidence of defense 
reform policy and commitment to collective military equipment procurement.450  
In the 2007-2009 period, UK’s Labour government was interested in maintaining 
strong national defence.451 It was important for Labour Party establishment to ensure that their 
country does not go back “to a Britain marginalized and weak,”452 but that it goes forward to 
“a stronger country in a safer, fairer world, … at the hear of Europe, working together to 
tackle terror and spread peace…”.453  
Programmatically, the party envisioned UK’s fighting forces to be some of the most 
flexible and effective in the world. To achieve this end, the government committed to 
continued investment in and reform of the defense forces.454 This decision was premised on 
the understanding that contemporary security situation demands defense modernization. 
Modernization was to be funded through newly acquired savings in force structures: “A 
                                                 
450 These sources include Labour Party Manifesto 2005, Defence White Paper 2003/2004, Government’s 
National Security Strategy 2008 (updated 2009), Strategic Defence Review and the Green Paper on Defence 
(2010), citations of political leaders or references to defense contracts and/or agreements. 
451 UK General Elections took place in 2005, resulting in the Labour government throughout the period of the 
defense spending cut period under analysis (2007-2009). The Prime Ministers who took office during this time 
were Tony Blair (2005 - June 2007) and subsequently Gordon Brown (June 2007- May 2010). In this period, the 
Ministry of Defense was led by three Labour Ministers of Defense: Des Browne (May 2006 – October 2008), 
John Hutton (October 2008 – June 2009) and Bob Ainsworth (June 2009 and May 2010). 
452 The Labour Party Manifesto 2005: Britain Forward Not Back, Chapter 7, International Policy: A Stronger 
country in a secure, sustainable and just world, pp. 1-56  
453 Ibid., p. 8 
454 Ibid., pp. 87-88 
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reduction in the number of infantry battalions, made possible because of the improved security 
situation in Northern Ireland, has allowed extra resources for the vital support services such 
as signals, engineers, intelligence and logistics units – the parts of the army most under 
pressure.“455  
The UK leadership intended to modernize the armed forces despite declining defense 
spending. Defence White Paper 2003/2004 Delivering Security in a Changing World spelled out a 
number of the key goals for improving the quality of the UK’s armed forces. The main 
objective was to “put in place a more cohesive and better equipped force than exists in the 
present,” and to reallocate resources toward equipment modernization by prividing 
“significant additional resources for equipment and infrastructure broadly within the existing 
level of financial allocation.”456 Funding for military equipment modernization or acquisition 
was to proportionally increase, regardless of how much the UK actually spent on defence.  
Modernization was also to be funded through savings. To save, UK intended to reduce 
their force structures by 1,000 men in the Defence Force, which resulted in a 100% of property 
sales and pay savings. These savings were to be reinvested in quipment and military 
infrastructure.457 Air Corps specifically benefited from “major investment in equipment” and 
the Naval Service acquired a new ship.458 
In light of the 2008 global financial crisis, UK initiated a Strategic Defence Review, 
which delivered broad defense reforms. UK leadership agreed to draft a new Defence White 
                                                 
455 Ibid., p.88 
456 The White Paper on Defence, Review of Implementation (2007), London, UK, p. 7  
457 Ibid., p. 8 
458 Ibid. 
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Paper459  as a way to bridge resource-capability gaps and “match foreign policy with the future 
capabilities of the UK Armed Forces.”460 It was necessary to build greater political support for 
dedicating more adequate resources to UK’s expeditionary capabilities as well as an ‘effects 
based’ transformation of the armed forces. The global economic crisis and the subsequent 
constraints on government spending put significant pressure on the Armed Forces and the 
Ministry of Defence expenditures. These stresses precipitated political capital to approve new 
National Security Strategy (NSS 2008/2009)461 and to conduct new Strategic Defence Review 
after the General Election in 2010. 
National Security Strategy (2008) Security in an Interdependent World462 established the 
need for a cross-departmental security framework as a prerequisit for UK’s ability to 
adequately meet future security challenges.463 In order to succeed in this endeavor, government 
pursued “strong, balanced and flexible national capabilities,” and continued to invest in 
strengthening national security.464 This meant retaining UK’s nuclear deterrence capability, but 
also “strong conventional forces capable of deterring and responding to a range of state-led 
threats.” 465   
However, a 2010 Defense and Security Review directive to reduce UK’s defense 
budget by 8% until 2014 in response to the global financial crisis “essentially ended the era of 
                                                 
459 Taylor, Claire (2010). Strategic Defence Review Green Paper: Preliminary Observations, International Affairs 
and Defence Section of the House of Commons, SN/IA/5341, p. 3. At the end of 2007, the Liberal Democrats 
demanded a new strategic defence review. This demand was one of the key themes in their report entitled Our 
Nation’s Duty.   
460 Ibid. 
461 Ibid., pp. 3-4 
462 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom (2008). Security in an interdependent world, Cm7291.  
463 Taylor (2010: 4) 
464  The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom (NSS) (2008), p.9 
465 Ibid., p. 45 
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Great Britain as a world power.”466 With budgetary reductions, major operations such as the 
Iraq war or unilateral missions such as the Falklands War would no longer be affordable.467 
Troops had to be reduced from 180,000 to 163,000, modernization of submarines abandoned, 
and many crucial systems decomissioned – including tanks, Tornado aircraft, and the Ark 
Royal aircraft carrier. Cost of constructing new aircraft carriers was not only to increase but 
also face delays in being put in service.468 
Despite the directive, UK in principle continued to emphasize quality over quantity of 
its military capabilities. UK’s spending on high-technology military equipment has been high 
by international standards.469 This choice has been made to ensure UK’s military supremacy 
and that “the capability of a given aircraft, ship, or infantry unit far outstrips that of even 10 
years ago, and that of most conceivable adversaries.”470 UK acquired or planned new high-
technology military equipment acquisitions even in austere times. These entailed additions to 
strategic airlift, support helicopters, protected patrol vehicles, surveillane and personal 
equipment, as well as the announced intent to procure aircraft carriers, air defence and anti-
submarine warfare capabilities.471  
UK Armed Forces were also reforming their defence procurement procedures and 
with them, the MoD’s relationship to the defence industry. The goal was to increase 
                                                 
466 Keller, Patrick (2011). “Challenges for European defense budgets after the economic crisis.” American 
Enterprise Institute, Europe and Eurasia, Foreign and Defense Policy, July 11, available at: 
https://www.aei.org/publication/challenges-for-european-defense-budgets-after-the-economic-crisis/  
467 Ibid. 
468 Ibid. 
469 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom (NSS) (2008), p.9 
470 Ibid. 
471 Ibid. 
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efficiencies and to “get more value for money.”472 The National Security Strategy (2009) Security 
for the Next Generation morphed the MoD’s relationship with defence industry to a partnership 
with defence industrial base.473 The government acknowledged the expertise embedded with 
the security industry suppliers and the value of innovative solutions and cutting-edge 
technologies of SMEs (Small Medium Enterprises). Strategic partnerships between 
governments and SMEs were to offer greater security and more advanced protection to the 
people, assets and critical national infrastructure.474  
As part of defense reform, the government continued major investments in service 
personnel, their equipment, and the infrastructure that supports them.475 This policy built on 
the 2006 decision to implement major equipment programs, which envisioned acquisition of 
new armoured vehicles for the Army and Royal Marines, continued renewal of equipment for 
the Royal Navy (e.g. Type 45 Destroyers, ASTUTE submarines and the Future Aircraft 
Carriers), as well as investment in new aircraft and weapons for the Royal Air Forces (e.g. 
Typhoon Tranche 3 and REAPER unamnned air vehicles).476 Overall, the NSS (2009) clearly 
commited the government to invest in “qualitative military advantage over potential state 
adversaries in technological, doctrinal, and structural terms, maintaining a minimum strategic 
deterrent capability.”477 
                                                 
472 Ibid., p. 46 
473 Ibid. 
474 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom (2009), Cm7590, p. 29 
475 Ibid., p. 33 
476 Ibid. 
477 Ibid., p. 69 
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In late 2009, the Ministry of Defence announced a re-balancing of future defence 
program. Secretary of State for Defence, Bob Ainsworth, explained that rebalancing should 
enhance support to UK’s military personnel in operations in Afghanistan. This was to be done 
by committing to reductions elsewhere and ensuring that UK maintains military capabilities 
for the future.478 Re-balancing also meant that the MoD’s core budget was designated to fund 
military equipment improvements. These were to be used on close-combat equipment 
package, new acquisitions of Bowman tactical radios and patrol satellite systems, doubling the 
number of Reapers (UAV), improving counter-IED capabilities and strengthening to air 
bridge (additional C-17479 aircraft and 22 new Chinook helicopters (2012-2013)).480 Additional 
costs of UK’s operations in Afghanistan were to be funded from the Reserve fund and not 
the core MoD budget. 
Labour Party has pursued developing strong ties between the UK and the EU since 
2005. UK was to pursue a leadership role in European defence cooperation, and offer support 
for stronger EU defence capabilities, including properly equipped EU battlegroups that can 
act quickly.481 This aligns with UK’s ambition to contribute to the development of European 
defence industry. In mid-2000, UK signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) Framework Agreement 
(FA) Treaty with the defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden, with the 
goal to “facilitate industrial restructuring in order to promote a more competitive and robust 
                                                 
478 Taylor (2010: 6) 
479 Defence Equipment (2010), Sixth Report of Session 2009-10, House of Commons, p. 3. The purchase of an 
additional C-17 was announced in 2009, and was designed to help with easing the Afghanistan air-bridge 
fragility.  
480 Taylor (2010: 6) 
481 The Labour Party Manifesto 2005, p. 84 
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European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in the global defence 
market.”482  
In early 2008, UK took a European turn in security and defense cooperation, 
beginning to pursue closer defense cooperation with other EU partners. Although Gordon 
Brown was at first cautious about the EU and had a sceptical view of ESDP, the 2008 crisis 
compelled him and the Cabinet to start “making a reality the notion of ‘effective 
multilateralism’ (Interview 2008).”483 Collective action throught eUN, EU and NATO was 
highlighted in the 2008 UK National Security Strategy as “the most effective way of managing 
the threats faced by the UK (Cabinet Office 2008).”484 In the early months of 2008, the Foreign 
and Defense secretaries began to officially support French proposals for strengthened 
ESDP.485 In October 2008, then Defence Secretary John Hutton “labeled those who dismissed 
ESDP as ‘pathetic,’ adding that working with the EU on military missions was ‘perfectly 
sensible’.”486 In October 2009, Miliband made “the most robustly pro European speech of 
Brown’s time in office,” arguing that it was “very strongly in the UK national interest for the 
EU to develop a stong foreign policy,” which Britain should embrace and shape (Miliband, 
2009).487 
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the UK looked to European 
defence cooperation as part of the 2009 re-balancing of the defence sector. Political 
                                                 
482 Letter of Intent: restructuring the European defence industry (2012): Overview of the work of the Letter of 
Intent (LoI) group (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK) on the defence industry.  
483 Brown, David (edt.) (2016). “The Development of British Defence Policy: Blair, Brown and Beyond,” 
Routledge, New York, pp.1-241, p.54 
484 Ibid. 
485 Ibid. 
486 Ibid. 
487 Ibid. 
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establishment became convinced that stronger European cooperation offers many 
opportunities in principle and that closer cooperation with the EU is not about Europe taking 
precedence over the US but seeing the two as fundamentally reinforcing relationships.488 
Political capital was to be spent on “strengthening the European contribution, including 
through more effectively aligning resources and priorities…”489  
Collaborative European procurement was to be considered as a priority, right at the 
oustet.490 The decision came in reaction to the 2009 Bernard Gray’s independent report on 
defence acquisition, which established that the MoD “substantially overheated equipment 
programme, with too many types of equipment being ordered for too large a range of tasks at 
too high a specification”491 and unaffordable under projections of future budgets. The dire 
budgetary prospects essentially served “as an incentive for greater military cooperation with 
capable partners.”492 Increased involvement in European multilateral treaties typically goes 
against British traditional distrust in EU institutions: Britain wants to be an “independent actor 
with a broader, truly global horizon, …[untied to the] complicated, expensive and inefectual 
nitty-gritty of EU procurement arrangements.”493 Despite UK’s preference to cooperate 
“directly, exclusively and on equal terms with partners of reliable and proper standing such as 
                                                 
488 Taylor (2010: 12) 
489 Ibid. 
490 Ibid., pp.15-16 
491 Ibid., p.15 
492 Keller, Patrick (2011)  
493 Ibid. 
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France and the United States,”494 declining defense budgets and UK’s military power495 
provided political leverage for the UK to justify participation in several multi-national defence 
projects within Europe.  
UK’s participation in the A400M, Merlin helicopters, Eurofighter Typhoon and the 
Galileo projects confirmed UK’s strategic choice to resort to multi-lateral or EU agreements 
in the long-term,496 effectively supporting European defence collaboration in austere times. 
UK has been committed to the European multi-national A400M497 project for a long time. 
The project originated in 2003 to provide tactical and strategic airlift capability to European 
states and replace older transport aircraft such as the Transall C-160 and the Lockheed C-130 
Hercules. The A400M was scheduled to have full operational capability in 2008. In 2009, 
however, the UK MoD announced additional delays to the in-service delivery schedule of 
A400M at least by three years because of technical problems and follow-up contract 
negotiations.498  
The delays in A400M delivery were concerning to the UK, but the Minister for 
Defence Equipment and Support voiced continued support to the project. He said: “I remain 
committed to trying everything possible to save this particular programme. …I think it meets 
                                                 
494 Ibid. Prime Minister Cameron has also claimed that Britain has a “NATO-first policy” (European Parliament 
2011: 33). The CSDP and other EU initiatives are perceived as constraints rather than benefits for two reasons: 
diverging interests and unequal political will to pool and share. [Larive, Maxime H.A. (2016). ”Debating European 
Security and Defense Policy: Understanding the Complexity,” Routledge, New York, pp.1-261, p.104] 
495 “The Franco-British Cooperation, led by the only military nuclear powers and largest defense spenders in 
Europe, nevertheless illustrates a relative decline of both powers.” [Ibid.] Some have also argued that Franco-
British Cooperation “is not to produce a greater or more effective ‘European’ military capability, [but] to maintain 
French and British aspirations to power projection and to military credibility in the eyes of the United States.” 
[Ibid.] 
496 Ibid. 
497 The A400M is a collaborative program involving seven European nations (Germany, France, Turkey, Spain, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the UK). 
498 Defence Equipment (2010), p. 3  
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our requirements extraordinarily neatly, and my own instinct… is that the technical problems 
of this aircraft can be resolved.”499 The DCM echoed the sentiments by stating that: “The 
lesson (CDM) draws from the A400M project is that collective projects are essential. If you 
do not collaborate with partenrs, then you will not get the kit you want because the production 
numbers are so small…”500 In the 2010 bilateral defense cooperation treaty, UK and France 
committed to ensure the success of the A400M project by agreeing to align logistics 
arrangements, including spares and support to the new A400M transport aircraft.501  
In the 2007-2009 period, UK decided to upgrade European multi-national Merlin 
helicopters as well as Eurofighter Typhoon multi-role combat aircraft. Merlin medium-lift 
helicopter was developed in cooperation with Italy, with the UK committing to the order of 
44 Merlins. Deliveries were completed in 2002. However, the project continued to develop. 
In 2006 the Lockeed Martin UK was awarded a contract for the Merlin capability sustainment 
plus (CSP) upgrade program, with improvements applicable to 30 Merlin helicopters under 
the contract.502 UK continued to be vested in the Eurofighter Typhoon project because it 
provides “massive stimulus for the high-technology industry achievements in Europe.”503  
                                                 
499 Ibid., p. 21  
500 Ibid.  
501 UK-France Defence Cooperation Treaty announced, Ministry of Defence and the Rt Hon David Cameron 
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The UK has cooperated with its European partners on the development of Galilelo, a 
global navigational satellite system (GNSS) that provides an alternative to the US or Russian 
navigational satellite systems. The project has faced serious fundings obstacles in 2007 and 
was slow to take off the ground. UK, however, continued to support the project. NSS 2009 
emphasized the added value of collective collaboration in ensuring the security of systems 
operating through space: global positioning satellite array, facilitation of a highly accurate and 
stable timing signal to many systems, e.g. regularity of electricity supply, time-stamp on global 
financial transactions, mobile phone coverage and sychronisation of radios used by security 
services.504  
The analysis indicates that UK was committed to both defense reform to increasing 
European defense collaboration during the 2007-2009 reductions in defense spending. 
However, the rise in equipment stock appears to be linked more with national initiatives rather 
than a result of UK’s collaobration with European partners. Reduction in defense spending 
triggered greater political support of European collaboration in the area of defense, but it does 
not appear to have had sufficient time to transpire into actual equipment procurement between 
2007 and 2009.  
 
VI. B. France (2008-2012) 
 The French case does not present robust empirical support for the hypothesis that 
France pursued closer European defense collaboration to deal either with its declining defense 
spending or declining aggregated military capacity. To evaluate this finding, I analyze France’s 
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defense policy for evidence of defense reform and agreements and initiatives related to 
European defense collaboration. Absence of evidence of French implementation of defense 
reforms or agreement to pursue closer collaboration in the area of defense with its European 
partners would validate empirical findings. 
France declined its national defense expenditure during President Nicolas Sarkozy’s 
term in office between 2008 and 2012.505 To combat this decline, France achieved broad 
political consensus506 and a unified national position in support of profound defense reform. 
The general feeling was that France was “to play a prominent role in the world.”507 Its nuclear 
capabilities, broad military-industrial base and readiness and willingness of a former colonial 
power have sustained France’s contemporary ambitions to be a “decisive actor in global 
security affairs.”508 Although the decline in defense spending did not alter this basic rationale, 
there is evidence that it did peak France’s interest in “saving money through increased 
cooperation with European partners.”509 
The strategic impulse for French defense reform came in 2007 when President Sarkozy 
set up the Commission on Defence and National Security, which produced a 2008 White 
Paper on Defence and National Security. In French case, genuine defense reform started 
                                                 
505 The French Ministry of Defense (and Veterans Affairs) was headed by several Defense Ministers affiliated 
either with centrist New Center Party (Herve Morin, May 2007-November 2010), center-right Union for Popular 
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Paper, Washington DC: Center on the United States and Europe and Brookings, p. 21.  
507 The UMP Project for France, 2007, Support Sarkozy’s Vision for France, http://www.support-sarkozy-
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508 Keller (2011). 
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before the 2008 crisis arrived.510 Defense transformation was rooted in restructuring and 
optimization of the military apparatus and equipment modernization511 to enhance France’s 
expeditionary capabilities. Despite indications that modernization of the Mirage 2000 jet 
fighter and acquisition of the aerial refueling and transport airplane (the Multi-Role Tanker 
Transport) would be postponed,512 France was determined to continue with other 
organizational reforms, 513 military equipment modernization and with the development of a 
new space program.”514  
Organizational reforms entailed personnel reductions.515 The 2008 White Paper 
suggested cutting “54,000 defense ministry and military positions (out of about 250,000 total), 
                                                 
510 Guidelines for the defense reform policy were drafted prior to the crisis. In addition, public policies were 
revised in 2008 to reduce costs. These two “anticipatory moves prevented any emergency cuts in the French 
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“Effect of the Financial Crisis on European Defence: The Case of France,” Institute for Defence Studies and 
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51 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and ASMP-A airborne missiles.” In O’Donnell (2012: 20) 
512 Ibid. Other delays possibly affected by the economic crisis involve the Scorpion program, delivery of the 
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but even a further reduction would not be surprising.”516 In June 2008, President Sarkozy 
declared: “… we must stop thinking that our armed forces are judged only by their manpower 
strengths. We must have equipped, trained and modernized armed forces,”517 abandon 
“patching up” routine equipment, such as 45-year-old tanker aircraft, 28-year-old light 
armored vehicles and 30-year-old Puma helicopters, and increase the equipment budget by 
20% to support equipment modernization efforts.518 Since its military professionalization in 
1995, France reduced its troop numbers several times, amounting to a 50% reduction over 15 
years.519  
By 2008, the personnel reform was well under way. Sarkozy announced that reductions 
in manpower must continue until they reach optimal level for fulfillment of France’s 
operational objectives: “In 6-7 years’ time, we will have a total of 225,000 civilian and defense 
personnel. The army will have 131,000, the air force 50,000 and the navy 44,000. I know… 
it’s a substantial reduction.”520 The transition towards a greater expeditionary capability also 
reduced Operational Ground Force by 88,000 troops to streamline armed forces and improve 
their rapid deployment capability.521  
Other key areas of capability procurement in the 2008 White Paper included 
prioritization of the “means of information communication and space-based assets, force 
                                                 
516 Keller, Patrick (2011). “Challenges for European defense budgets after the economic crisis.” American 
Enterprise Institute, Europe and Eurasia, Foreign and Defense Policy, July 11, available at: 
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protection (including against CBRN, a long-range precision-strike capacity, capability to 
…operate in close contact with the population… naval superiority …and air 
superiority/mobility.”522 Implicit in French approach to the 2008 reforms was the recognition 
of the limited strategic impact of technological advances: “Superior technology does not per se 
guarantee operational superiority. The human factor [training and education of soldiers] will 
remain prevalent in complex operations where all instruments of national power and influence 
are brought to bear.”523 France thus increased its emphasis on acquiring knowledge and 
anticipation superiority, which was to entail increased efficiency of information sharing within 
the diplomatic network, recruiting engineering, computer, imaging and language specialist and 
doubling of the budget for the development of space-based applications.”524 
France decided to modernize sea-based ballistic missile submarine force and airborne 
missiles carried by nuclear-capable combat aircraft. This decision entailed broad investments 
in armored vehicles and reinforced protection of French Navy ships through air-to-air and 
anti-cruise missiles, as well as in knowledge-based security, which in itself requires 
development of surveillance, armed drones and offensive and defensive cyber-war 
capabilities.525 France also intended to develop satellite capabilities, double its space research 
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budget and complete the CERES satellite system.526 This should entail replacement of the 
Syracuse military telecommunications satellite system and acquisition of UAVs.527  
Reducing dependency on nuclear deterrence and developing satellite capability were 
other important strategic efforts in French defense reform. While nuclear disarmament 
remained an essential concept of France’s national security in the 2008-2012 period,528 France 
initiated nuclear disarmament by “decreasing its airborne nuclear weapons to half the level 
held during the Cold War, dismantling its nuclear testing site in Mururoa … and ceasing the 
manufacture of fissile missile for nuclear weapons.529 
European defense industry played a key part with regard to the development of 
military capabilities between 2008 and 2012. During its EU presidency in the second half of 
2008, France prepared an ambitious plan for establishing European defense policy and 
enhancing military cooperation within the EU.530 It successfully presided over the adoption of 
a Joint Action on an EU military operation against piracy in Somalia (EU NAVFOR Somalia 
– Operation Atalanta), and made progress in harnessing European commitment to enhance 
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force projection to external theaters. Primarily, force projection involved preparations in 
support of the European airlift feet: twelve EU member states signed a declaration of intent 
on optimizing the use of their airlift aircraft, and four signed a declaration of intent on A400M 
multinational unit. In addition, five EU member states signed a letter of intent on 
Multinational Space-based Imaging System for Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Observation 
project (MUSIS).531  
Since 2008, France has preferred European defense collaboration as a way to remedy 
national capability shortfalls. In light of the financial crisis, French defense was under pressure 
to save 3.5billion Euros between 2011 and 2013, a cut that was difficult to manage.532 One way 
to face this budgetary decline was to find savings. First cost-saving measures entailed “closing 
military bases and installations, both at home and abroad, [with] French military presence in 
Africa …to be downgraded significantly.”533 As a way to retain strong and independent military 
industry, France also decided to increase the 2011 order of the Rafale jet fighter from 22 to 33 
airplanes.534 This decision was to “guarantee production despite cancellations by other 
countries.”535  
European defense cooperation presented another viable solution to the declining 
defense spending. French government embraced the idea that European framework “must be 
privileged [for acquisition of]: combat aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, satellites, electronic 
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components, etc., although procurement policy must include acquisitions on the world 
market.”536 France has endorsed development of EU military capabilities, establishment of EU 
military structures independent of NATO, and EU-led operations.537 It has been a strong 
advocate of European collaborative pooling and sharing policies, especially in the area of air-
to-air refueling, satellite communication, remotely piloted air systems (UAVs) and cyber 
defense. It has expressed its continued support for developing strategic and tactical support 
aircraft (A400M), in-flight refueling capability, mobile-air capability,538 as well as naval-air 
capability that involves association of aircraft carriers, and airbase and escort carriers.539 
More specifically, France has been a participating member in several high-profile 
collaborative European defense initiatives. Since the end of 2012, France and 19 other 
European states540 jointly address airlift provisions for the EU: “The long term vision of the 
EATF is to establish a robust network linking various European air transport entities aiming 
at the efficient employment of all present and future capabilities made available by the 
participating members for military needs, regardless of type or origin.”541 This is meant to 
optimize how air transport assets are acquired, operated, supported and managed in the most 
efficient way.542  
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Despite the cuts in defense spending, France decided that the A400M transport aircraft 
“will not be abandoned despite additional costs because [it] is regarded as strategically 
significant, both in terms of military use and industrial policy.”543 France has partnered-up with 
six EU member states,544 to deliver the A400M airbus to the European defense market. After 
a four-year delay, France was the first country to receive an A400M military transport plane in 
August 2013, bringing to fruition a ‘long-troubled’ program.545 This new generation aircraft 
“has been authorized by the French defence procurement agency (DGA) to join the Orleans-
Bricy airbase in France, for future operations by the national air force.”546 Known as ‘Atlas’ in 
French service, the A400M serves tactical and strategic airlift purposes, configured for long-
range cargo and troop transport, medical evacuation, aerial refueling and electronic 
surveillance missions.547  
In November 2008, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Greece signed the Besoin 
Operationalle Commun agreement, which initiated the development of the Multinational Space-
Based Imaging System (MUSIS) program.548 France contributes the CSO system integrating 
optical and radar space components to the MUSIS configuration. By March 2009, the MUSIS 
initiative was approved by the European Defence Agency, supporting European collaboration 
in transmitting images from space components and two radar systems (SARah and CSG) to a 
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common ground-user segment.549 Two months later, French Directorate General of 
Armament (DGA) and the French national center for space studies (CNES) signed a protocol 
for the design of the CSO project, anticipating a release of the first of the two satellites by 
December 2016.550 Two years later, France signed a joint armament cooperation agreement 
with Italy, “allowing the two countries to access optical and radar images produced by the 
CSO and CSG systems.”551 In June 2012, the two partners agreed to launch MUSIS preliminary 
definition phase. 
France has also pursued regional venues to enhance European cooperation through 
deepening its engagement in bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation with key European 
partners. In 2010, France signed a defense cooperation treaty with the UK.552 The cooperation 
agreement is designed to improve collective defense capabilities through UK and French 
“forces working more closely together, contributing more capable and effective forces, and 
ultimately improving collective capability of NATO and European Defence.”553 Key measures 
of this initiative include: jointly developing a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force as a non-
standing capability able to carry out a range of operations under the aegis of NATO or the 
EU, building the ability to deploy integrated carrier strike group around the French carrier 
Charles de Gaulle and other UK assets, or extending cooperation in acquisition of equipment 
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and technologies (UAVs, satellite communications, R&T, complex weapons and submarine 
technologies).554 
France has also supported closer European defence cooperation within a Weimar 
‘Plus’ group (France, Germany, Spain, Poland and Italy). In November 2012, the foreign and 
defense ministers declared the need to “foster an ambitious European policy in the field of 
security and defence.”555 They called for a reform of the EU crisis-management procedures, 
enhancing EU’s capability to act in a timely and effective manner on the whole spectrum of 
crisis-management actions. Defense cooperation within the Weimar Triangle has been also 
advocated in support of the Weimar EU battle group, collaborative approach to developing 
UAV surveillance platforms, or establishment of armored vehicles coordination group that 
would promote a viable European defense and technology industrial base in the long run.556 
The analysis demonstrates that French decline in military spending did not mean a 
broad-scale decline in service-level equipment and manpower, nor did lack of evidence of 
growing investment in collaborative procurement and R&T mean French disengagement from 
European defense collaboration. Sustained cuts in national defense spending were strategically 
associated with defense reform driven by substantial reductions its personnel numbers, but 
also by revitalization and modernization of French military equipment stock. Far from 
abandoning European defense collaboration, France has been its staunch advocate especially 
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since the 2008 global financial crisis and during the subsequent four-year period of declining 
defense spending. Specifically, France has supported Europe’s aviation initiatives to remedy 
strategic and tactical transport capabilities and need for satellite surveillance.  
 
VII. Discussion of the Findings 
IR theory on alliance cooperation predicts that reduced national defense spending is 
not always harmful to military capacity, especially if states step-up their collective defense 
collaboration. I find some evidence in support of the defense collaboration hypothesis. In 
33.3% of the 6 DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase in military capacity, cuts in defense 
spending were also possibly related to defense collaboration. In 47.3% of the 19 DSCP’s, cuts 
in defense spending potentially relate to qualitative improvements in military capacity 
outcomes due to increased defense collaboration.557 These findings imply that defense 
collaboration appeared more frequently (53.8%) in DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline in 
military capacity. However, qualitative improvements in military capacity appear to have 
occurred to a greater extent in states that increased rather than decreased defense collaboration 
during DSCP’s.  
The effort to counter detrimental military capacity outcomes appears to have focused 
on collaborative investment in the future development of military capabilities rather than on 
immediate collaborative procurement of new military capabilities. In 55.5% of the 9 cases, 
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increased defense collaboration resulted mostly from increases in collaborative R&T. In 
additional 22.2% of the 9 cases, defense collaboration resulted from increases in both 
collaborative R&T and equipment procurement. In the remaining 22.2%, defense 
collaboration resulted from increases in investment in collaborative procurement of military 
equipment. 
DSCP’s potentially related to increased defense cooperation in Europe appear non-
detrimental to national military equipment stock and to the hiring of additional military 
personnel. I find that frequency of service-level increases in equipment and manpower in 
DSCP’s related to increased defense collaboration exceeded the frequency in DSCP’s 
unrelated to increased defense collaboration 7.7% and 23.1%, respectively. On the other hand, 
R&D-driven defense reform occurred 23.1% more frequently in DSCP’s unrelated to 
increased defense collaboration.  
These findings imply that we may need more granular theorizing about how declining 
defense expenditures and increased defense collaboration within alliances relate to different 
aspects of military capacity of states. It seems that when states put more money in the 
collaborative projects, they invested less in national R&D initiatives. Theoretically, this implies 
a potential trade-off between national and collaborative investment in the future development 
of military capacity among allied states. 
The finding that increase in defense collaboration may be primarily a result of 
increasing investment in R&T has theoretical implications for immediate and future 
development of national military capacity. Increasing collective-level cooperation seems to 
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offer few immediate solutions to military capability shortfalls. On the other hand, states have 
the ambition to search for and develop common solutions to military equipment problems 
and develop future military capacity together.  
We may also need to revisit conventional assumptions about who sustains or drives 
increased European defense collaboration. It may be that the larger states provide the impetus 
for developing some European defense capabilities. However, it is the smaller European 
security players who empirically increased their collaborative R&T spending more often than 
some of the major European powers.  
Lastly, there appears to be a time-lag between declining defense spending, increased 
policy support for collective defense collaboration and actual delivery of military capabilities. 
Delays in delivery of military capabilities appear conditioned on external and domestic factors. 
The case of the UK shows that the impetus for increased collective cooperation in military 
capabilities is more evident at policy level rather than in actual hardware procurement. 
National procurement of collectively developed military equipment is still not large enough to 
embody the difference in national equipment stock above national military capabilities.  
Lack of empirical evidence of France’s actual rejuvenated support for EU defense 
collaboration suggests potentially different focus in French pursuit of European defense 
collaboration. No evident increase in French investment in collaborative R&T and equipment 
procurement seems to be compensated by French involvement in collaborative projects whose 
delivery was delayed. Delays were associated with declining defense budgets and increased 
political uncertainties among the collaborating partners in the aftermath of the 2008 global 
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financial crisis, increased threats outside of the EU’s external borders, and the internal 
challenges to the viability of the EU as a political project on the whole.   
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Chapter 6: Buck-passing 
 
Decline in defense spending can relate to buck-passing behavior of states but may not 
always lead to detrimental military capacity outcomes. Buck-passing states pass their security 
responsibilities to militarily stronger and proactive allies. Shifting the burden of responsibility 
for global stability and security to others may reduce operational expenditures of the buck-
passing states. If some of these savings are reinvested in improving military forces and 
capabilities, a sustained decline in defense spending does not have to be detrimental to military 
capacity of states. 
In this chapter, I probe the possibility that reductions in defense spending are non-
detrimental to military capacity if they relate to buck-passing. I examine whether European 
reductions in defense spending related to buck-passing. I also examine whether evidence of 
the latter was accompanied by non-detrimental changes in military capacity of states. I do so 
in four steps. 
First, I determine the baseline pattern of European buck-passing vis-à-vis three 
important military players in the European security theater: the US, UK and France. Secondly, 
I examine patterns of foreign deployments for evidence of a potential link between declining 
defense spending and buck-passing. I do so by evaluating whether countries engaged in buck-
passing behavior more frequently during DSCP’s relative to the baseline patterns. Thirdly, I 
evaluate the relationship between defense spending cuts potentially related to buck-passing 
and military capacity outcomes.  
  
 
189 
 
Fourthly, I qualitatively analyze two cases of declining defense spending: Germany 
(2004-2006) and Austria (2003-2005). Germany entails evidence in support of the buck-
passing hypothesis, while Austria does not. These two countries present similar cases with 
divergent outcomes. 
I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the findings and their theoretical 
implications. 
 
I. Buck-Passing Behavior of European States 
A decline in defense spending can stem from buck-passing behavior, but does not 
have to result in detrimental outcomes for military capacity of states. Theory of buck-passing 
relates to state behavior within alliances. In this context, Europeans have been found to buck-
pass to the U.S. or to big European military powers.  
Scholars and policymakers explain European buck-passing to the U.S. by referring to 
the hegemonic position of the U.S. military as well as the trustworthiness of U.S. commitment 
to European security.558 U.S. has not only developed a big comparative military advantage 
against other military powers in the world, but is able to effectively implement an array of 
foreign policy tools in pursuit of its security interests.559 Good trans-Atlantic relations have 
been of strategic importance to the U.S. U.S. Recently, president Barack Obama has assured 
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his European allies of continued U.S. support. In the European Reassurance Initiative, the U.S. 
proposed up to $1 billion to bolster the security of NATO allies in Europe. The number of 
American Army and Air Force units rotating through allied countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe was to go up and U.S. vowed to deepen its partnerships with Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia as a “demonstration of America’s unshakable commitment to [her] NATO allies.”560 
Credibility of U.S. commitment to European security lends credence to the hypothesis that 
European countries reduced their defense spending because they chose to buck-pass security 
responsibilities to the U.S. At the same time, buck-passing is not necessarily detrimental to 
military capacity: European states’ membership in NATO or the EU compels them to 
continuously commit resources to military modernization. 
Europeans have also buck-passed responsibility for security to militarily strong EU 
members. Buck-passing is possible within the framework of EU’s ‘enhanced cooperation in 
the area of security and defense.’ Enhanced cooperation entails a legal permission for “those 
countries of the Union that wish to continue to work more closely together to do so.”561 
Because it is open to all EU members but decisions are binding only to the participating 
member states, those countries that do not self-select into this form of cooperation are free 
from obligations agreed to within this framework. Enhanced cooperation thus enables buck-
                                                 
560 Joyner, James (2014) “Europe’s Free Ride on the American-Defense Gravy Train” The National Interest: 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/europes-free-ride-the-american-defense-gravy-train-10864?page=2 
561 States that engage in enhanced cooperation must respect the legal framework of the Union. Enhanced 
Cooperation “does not allow extension of the powers as laid down by the Treaties, nor may it be applied to areas 
that fall within the exclusive competence of the Union. It may be undertaken as a last resort, when it has been 
established within the Council that the objective of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable 
period by the Union as a whole.” [Enhanced Cooperation, Europa, accessed online on June 11, 2015: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/enhanced_cooperation_en.htm]  
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passing on part of those EU members excluded from the cooperative framework. Military 
engagement and material commitments are buck-passed to other European colleagues.  
Enhanced cooperation allows EU member states to pursue different security goals at 
different speeds. On one hand, it cements partnerships within the group of participating states. 
On the other hand, it creates commitment gaps between states that are and those that are not 
participating in the framework. Scholars have described the divisive outcomes of enhanced 
cooperation as Europe ‘a la carte’, hard core Europe vs. weak European periphery, ‘multi-
speed’ Europe or ‘variable geometry’ Europe.562 These concepts essentially describe a buck-
passing behavior of those countries that choose to abstain from closer cooperation in defense 
matters.563  
 
II. Measuring Buck-Passing Behavior of States 
A decline in defense spending that is non-detrimental to military capacity potentially 
relates to buck-passing if buck-passing frequency increased during a DSCP relative to baseline 
buck-passing frequency between 2000 and 2012. Buck-passing means that a country free-rides 
on the balancing efforts of its allies. Buck-passing behavior can be modeled by patterns of 
foreign military deployments. Potential buck-passing requires evidence of states’ decline in its 
                                                 
562 Ibid. 
563 Although buck-passing to key security allies has been a viable option for European states, states do not always 
choose to buck-pass. The choice to abstain from buck-passing can relate to the need for projecting credible 
deterrence (Oneal and Diehl (1994: 391), credible commitment to the alliance, or the choice to pursue greater 
national military self-sufficiency, which entails continued commitment to provide operational experience for the 
national armed forces. 
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foreign deployments as key security allies increase theirs. I evaluate possible buck-passing of 
European states to the U.S., the UK and France.  
The data on U.S. foreign deployments comes from The Military Balance (2000-2012) 
and entails military deployments outside of the U.S. or EU territory.564 The data on foreign 
military deployments of all the 27 EU states comes from The Military Balance (2000-2012), 
under the rubric of ‘forces abroad’ or ‘foreign deployments.’ European foreign deployments 
entail all deployments outside of the EU territory.  
To examine data for evidence of potential buck-passing, I first analyze biennial 
changes in foreign military deployments of the 27 EU states and the U.S. between 2000 and 
2012.565 Next, I evaluate biennial changes in European foreign military deployments vis-à-vis 
biennial changes in foreign military deployments of the US, UK and France. Potential buck-
passing requires evidence that US, UK, or France increase their foreign deployments as 
European states decrease or maintain the same levels of military deployments abroad.  
Buck-passing may explain the decline in defense spending if buck-passing frequency 
increased during a DSCP relative to baseline frequency between 2000 and 2012. Annualized 
                                                 
564 The data on U.S. military deployments abroad comes from The Military Balance (2000-2012) and includes all 
deployments except the following: (1) those that are deployed in any one of the 27 EU member states being 
analyzed, which includes EUCOM forces deployed in NATO member states (Germany, Belgium, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Mediterranean, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK), (2) forces that are deployed 
in Alaska and Hawaii under the USPACOM (Pacific Command) umbrella, (3) forces deployed on the US West 
Coast, (4) forces that are part of Central Command, Southern Command (HQ Miami FL, Honduras), Joint Forces 
Command (US East Coast, Bermuda, Haiti, Iceland, Portugal, UK) or part of the Continental US deployments.  
565 Annualized totals of foreign military deployments of the 27 EU states as well as the U.S. are available in the 
Appendix (Table 27.A). 
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patterns of potential buck-passing to the U.S. (Table 28.A), to the UK (Table 29.A), and to 
France (Table 30.A) between 2000 and 2012 are available in the Appendix.566  
Baseline buck-passing frequency is expressed as a percentage of total buck-passing 
observations within the 2000-2012 period. Buck-passing frequency during DSCP relates to the 
percentage of total buck-passing observations within the total biennial differentials within a 
DSCP. If the DSCP frequency of buck-passing increased relative to the baseline buck-passing 
frequency, the decline in defense spending is potentially related to buck-passing behavior of 
states. 
In a qualitative analysis, buck-passing behavior can be explained by government’s 
political preference for non-military engagement in crisis-management, or security culture of 
reserved use of military force. Reserved military culture explains declining military spending 
by reductions in military engagement in international crisis-management. If buck-passing is 
not detrimental to military capacity, we should see evidence of policy decisions to invest in the 
military. 
 
III. DSCP’s Potentially Related to Buck-Passing  
 Theory suggests that government’s decision to buck-pass can reduce defense spending 
as states reduce their foreign military engagement. In this section, I empirically evaluate 
                                                 
566 On the basis of Boolean algebra, I code observations that meet the necessary conditions of buck-passing as 
‘1.’ When a European state and the U.S., UK or France are simultaneously either decreasing or increasing their 
military deployments abroad between the same two consecutive years, the observation is coded ‘0’. When a 
European state exhibits reversed buck-passing behavior and increases its foreign military deployments when the 
U.S., UK or France decrease theirs, the observation is coded ‘-1’. 
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whether the frequency of potential buck-passing during a DSCP exceeds baseline buck-passing 
frequency of European states vis-a-vis three key security players: US, UK and France (Table 
17). 
Table 17. – Potential Buck-Passing to the US, UK and France 
No. Country Period 
Frequency of Potential Buck Passing  
United States United Kingdom France 
2000-
2012 
DSCP 
> 
DSCP 
2000-
2012 
DSCP 
> 
DSCP 
2000-
2012 
DSCP 
> 
DSCP 
1 Denmark 2010-2012 33% 50% Yes 17% 0% No 8% 50% Yes 
2 France 2008-2012 33% 25% No 50% 50% No  
3 Germany 2004-2006 25% 50% Yes 42% 50% Yes 8% 0% No 
4 Greece 2008-2011 25% 33% Yes 8% 33% Yes 25% 0% No 
5 Italy 2004-2006 
17% 
0% No 
50% 
50% No 
17% 
0% No 
6 Italy 2007-2010 0% No 33% No 0% No 
7 Netherlands 2008-2012 33% 25% No 33% 25% No 17% 25% Yes 
8 Portugal 2002-2004 
33% 
0% No 
33% 
0% No 
8% 
0% No 
9 Portugal 2008-2012 25% No 50% Yes 0% No 
10 Spain 2008-2012 17% 25% Yes 8% 0% No 8% 0% No 
11 United Kingdom 2007-2009 33% 50% Yes  17% 50% Yes 
12 Czech Republic 2008-2012 0% 0% No 25% 50% Yes 0% 0% No 
13 Hungary 2003-2006 
25% 
33% Yes 
25% 
33.3% Yes 
17% 
0% No 
14 Hungary 2008-2012 25% No 25% No 20% Yes 
15 Austria 2003-2005 
25% 
0% No 
25% 
0% No 
0% 
0% No 
16 Austria 2007-2010 33% Yes 0% No 0% No 
17 Ireland 2008-2011 17% 0% No 33% 66.7% Yes 0% 0% No 
18 Sweden 2007-2009 25% 0% No 33% 50% Yes 8% 0% No 
19 Bulgaria 2008-2012 25% 25% No 8% 0% No 8% 0% No 
20 Cyprus 2000-2002 
33% 
50% Yes 
42% 
50% Yes 
17% 
0% No 
21 Cyprus 2010-2012 0% No 0% No 0% No 
22 Estonia 2008-2010 33% 50% Yes 50% 50% No 0% 0% No 
23 Latvia 2008-2010 8% 0% No 17% 50% Yes 8% 0% No 
24 Lithuania 2003-2005 
8% 
50% Yes 
33% 
50% Yes 
0% 
0% No 
25 Lithuania 2008-2010 0% No 0% No 0% No 
26 Malta 2003-2007 
33% 
25% No 
50% 
75% Yes 
17% 
25% Yes 
27 Malta 2009-2012 0% No 0% No 0% No 
28 Romania 2008-2010 17% 50% Yes 17% 0% No 17% 0% No 
29 Slovakia 2008-2012 25% 25% No 25% 25% No 17% 25% Yes 
30 Slovenia 2008-2012 42% 25% No 25% 25% No 17% 25% Yes 
 Average Frequency of  
Buck Passing 
25% 22% 38% 30% 29% 38% 11% 8% 24% 
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III.A. Spending Cuts Related to Potential Buck-Passing to the United States 
I find that on average, Europeans buck-passed to the U.S. 25% of the time between 
2000 and 2012. In 60.9% of the 23 states, buck-passing to the U.S. occurred less than 33.4% 
of the time and no country buck-passed to the U.S. more than 50% of the time. Slovenia and 
Finland buck-passed to the US most frequently (42% of the time), while the Czech Republic 
never buck-passed to the US.  
More states shadowed US foreign deployments more often than either buck-passed to 
the US or increased annual military deployments abroad when the US decreased its (Figure 
5.A). In 59.3% of the 23 states with DSCP’s, states simultaneously increased or decreased 
foreign deployments with the US at least 50% of the time. In 73.9% of the 23 states, European 
governments increased foreign deployments when the US did not less than 25.1% of the time. 
In Greece, UK, Bulgaria and Slovenia this happened most frequently, 42% of the time. 
 I find that more than 35% of the 30 DSCP’s do not relate to any evidence of buck-
passing.567 Additional 30% of the DSCP’s relate to a 25% frequency of potential buck-passing 
to the US. Only about 20% of the cuts relate to buck-passing 50% of the time (Figure 6.A). 
This means that more than 65% of the DSCP’s were accompanied by infrequent or no buck-
passing to the US. 
 Evidence suggests that declining defense spending increased buck-passing frequency 
to the US in 11 out of the 30 DSCP’s (Table 17). This means that a decline in defense spending 
                                                 
567 More countries buck-passed to the U.S. less frequently after 2008. In 38% of cuts occurring before 2008, 
states buck-passed on the US 50% of the time. In 50% of cuts before 2008, states buck-passed between 33.3% 
and 50% of the time. This compares to 27.7% of cuts after 2008 in which states buck-passed with the same 
frequency. Declining defense spending in about 37% of cut periods either before or after 2008 show no evidence 
of being related to buck-passing. 
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in 37% of the cases - Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, UK, Hungary, Austria, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Lithuania and Romania - is potentially related to buck-passing to the US (Figure 10).568 
 
III.B. Buck-Passing to the United Kingdom 
  European states on average buck-passed to the UK 30% of the time in the 2000-2012 
period. In 17% of the 22 cases, states buck-passed to the UK 50% of the time. In 63% of the 
cases, states buck-passed between 17% and 42% of the time, and in 13.6% of states buck-
passed only 8% of the time. 
 On average, European states shadowed UK’s deployment patterns 18% more 
frequently than they buck-passed to the UK and twice as frequently (48%) as they negated 
buck-passing behavior (22%). In 59% of the 22 cases, countries increased or decreased their 
                                                 
568 During a DSCP, buck-passing frequency increased the most in Lithuania (42%), Romania (33%) and Germany 
(25%). The increase was less significant in Spain, Greece, Hungary, and Austria. Decline in defense spending did 
not appear to change baseline buck-passing frequency in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia. 
On the other hand, Portugal, Cyprus, Malta, Austria, and Sweden significantly reduced their buck-passing 
frequency during a DSCP. France, Netherlands, Portugal, Malta, Latvia and Lithuania decreased their buck-
passing frequency only by 8% during a sustained decline in defense spending. 
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Figure 10. - DSCP's Related to Potential Buck-Passing to the US (values > 0) 
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foreign deployments with the UK at least 50% of the time.569 In 73% of the cases, states 
increased their foreign deployments as the UK decreased at the most 25% of the time (Figure 
7.A).  
 I find that majority of the 29 DSCP’s are accompanied by infrequent or no buck-
passing behavior: 34% relate to zero evidence of buck-passing, 14% to a 25% frequency of 
buck-passing and additional 10% to 33% frequency of potential buck-passing to the UK. In 
34% of the 29 cases, defense spending cuts related to 50% buck-passing frequency and in 3% 
of the cases to a 75% frequency of buck-passing (Figure 8.A).570 
Evidence suggests that in 62.1% of the 29 cases, cuts in defense spending failed to 
increase frequency of potential buck-passing to the UK relative to the baseline pattern. In the 
remaining 38% of the cases, however, buck-passing frequency during DSCP’s increased (Table 
17). This means that a decline in defense spending in Germany, Cyprus, Hungary, Portugal, 
Sweden, Lithuania, Greece, Czech Republic, Malta, Latvia, and Ireland was possibly related to 
governments’ buck-passing behavior. 
Defense spending cuts relate to the highest increase in the frequency of potential buck-
passing to the UK in case of Ireland (34%) and Latvia (33%). In Greece, Malta and the Czech 
Republic buck-passing frequency increased during a DSCP by about 25%. Germany, Cyprus, 
Hungary, Portugal, Sweden and Lithuania registered a smaller increase in buck-passing 
                                                 
569 In 23% of the cases, shadowing occurred between 66% and 75% of the time. 
570 About 25% of pre-2008 and 38% of post-2008 reductions in defense spending lacked evidence of buck-
passing to the UK. In 63% of the cases, defense spending cuts correlated with 50% - 75% buck-passing 
frequency. Such frequent buck-passing occurred only in 33.3% of the post-2008 defense spending cut periods. 
After 2008, 16% more cases of defense spending cuts related to less frequent buck-passing and 14% more cases 
related to no buck-passing. 
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frequency, ranging from 8% to 17%. On the other hand, defense spending cuts in Malta, 
Cyprus, Portugal and Lithuania decreased buck-passing frequency relative to the baseline 
patterns. These countries decreased the frequency of biennial increases in foreign military 
deployments by 33% to 50% (Figure 11). 
 
 
III.C. Buck-Passing to France 
 European states buck-passed to France least frequently. On average, buck-passing 
occurred only 11% of the time between 2000 and 2012. No state buck-passed to France more 
often than 25% of the time. In 73% of the 22 cases, countries buck-passed to France between 
8.3% and 16.7% of the time, and in 23% of the cases, states did not buck-pass to France at all 
(Figure 9.A). 
 On average, Europeans synchronized their deployment patterns with France almost 
5-times more frequently (54%) and decided to increase their deployments as France was 
reducing its deployments about 3-times more frequently (36%) than they buck-passed to 
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Figure 11. - DSCP's Potentially Related to Buck-Passing to the UK  
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France (11%). All of the European countries shadowed French deployment decisions at least 
33% of the time. About 63.9% of the 22 European states did so at least half the time, and 
almost 20% of the states shadowed French deployment patterns at least 75% of the time. In 
77.3% of the 22 countries, governments increased their foreign deployments when France 
withdrew its military personnel from foreign theaters between 33% and 50% of the time. 
 I find that 76% of the 29 DSCP’s did not relate to any evidence of potential buck-
passing to France. Only 7% of DSCP’s appear associated with a 50% frequency of buck-
passing to France, while about 17% of DSCP’s related to buck-passing frequency ranging 
between 20% and 25% of the cut periods (Figure 10.A).  
These findings imply that defense spending cuts potentially did not relate to buck-
passing to France in 76% of the 29 cases.571 In more than half of the 29 DSCP’s, the decline 
in defense spending diminished the free-riding frequency by 8% to 25%. Out of these latter 
cases, Greece decreased its buck-passing frequency during a DSCP the most. In 24.1% of the 
29 DSCP’s, the sustained reductions in defense spending did not appear to change states’ 
baseline buck-passing frequency. 
The remaining 24.1% of the cases, however, indicate DSCP’s potentially related to 
buck-passing to France. In this group of DSCP’s, buck-passing frequency increased during 
defense spending cuts relative to the baseline pattern. This pattern occurred in Hungary, the 
                                                 
571 In 34.5% of the 21 post-2008 DSCP’s, declining defense spending did not change buck-passing frequency at 
all. While buck-passing to the U.S. or the UK became less frequent during periods of defense spending occurring 
after 2008, buck-passing to France became more frequent after 2008. Out of the 8 cases of pre-2008 defense 
spending cuts, 87.5% related to zero evidence of buck-passing and 12.5% to buck-passing occurring 25% of the 
time. Out of the 21 cases of post-2008 defense spending cuts, 11.3% occurred with 25% to 50% frequency and 
71.4% of the cases did not show any evidence of buck-passing to France. 
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Netherlands, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, UK and Denmark. Out of this latter group of states, 
Denmark increased its buck-passing frequency during a DSCP the most, by 42% (Figure 12).  
  
 
IV. Comparison of European Buck-Passing to the US, UK and France 
 I find that on average, European countries buck-passed most frequently to the UK. 
Average baseline frequency of buck-passing to the UK exceeded that of the US by 5% and 
that of France by 19%. Frequency of buck-passing to the UK during DSCP’s exceeded that 
of the US by 7% and that of France by 21%.  
Average baseline European buck-passing to the 3 security players was infrequent, 
ranging between 11% and 30%. More frequently, between 48% and 54%, European states 
shadowed patterns of U.S., UK, and French foreign military deployments. Shadowing French 
patterns occurred most frequently, but exceeded European shadowing of the US only by 3% 
and of the UK by 6%. 
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Figure 12. – DSCP’s Potentially Related to Buck-Passing to France (values >0) 
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About a third of the DSCP’s related to potential buck-passing to any one of the three 
allies: 38% of DSCP’s related to buck-passing to the US, 38% to the UK and 24% to France 
(Figure 13).  
  
 
I find that in aggregate, declining defense spending was not related to any evidence of 
buck-passing in about a third of the 29 DSCP’s (Figure 14).572 All singularly targeted buck-
passing activities increased in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. In 14% of the 
29 cases, declining defense spending related to buck-passing to France, in additional 17% cases 
to the UK, and in 14% to the US. When European states increased their buck-passing to two 
allies, they did so most frequently to the US in combination with UK or France (38%). Buck-
passing to both US and the UK occurred primarily during spending cuts before 2008. Buck-
passing to the US and France happened only after 2008. Buck-passing to both UK and France 
increased least frequently (3%). After the 2008 global financial crisis, Europeans buck-passed 
                                                 
572 This assessment is based on the information in the last column of Table 17, ‘No. of Allies’. No evidence of 
potential increase in buck-passing during DSCP relates to ‘0’ value in the last column.  
25%
30%
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24%
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Avg Shadowing Freq. (2000-2012) Buck-passing increased during DSCP
Figure 13. - Buck-Passing Comparison: US, UK, France 
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to France by about 7% points more frequently than they did to the US or the UK during post-
2008 periods of defense spending cuts (Table 31.A). 
 
V. Buck-Passing and Military Capacity during DSCP  
 I hypothesized that a decline in defense spending related to buck-passing can result in 
non-detrimental outcomes in military capacity. To analyze this relationship, I evaluate how 
average increase in DSCP frequency of buck-passing relates to a change in aggregated military 
capacity. Average increase in DSCP frequency is calculated across the three key security players 
(Table 18).573  
I find that in 43% of the 30 DSCP’s, decline in defense spending increased average 
buck-passing frequency. Out of these 13 DSCP’s potentially related to buck-passing, 69% of 
defense spending cuts correlated with a decline in aggregated military capacity. In the 31% of 
the remaining cases, DSCP’s related to buck-passing co-varied with an aggregated increase in 
military capacity. This means that on average, 13.3% of DSCP’s directly support the buck-
                                                 
573 The average frequency of buck-passing aggregated for all three allies is a percent increase in buck-passing 
calculated by summarizing all percentage increase in buck-passing frequency to US, UK and FR during DSCP 
and then dividing the total sum by 3, the number of the three allies. 
31%
17% 17%
14%
10%
7%
3%
none UK US, UK US FR US, FR UK, FR
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
2
9
 
D
SC
P
's
Potential Buck-Passing Combinations
Figure 14. - Type of Potential Buck-Passing during DSCP's 
  
 
203 
 
passing hypothesis. This group of DSCP’s presents the most likely cases that support the buck-
passing hypothesis and entails cuts in defense spending in Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, and Latvia. 
The DSCP’s potentially related to buck-passing but a net decline in military capacity also 
support the buck-passing hypothesis because of the evidence of defense reform-related 
improvements: increases in service-level manpower and equipment and line-item R&D 
spending. 
However, in 57% of the 30 cases, declining defense spending potentially does not 
relate to buck-passing: the average buck-passing frequency did not increase during DSCP’s 
relative to the baseline pattern.574 Out of these DSCP’s, 71% related to an aggregated decline 
and 29% to an aggregated increase in aggregated military capacity. This means that 5 out of 30 
DSCP’s (16.7%) – Slovenia, Sweden, Lithuania, Austria, and Italy - did not relate to buck-
passing but did relate to increased aggregate military capacity. These 5 DSCP’s challenge both 
the buck-passing hypothesis and the assumed direct proportionality between defense spending 
cuts and military capacity. 
 
Table 18. - Average Buck-Passing Frequency during DSCP 
No. 
DSCP Country Period 
Aggregated 
Military 
Capacity 
Change in Buck-Passing Frequency during DSCP 
relative to Baseline Patterns 
US UK FR Average 
No. of 
Allies 
Average Buck-Passing Increased, 2 Allies 
11 UK 2007-2009 -7% 17%   33% 25% 2 
24 Lithuania 2003-2005 -36% 42% 17% 0% 20% 2 
1 Denmark 2010-2012 -107% 17% -17% 42% 14% 2 
3 Germany 2004-2006 -2% 25% 8% -8% 8% 2 
26 Malta 2003-2007 11% -8% 25% 8% 8% 2 
4 Greece 2008-2011 -15% 8% 25% -25% 3% 2 
                                                 
574 I find in 82% of these cases, a decline in defense spending depressed baseline buck-passing frequency and in 
17.6% DSCP’s did not change baseline buck-passing frequency. 
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20 Cyprus 2000-2002 21% 17% 8% -17% 3% 2 
Average Buck-Passing Increased, 1 Ally 
12 CZ 2008-2012 -30% 0% 25% 0% 8% 1 
22 Estonia 2008-2010 31% 17% 0% 0% 6% 1 
23 Latvia 2008-2010 8% -8% 33% -8% 6% 1 
17 Ireland 2008-2011 -4% -17% 34% 0% 6% 1 
29 Slovakia 2008-2012 -45% 0% 0% 8% 3% 1 
14 Hungary 2008-2012 -91% 0% 0% 3% 1% 1 
Average Buck-Passing Did Not Increase during DSCP 
13 Hungary 2003-2006 -61% 8% 8% -17% 0% 2 
9 Portugal 2008-2012 -11% -8% 17% -8% 0% 1 
28 Romania 2008-2010 -10% 33% -17% -17% 0% 1 
10 Spain 2008-2012 -9% 8% -8% -8% -3% 1 
7 Netherlands 2008-2012 -27% -8% -8% 8% -3% 1 
30 Slovenia 2008-2012 10% -17% 0% 8% -3% 1 
2 France 2008-2012 -20% -8% 0%   -4% 0 
19 Bulgaria 2008-2012 -81% 0% -8% -8% -5% 0 
18 Sweden 2007-2009 1% -25% 17% -8% -5% 1 
16 Austria 2007-2010 -38% 8% -25% 0% -6% 1 
5 Italy 2004-2006 -19% -17% 0% -17% -11% 0 
25 Lithuania 2008-2010 58% -8% -33% 0% -14% 0 
15 Austria 2003-2005 67% -25% -25% 0% -17% 0 
6 Italy 2007-2010 56% -17% -17% -17% -17% 0 
8 Portugal 2002-2004 -3% -33% -33% -8% -25% 0 
21 Cyprus 2010-2012 -6% -33% -42% -17% -31% 0 
27 Malta 2009-2012 -25% -33% -50% -17% -33% 0 
 
VI. Case Selection 
According to the buck-passing hypothesis, buck-passing can not only free-up 
resources by reducing operational expenditures on foreign deployments, but also avoid 
detrimental outcomes in military capacity by continued investment in national militaries. I 
further evaluate this hypothesis in the context of Germany (2004-2006) and Austria (2003-
2005). Germany and Austria have both been cautious about deploying military forces, but 
present opposite cases with respect to the buck-passing hypothesis.  
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Austria empirically challenges the buck-passing hypothesis. Evidence suggests that 
cuts in defense spending related to an aggregated increase in military capacity did not relate to 
buck-passing. Germany provides evidence in support of the buck-passing hypothesis. German 
buck-passing frequency increased during a period of defense spending cut and simultaneously 
related to potentially non-detrimental outcomes in military capacity: aggregate measures 
provide evidence of a small decline in military capacity (-2.2%), which was not accompanied 
by a top-level decline in military manpower and also entailed lower-level increase in military 
equipment and R&D spending.  
Although Germany does not present empirically strongest case of the buck-passing 
hypothesis, it presents the likeliest case due to its cautious approach to military involvement 
abroad. The WWII experience as well as the timing of the defense spending cut establishes 
Germany and Austria as cases with more ceteris paribus conditions than if Austria was 
compared to empirically stronger cases of buck-passing, such as pre-2008 Malta and Cyprus 
or post-2008 Latvia and Estonia. 
 
VI.A. Germany (2004-2006) 
 Evidence suggests that Germany’s cuts in defense spending related to buck-passing to 
the U.S.. To ascertain the validity of this finding, I evaluate further evidence. For buck-passing 
to be a valid explanation of the defense spending cuts, we must see evidence that Germany’s 
security policy restrained its use of military force abroad. Reserved approach to foreign military 
engagements serves as evidence of strategically intended buck-passing to allies, such as the 
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U.S.. Furthermore, for buck-passing related cuts in defense spending to be non-detrimental to 
Germany’s military capacity, we must see evidence of continued investment in national 
defense and policy choices to improve German military. 
The goal of Germany’s security and defense policy between 2004 and 2006 was to 
ensure capabilities for national as well as collective defense.575 Germany understood that it 
cannot guarantee national security by tackling contemporary security threats alone.576 NATO, 
with its potential for military action, remained the fundamental guarantor of global security: 
“In the long run, the global challenges confronting German security cannot be met without 
an effective transatlantic alliance that is based on mutual trust among its member states. The 
fundamental issues of European security can be addressed only in a joint effort with the United 
States of America…”.577 Germany thus strategically relied on NATO, the US, and increasingly 
the EU to engage in international crisis-management in the world.  
Military reliance on allies is the founding principle of alliances; however, Germany’s 
security and defense policy as well as strategic culture restrained Germany’s use of military 
force. National reservations about the actual use of military force have been shaped by 
German historical experience. Many scholars argue that the horrors of Nazi militarism pushed 
German policy-makers toward a foreign policy based on “trade, soft diplomacy, and on 
occasion unilateral disarmament initiatives.”578  
                                                 
575 The political direction of the Germany’s defense orientation was provided by Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (SPD) Chancellor Schroder and Defense Minister Peter Struck between 2004 and 2005 and by 
CDU’s Chancellor Merkel and her Minister of Defense Franz Josef Jung between 2005 and 2006.  
576 223. White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, pp.6-7 
577 Ibid., p.7 
578 Germany and Europe (2013): “The Reluctant Hegemon - If Europe’s economies are to recover, Germany 
must start to lead,” The Economist, Leaders, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21579456-if-europes-
economies-are-recover-germany-must-start-lead-reluctant-hegemon  
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German strategic security culture entails a degree of aversion to the use of military 
force. The zivilmacht element of Germany’s security culture 579 translates to a strategic 
preference for the use of civilian instruments in dealing with security challenges. German 
Defense Minister Struck has courted a ‘peace coalition’. The SPD’s “international policy 
motion at the November 2003 party congress was strident in its emphasis upon the importance 
of the EU as a forum for the development of German defence and security policy.”580 This 
position was to assure the ‘peace coalition’ that the new “tasks of the Bundeswehr would not 
lead to a ‘militarization’ of German defence and security policy and assertion of national 
interest by military force.”581  
Similarly, for Gernot Erler, vice chair of the Parliamentary Party responsible for 
Foreign Policy, Development and Human Rights, the ESDP would be an essential part of the 
‘European peace order, and a ‘European civil power’.582 The aim was to support the ‘European 
model’ of international politics, focused on a “foresighted peace policy and crisis prevention, 
that emphasizes the primacy of political means and rejects preemptive military strikes without 
the legitimization of international law.”583 In March 2005, the ‘peace’ thinking within SPD 
reflected a “deep sense of unease with the new US military doctrine of ‘preventative strike.’”584 
                                                 
579 But while German public opinion is often characterized as ‘pacifist’ and its leaders have limited the overseas 
deployment of combat troops, Germany has not otherwise taken measures compatible with intentional 
demilitarization. Germany is one of the top arms exporters in the world, and the promotion of German arms 
exports as foreign policy is often justified not on the basis of industry jobs, but on maintaining a security of arms 
supply on strategic grounds. [Keller, Patrick (2013). American Enterprise Institute “German hard power: Is there 
a there there?”]  
580 Dyson, Tom (2007) “The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and MilitaryReform 
in the Post-Cold War Era,” Berhahn Books, New York, pp.1-219, p.129 
581 Ibid. 
582 Ibid. 
583 Ibid. 
584 Ibid. 
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Reservation about deploying military forces shaped Germany’s position toward the 
U.S.-led war on terror. Der Spiegel magazine remarked that the political campaign “marked the 
end of ‘unlimited solidarity’ when Schroder became the Chancellor of Peace.”585 Chancellor 
Schroeder opposed U.S. plans to invade Iraq, eventually embracing an “unequivocal 
opposition to any military intervention even under a UN mandate.586 Shroeder explained his 
position by referring to the ‘German way’ of international engagement and his campaign 
promise to keep Germany out of any conflict.587 Military response in Afghanistan was opposed 
also by the German public, which was not enthusiastic about having German troops “engaged 
in what was seen as an undesirable and risky military campaign.”588  
Although Chancellor Schroder eventually announced a deployment of 3,900 
Bundeswehr troops to the Operation Enduring Freedom, the decision was shrouded in the 
rhetoric of Germany’s international responsibility, its commitment to the transatlantic 
partnership and the need to maintain credibility of German foreign policy. Despite having 
substantial doubts about the military deployment itself, over seventy members of the 
Parliament voted ‘yes’ because they wanted to keep Schroder’s governing coalition in power.589  
Under Chancellor Merkel, political leadership continued to express German sensitivity 
to the real consequences of military engagement. In general, dangers associated with military 
                                                 
585 This opposition to the Iraq war could be viewed from the perspective of domestic political competition. 
Schroeder’s “staunch opposition to the war marked him from his challenger, CSU candidate Edmund Stoiber. 
…The anti-war rhetoric …turned a 10 percentage point deficit into a SPD-Greens victory by the slimmest margin 
in the Federal Republic’s history.” [Baltrusaitis, Daniel F. (2008), “Friends Indeed? Coalition Burden Sharing and 
the War in Iraq,” ProQuest LLC, pp.1-459,  p. 273-274] 
586 Ibid., p. 274 
587 Longhurst (2004: 89) 
588 Ibid., p. 84  
589 Ibid., p. 86  
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engagement are salient in German strategic culture. The Federal Government routinely 
evaluates which German values and interests validate operational involvement of the 
Bundeswehr.590 Caution is embedded in the decision-making about military deployments, with 
‘dangers to life and limb’ and the possibility of ‘far-reaching political consequences’ being high 
on the political radar.591  
Bundeswehr has committed to “transform a purely defensive force to a power 
projection force, designed for international military operations. ...The terms of participation, 
however, are still strongly influenced by the paradigm of a civilian power.”592 The Reserved 
use of military forces explains Germany’s operational engagement between 2004 and 2006. 
Majority of Bundeswehr operations were peace-stabilization missions, aimed at creating the 
preconditions for establishing governmental and societal structures. Such operations minimize 
the need for military engagement, highlighting the need to engage civilian or policing 
instruments. These have ranged from enforcement of embargo measures, monitoring air and 
maritime spaces and protecting populations.593 
Germany realized the need to participate in military operations beyond its borders with 
the Gulf War in 1990. German leadership began to realize that it was “no longer possible to 
abstain from such kind of operations, relying merely on Scheckbuch-Diplomatie.”594 Helmut 
Kohl’s government introduced a new policy paradigm of greater German participation in 
                                                 
590 White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, p.22 
591 Ibid.  
592 Breuer, Fabian (2006). “Between Ambitions and Financial Constraints: The Reform of the German Armed 
Forces,” German Politics, Vol. 15, No.2, June, pp.206-220, pp. 206-207 
593 White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, p.67 
594 Breuer (2006), p.208 
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international military operations. The Bundeswehr participated in the UN Transnational 
Authority in Cambodia, the UN Special Commission in Kuwait, UN Operation in Somalia II 
peacekeeping mission, and German forces were deployed in former Yugoslavia for the 
supervision of economic sanctions and monitoring of the no-fly zone.595 The Federal Republic 
participated in combat operation for the first time in 1995 NATO attacks against the Bosnian 
Serbs.596 
After that, the Bundeswehr deployed in various international operations: NATO-led 
Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilization Force (SFOR), Operation ‘Allied Force’ against 
Serbia (1999), operations in East Timor, ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Kuwait, EU-led operations 
‘Concordia’ in Macedonia and ‘Artemis’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo, International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF, Afghanistan), SFOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina), KFOR 
(Kosovo), UN observer mission in Georgia, UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, ‘Active 
Endeavor’ (surveillance of shipping traffic in the Mediterranean Sea), and ‘Enduring Freedom’ 
(anti-terror operation in the Horn of Africa.)597 The new paradigm of German participation in 
international mission therefore does not exclude the use of force in principle, but deployments 
still need to be in line with German values: “traditional culture of restrained continues to play 
a crucial role in the German approach to Bundeswehr deployment.”598 
Cautious attitudes about the use of force are imbedded in Germany’s Innere Fuhrung’ 
education of the Bundeswehr. Civic education is the fundamental principle in this approach, 
                                                 
595 Ibid. 
596 Ibid., p. 209 
597 Ibid. 
598 Ibid., p.210 
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aimed to harmonize mission-capable forces with the principles of a free and democratic state, 
governed by the rule of law. It endeavors to cultivate a sense of civic tradition and moral 
responsibility within Germany’s armed forces: “Civic education helps them grasp the 
complexity of crisis scenarios and to take account of political parameters. Intensive ethics and 
moral education …promotes the capability of the individual to act on his or her own 
responsibility in morally difficult situations.”599 A typical job profile of a German soldier “calls 
for analytical and action-taking capabilities that go far beyond purely military needs.600 
Individual soldiers are thus responsible for making ethical judgements about the use of military 
instruments in each particular situation.  
Cautious approach to the use of military force explains Germany’s development of 
civilian crisis-management instruments as well as its focus on prevention. Prevention is key to 
reducing the need for military crisis-response operations.601 Federal Government developed a 
robust civilian crisis-management concept ‘Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and 
Post-Conflict Peace Building,’ advocating for non-military approach to crisis-management and 
prevention. The idea was to deal with the root causes of potential or actual conflicts and 
security risks:602 if caught early, these would not require military action. 
To facilitate conflict prevention, Germany committed to continued arms control, 
disarmament, non-proliferation and restrictive armaments export policies. The 2006 White 
Paper on defense prohibits certain types of military engagement and prioritizes development 
                                                 
599 White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr., pp.59-60 
600 Ibid. 
601 Ibid., p. 23 
602 Ibid., p.5 
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of civilian instruments to complement military tools. Under the purview of the Federal and 
Land authorities, it is legal to deploy Bundeswehr against terrorist or other asymmetric threats 
– whenever necessary. However, in these instances the law also strictly prohibits the use of 
military munitions.603  
Cultural and strategic reservations about the use of military force, did not, however, 
mean abandonment of German national armed forces. In the 2004-2006 period, the aim was 
to transform its armed forces into more modern, efficient, and effective expeditionary forces. 
As part of the continuing effort to modernize outdated military, Defense Minister Peter Struck 
announced in 2004 deep cuts in national defense spending but also a sweeping overhaul of the 
armed forces.604 Spending reductions were not to negatively affect Germany’s orders of 
armored vehicles, combat helicopters, or the 180 Eurofighter aircraft intended to enhance 
European military capabilities.605  
In 2005, Chancellor Angela Merkel promised “a foreign policy anchored in a 
revitalized transatlantic partnership.”606 This required a high degree of continuity in the reform 
policies of the previous government.607 Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung maintained 
modernization efforts of his predecessor, proposing a “rigorous restructuring and re-
equipping of the military to suit its ‘more likely tasks’ – international crisis control instead of 
                                                 
603 Ibid., p.10 
604 Smith, Craig S. (2004). “Germany to Overhaul Military and Reduce Defense Spending,” The New York 
Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/14/world/germany-to-overhaul-military-and-reduce-defense-
spending.html  
605 Ibid. 
606 Belkin, P. (2007, October). German foreign and security policy: trends and transatlantic implications. 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE.  
607 Meiers (2007: 623-644)  
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tank battles on the northern German plains.”608 By 2006, the army reduced the outdated heavy 
Leopard 2 tanks from almost 2,000 to 350 and purchased 188 of the more modern “Howitzer 
2000” tanks as a replacement.609  
Germany’s defense transformation and modernization was cemented in several 
strategic documents. Germany’s Defence Policy Guidelines (2003) and the Bundeswehr 
Concept (2004) are premised on consistent transitioning of Germany’s military toward 
expeditionary forces.610 This meant improvement of Germany’s military capability profile over 
a wide spectrum of capability categories: command and control, intelligence collection and 
reconnaissance, mobility, effective engagement, support and sustainability, and survivability 
and protection.611  
Germany’s modernization aligned with NATO’s military transformation as defined in 
the 1999 Strategic Concept and the 2005 Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG). Germany 
also participated in the EU effort to modernize European militaries. The 2003 European 
Security Strategy and the 2004 Headline Goal 2010 call for improved instruments for threat 
prevention and furthering military capabilities through increasing coherence and partnerships 
of defense cooperation within Europe.  
The reorganization of the Bundeswehr was developed with the aim to achieve balance 
between mission tasks, equipment and resources. The German defense budget at the time was 
                                                 
608 Von Hammerstein, Konstantin and Alexander Szandar (2006). “Too Many Missions, Too Little Money: 
Germany’s Army Feels the Pinch,” Spiegel Online,  http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/too-many-
missions-too-little-money-germany-s-army-feels-the-pinch-a-435368.html  
609 Ibid. 
610 White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, p.16  
611 Ibid., p. 10 
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characterized by “high operating expenditures and personnel costs, insufficient investment 
rate, considerable over-planning and resources committed to contracts.”612 The reforms were 
aimed at improving materiel, equipment, and rationalizing personnel structures and 
management processes. Consequently, German Army introduced biggest cuts in personnel 
(from 230,000 to 132,000), but these were accompanied by increased focus on 
professionalization of the troops and continued investment in army equipment.613 Luftwaffe 
started phasing out outdated and aging equipment (e.g. 23 MIG 29 fighters were transferred 
to Poland), but also focused on increasing interoperability and interconnectivity as key 
requirements for internationally oriented Air Force.614 The planned purchase of Eurofighter615 
and A400M616 cargo aircraft were to “close serious gaps in capability.”617 Reforms in the Navy 
envisioned development of new technology on frigates, fast boats, submarines, mine detection 
and marine aviation.618 
 Modernization also entailed reform of the force structures and a sustainable 
indigenous defense technology and industry base. Germany set out to develop 35,000 troops 
for high intensity, short duration crisis intervention operations, 70,000 troops for longer 
duration crisis stabilization operations, and 147,500 troops in support forces. It aimed to build 
                                                 
612 Tiron, Roxana (2003), “Germany Launches Wide-Ranging Defense Reform,” National Defense, December, 
available at: 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2003/December/Pages/Germany_Launches3691.aspx  
613 Ibid. 
614 Ibid. 
615 Eurofighter has faced a series of delays and considerable cost overruns and the order is estimated at a total 
of 19.5 billion Euros. Eurofighter is to replace F-4 Phantom and MIG 29 aircraft as well as air-to-ground 
version of Tornado. [Ibid.] 
616 Germany has set aside 8.2 billion Euros for 60 aircraft and expects initial capability in 2009. [Ibid.] 
617 Ibid. 
618 Germany also intends to purchase 4 submarines in the amount of 1.6 billion Euros. [Ibid.] 
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the capability to deploy 14,000 troops in two larger scale or five smaller scale operations 
simultaneously.619 In order to promote adequate use of defense capabilities, the Federal 
Government supported exports of German defense industry companies. It also vouched to 
adequately invest in military research and development to support Germany’s competitiveness 
and the future viability of its armed forces.620  
The analysis lends credence to the empirical finding that Germany’s 2004-2006 cuts in 
defense spending were – alongside defense reform efforts - associated with buck-passing to 
the U.S. (or NATO). This is not to say that Germany did not participate in international crisis-
management by military means. However, Germany’s strategic and cultural reservations about 
the use of military force translated to Germany’s opposition to the US invasion of Iraq, and 
explained Germany’s reservations and caveats on the use of military force in Afghanistan.621 
As a matter of strategic preference, Germany also pushed forward development of civilian 
crisis-response tools, and placed legal restrictions on the use of some munitions. Although 
Germany envisioned more robust deployment of its military personnel abroad, involvement 
in non-combative and preventive roles was a priority. Nonetheless, the decline in defense 
                                                 
619 Belkin (2007)  
620 White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, p. 64 
621 “While the Bundeswehr has been deployed I some 15 countries, deployments have regularly addressed 
humanitarian crises and/or clear breaches of international law rather than strategic interests in resources or the 
counterbalancing of upcoming competitors, e.g. Russia. …deployment has often been motivated by civilian 
power norms. …In-dept studies of Germany’s domestic deployment debates clearly indicate that mandates 
reaped large parliamentarian support because of their close fit with the civilian power tradition and drew 
substantial opposition when these were in doubt. …Germany has insisted on setting tight limits to its 
deployments, especially in Afghanistan (Cooper and Kulish 2008). The German contribution to ISAF is limited 
in number …and confined to Kabul and the northern region, and only German special forces participate in 
Operation Enduring Freedom combat missions against Taliban insurgents.” [Kirchner, Emil J. and James 
Sperling (edt.) (2010). “National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance,” Routledge, New York, pp.1-
307, pp.57-59] More on the tensions between civilian culture and the culture of war see Snyder, Elizabeth S. 
(2011). “Possibilities for Peace: Germany’s Transformation of Culture of War,” The Journal of Sociology & Social 
Welfare, Vol. 38, Issue 2, June, Article 10. Available at: http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol38/iss2/10  
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spending was, despite evidence of buck-passing behavior, accompanied by a strategic choice 
to further invest in and develop German military capacity. 
 
VI.B. Austria (2003-2005)  
Evidence suggests that the decline in defense spending and the aggregate increase in 
military capacity was not related to Austria’s buck-passing behavior: buck-passing frequency 
declined during the defense spending cut period, relative to the baseline pattern. In order to 
evaluate whether cuts in Austrian defense spending were not related to buck-passing policies, 
I examine the details of Austria’s political programs, foreign and security policy and military 
equipment procurements. Evidence of pro-active military policies, which entail choices in 
support of strategic modernziation of national defense, improvement of Austria’s 
expeditionary readiness and increasing participation in EU, NATO or UN missions are 
required to illustrate absence of buck-passing policies. 
Austria has declared itself as militarily neutral in 1955. The promise of not joining any 
military alliances implies minimal military engagement abroad. After becoming an EU 
member, however, Austria gradualy relaxed the principle of military non-alliance (Article 23f 
of Federal Consitution).622 Austrian People’s Party (OVP) and Freedoms Party of Austria 
(FPO), joined in a coalition government after the 2000 elections, for the first time openly 
questioned the relevance of Austria’s neturality. The government indicated that “Austria 
would commit itself to active participation in the development of the ESDP including a 
                                                 
622 Ibid., p. 5  
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possible mutual military assistance guarantee (Beistandpflicht), in case of armed aggression 
against an EU member state.”623 Austrian new Security Policy Doctrine of 2001 implemented 
a paradigmatic shift from reactive to preventive security policy. The policy evisioned 
deepening of European cooperation and reliance on the security guarantee in the EU as a de 
facto military alliance.624 
The 2001 Defense Doctrine indicated Austria’s political willingness to move away 
from neturality in order to maintain its position of influence within the EU: “The old template 
– Lippizaner, Mozarkugeln [chocolate balls], or neutrality no longer subscribe[d] to the reality 
of the 21st Century [Austria].”625 The doctrine emphasized comprehensive and cooperative 
security, effectively moving away from the old political paradigms of balance of power and 
deterrence policies.626 Traditional security threats were to be replaced by adequete counter-
measure strategies based on individual and/or collective self-defense.627  
The defense doctrine primarily aimed to “promote Austria’s role as an active and 
solidary player within the European Security and Defense Policy in order to preserve national 
and Eurpean security interests as well as maintain Austria’s position in the group of European 
                                                 
623 In May 2001 this idea was formally expressed by Chancellor Schussel (Holl 2002: 302, fn 43) [Steinmetz and 
Wivel (2010). Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities, Ashgate Publishers, p. 186] 
624 Neuhold (2003) and Steinmetz and Wivel (2010: 187). “After 9/11 the likelihood of NATO members to be 
drawn into the increasing unpopular wars of an increasingly unpopular US President grew. Traditional anti-
American sentiments were spurred by the feeling that the USA as the world’s and NATO’s largest military power 
would use that power not in a benevolent way but rather like an empire, defending its interest with no respect 
for others. Against this backdrop it was common sense in Austria to stay outside NATO. So the comeback of 
neutrality was completed.” [Brettner-Messler, Gerald (2008) “Austria’s Engagement in Chad as Element of its 
Neutrality Policy – Security Policy between Abstinence and Engagement,” Defence and Strategy EU, pp.81-92, 
p.84, available at: file:///C:/Users/lwieluns/Downloads/brettner_messler_oas_1_2008.pdf] 
625 Chancellor Schussel (2001) [Steinmetz and Wivel (2010: 187] 
626 Bachora, Rastislav, 2010, Austrian security and defence doctrine- the changing process of Austrian security 
policy and the impacts of political interests, In: Majer, M. – Ondrejcsák, R. – Tarasovič, V. – Valášek, T. (eds.): 
Panorama of global security environment 2010. Bratislava: CENAA, pp. 217-235.  
627 Ibid. 
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financial core contributors and policy shapers.”628 This required reorganization of Austria’s 
military to enhance an ambtious and proactive military compotent on par with European 
standards.629 Austria was determined to “cooperate, on equal footing and in solidarity, in all 
spheres of European security and defence,” and to make “adequate contribution to the military 
and civilian capabilities of the EU.”630 The government vouched to support the realization of 
Euroepan defense, efforts in international conflict prevention, crisis- and post-conflict 
mangement, pursue a greater degree of interoperability of national and international disaster 
relief capabilities, foster research on security policy issues, and intesify intelligence sharing 
among the EU member states.631 
Military transformation morphed Austrian military neturality into an expression of 
‘European solidarity’. When the Heads of States and Government could not agree on the draft 
Constitutional Treaty in Rome in December 2003, Chancellor Schussel reaffirmed Austria’s 
commitment to Europe, putting forth a new security policy formula: “‘solidarity within 
Europe, neturality in wars outside Europe.’”632 This permitted Austrian government to share 
in the European planning, decision-making and execution of humanitarian actions, rescue 
operations, and peacekeeping missions.633 The idea of active neutrality empowered Austria “to 
take over new roles in global politics, such as … in international peacekeeping and 
humanitarian aid missions led by the United Nations, or promoting Vienna as the htird UN 
                                                 
628 Reiter, Erich and Johann Frank (2004) “The European Security Strategy – Austrian Perspective,” pp. 1-6, 
p.1  
629 Reiter and Frank (2004: 1) 
630 Majer, M. – Ondrejcsák, R. – Tarasovič, V. – Valášek, T. (eds.): Panorama of global security environment 
2010. 
631 Ibid. 
632 Steinmetz and Wivel (2010: 187) 
633 DeRouen and Heo (2005: 64) 
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HQ city in the world after New York and Geneva.”634 After the 1998 ratification of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, Austria’s National Assembly specifically enabled the country’s 
participation in the EU Petersberg Tasks, including crisis-management combat missions.635  
In its growing support for stronger European military capabilities, Austria welcomed 
the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). On one hand, the strategy influenced Austria’s 
national defense reform between 2004 and 2005.636 On the other hand, Austrian policy-makers 
supported further development of European capabilities. In the Austrian view, the latter 
required Europeans to endorse a ‘European Military Doctrine’ (EMD) and Austria to stay 
involved in European defense dcision-making. EMD was to facilitate reorientation of Austrian 
national defense planning toward the objectives of European planning as well as deeper 
integration of the armed forces of the smaller and bigger European states.637 By gardering 
European agreement, EMD would legitimize Austria’s military actions to its citizens.638   
These paradigmatic policy changes allowed Austria to participate in a number of 
European and UN missions and operations: EUFOR-Concordia in Skopje, Kosovo; KFOR 
in Pristina, UN Disengagement Observer Forces in Syria (UNDOF); UN Peacekeeping Force 
in Cyprus (UNFICYP); UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), more recently in 
UNIFIL in Lebanon.639 Since 2002, Austria has participated in the ISAF missions and in May 
                                                 
634 Ibid., p. 63 
635 Resolution by the Austrian Parliament (2004), p.7 
636 European Union Committee, 31st Report of Session 2007-2008.  “Adopting the EU’s Approach to Today’s 
Security Challenges – the Review of the 2003 European Security Strategy,” House of Lords, UK, p.15 
637 Reiter and Frank (2004: 5) 
638 Ibid., pp.5-6 
639 Although the solidarity concept entered public language, it did not enter the Austrian legal system as an 
amendment to or a change of the Federal Consitutional Law of 1955 on Austria’s neutrality. [DeRouen and 
Heo (2005: 63, 66)]  
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2012 agreed to provide financial support for the training and capacity building of the Afghan 
police forces in the amount of 18 million Euros.640 In December 2004, Austria and Canada 
lauched a new Trust Fund project for the destruction of anti-personnel land mines in Serbia 
and Montenegro: “the project was designed for the destruction of more than 1.3 million anti-
personnel land mines at a total cost of 1.6 million Euros.”641 
Increasing participation in international operations required adequate military 
capabilities.642 The 2004 Defense Reform Commission643 set out to transform Austrian armed 
forces into expeditionary forces prepared for the challenges of the 21st Century.644 On one 
hand, the commission called for adequate means for national defense and domestic assistance 
and relief operations. On the other hand, it emphasized the need to support Austria’s 
participation in international missions.645 Austria came to play an active role internationaly, 
deploying its military personnel in a number of EU, NATO, and UN misions between 2003 
and 2005: military operation EUFOR Concordia in Macedonia, Stabilisation Force in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (SFOR), operation EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
                                                 
640 Biehl, Heiko, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas (edt.) (2013), Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and 
Defence Policies Across the Continent (Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Militärgeschichte und 
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641 Video Interview with Franz Cede, Head of Mission of the Republic of Austria to the North Atlantic Treaty 
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642 “Participation in permanent structured cooperation under Art. I-41(6) requires military capabilities that fulfil 
higher criteria, as well the acceptance of commitments with a view to the most demanding missions. Its 
compatibility with neutrality depends on the concrete operation undertaken, in particular on whether it entails 
the use of non-defensive armed force against states without the authorization of the UN Security 
Council.” [Munro, Emily (edt.) (2005) “Challenges to Neutral and Non-Alighted Countries in Europe and 
Beyond,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland, pp. 1-61, p.15] 
643 More on 2010 Defense Reform Commission [Brueau, Thomas and Florina Cristiana Matei (edt) (2013). The 
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p. 296] 
644 Steinmetz and Wivel (2010: 188) 
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assistance in maintaining security in Kabul (ISAF 2 and ISAF 3), UN assistance mission for 
national reconciliation in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNAMA), UN mission in Cote d’Ivoire 
(MINUCI), EU military operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis), a search and 
rescue operation in Sri Lanka, support for the African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS II), and 
a disaster relief operation in Pakistan/Cashemere.646  
Defense reform was based on safeguarding Austria’s military defefence capability to 
“counter punctual attacks.”647 This required maintaining and developing of all “military core 
functions at a high technological level,”648 which was to ensure additional capabilities and 
constant air surveillance and control to defend against sub-conventional attacks and potential 
conventional threats.649 
Defense reform further required leaner military forces as well as reduction of old and 
acquisition of new military equipment. Austria started downsizing its total mobilization 
strength in 1992, and within a decade reduced the number by about a half. In 2003, Austrian 
Ministry of Defense ordered 18 Eurofighers650 for a total cost of about 1.96 billion Euros: 4 
Eurofighter planes were scheduled to be delivered by 2007, 12 in 2008 and 2 in 2009.651 In 
                                                 
646 Urrisk, Rolf: Die Einsätze des Österreichischen Bundesheeres von 1955 - 2002, Weißhaupt Verlag, Graz 
2002, http://www.bundesheer.at/english/td_international/artikel.php?id=28  
647 Resolution by the Austrian Parliament (2001), Security and Defence Doctrine, Translation, Orig. German, 
p.10 
648 Ibid., p.10 
649 Ibid. 
650 During the early election campaign (2006), SPO fought under the slogan “No Eurofighters under a Chancellor 
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interceptors from 18 to 15, and a savings of 370 million Euros. [Meyer, Berthold (2007). “Austria between Felt 
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addition, in February of 2004, Austria entered negotiations with Switzerland over purchasing 
additonal F-5 Tiger aircraft to secure Austrian air space until 2008.652 
The analysis supports the finding that Austria’s defense spending cuts were not related 
to buck-passing behavior. The buck-passing hypothesis is contradicted by three key findings. 
Firstly, Austria’s neutrality transformed to mean solidarity within European security and 
defense and allowed Austria to engage in expeditionary missions under the EU, NATO, and 
the UN. Secondly, Austria reformed its national defense with the view of building 
expeditionary forces and capabilities, and expressed strong support for a greater strategic EU 
role in the international context. Thirdly, Austria acquired new military equipment to buttress 
its military capabilities despite reduced defense spending. All these factors illustrate Austria’s 
strategic choice to transform, modernize, and reform its defense to be a stronger and more 
reliable security contributor within the EU, rather than a buck-passer. 
 
VII. Discussion of the Findings 
In this chapter, I examined whether European states diminished their defense 
spending due to buck-passing and whether such decline in defense spending resulted in non-
detrimental military capacity outcomes. I find that 43% of the 30 DSCP’s potentially relate to 
buck-passing: the average frequency of buck-passing increased during DSCP relative to the 
baseline frequency between 2000 and 2012.  
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As hypothesized, I find compelling evidence that suggests that buck-passing was not 
detrimental to military capacity. First, in 30% of the 13 DSCP’s defense spending cuts possibly 
related to buck-passing co-vary with an aggregated increase in military capacity. Second, in 
61% of the 13 cases, buck-passing was accompanied by defense reform-related investment in 
national militaries despite the net decline in military capacity.  
I find that relative to the baseline patterns, declining defense spending galvanized 
buck-passing to the US in 38% of all DSCP’s. Similarly, falling defense expenditures increased 
buck-passing to the UK in 38% of the 29 DSCP’s, while 24% of all DSCP’s related to increased 
buck-passing to France. These DSCP’s were potentially related to policy decisions to buck-
pass to any one of these three strategic security players in Europe. On average, this means an 
8% increase in DSCP’s buck-passing to the US or the UK, and a 13% increase in DSCP buck-
passing to France, relative to the average baseline buck-passing frequency.  
These findings challenge the conventional assumptions that Europeans predominantly 
pass off their foreign military engagement to the US alone. The analysis implies that in terms 
of shouldering responsibility for international security, Europeans perceive the UK and the 
US similarly: the degree of trans-Atlantic buck-passing – buck-passing to the US and the UK 
individually or together – exceeds any evidence of European buck-passing to France alone, or 
in combination with either the US or the UK.   
I also find that in 57% of the 30 DSCP’s potentially do not relate to buck-passing: 
buck-passing frequency did not increase during a DSCP relative to the baseline pattern. These 
findings have two important implications. Firstly, they demonstrate that falling defense 
expenditures do not automatically decease states’ military deployments abroad. Secondly, 
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evidence supports the conventional wisdom that continued operational engagement provides 
incentives for continued investment in military modernization – even under budgetary 
pressures. The Austrian case indicates that defense spending cuts (not related to buck-passing) 
were accompanied by concerted Europeanization of Austrian foreign and security policy. This 
resulted not only in Austria’s continued participation in expeditionary operations, but also in 
the commitment to modernize, reform and improve Austria’s national armed forces. 
It is good to know that in more than half of the periods of declining defense spending, 
states either did not buck-pass more or buck-passed less frequently relative to the patterns 
between 2000 and 2012. This means that the spending decline in Europe does not translate to 
a drastic decline in European military engagement abroad, and that even when it does, it is 
infrequent. At the same time, buck-passing does not automatically degrade national military 
potential. In Germany, for example, buck-passing did not stem from strategic demilitarization 
despite its reluctance to engage in military operations abroad. Germany carried out substantial 
defense reform and modernization despite its buck-passing strategic culture.  
On the other hand, evidence of increasing buck-passing as defense spending falls is 
bad news for alliance cohesion and credibility. The German case shows that when buck-
passing behavior stems from historical and cultural aversion to the use of military force, it can 
cause fissures within the security alliance. Buck-passing philosophy translated to Germany’s 
opposition to the US invasion of Iraq, and explained Germany’s reservations about use of 
military force in Afghanistan. Falling defense expenditures can exacerbate the pressure to cut 
costs by prematurely minimizing or withdrawing military forces from allied or coalition 
operations. 
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Lastly, the analysis implies that more frequently, European states shadow patterns of 
the U.S., UK, or French foreign military deployments rather than buck-pass to them. On 
average, European countries increased or decreased their foreign military deployments 
together with the US, UK or France between 48% and 54% of the time. This means that most 
of the time, the pattern of changes in military participation of an alliance are a function of 
fluctuations in foreign deployments of its key members – for better or worse.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 Europe has strived for a larger role on the international scene for years. It has become 
an “economic giant on par with the US and Japan, able to wield a great deal of influence in 
global economic, financial, trade and aid issues.”653 Nonetheless, it has struggled to match its 
economic influence in politics or diplomacy. At the beginning of the 21st Century, it appeared 
the EU was making significant progress in “elaborating a defense capability.”654 EU members 
committed to developing an autonomous capacity to make decisions and conduct EU-led 
military operations. Relevant institutional machinery was established in the form of political 
and security committee, military committee and an ‘embryonic’ European military staff. The 
EU members shared a common goal to ‘improve military capabilities as a central tenet of 
achieving credibility and effectiveness of the Common European Security and Defence 
Policy.655 
However, over the course of the next decade, the momentum to build up European 
military capability has slowed down, especially in the aftermath of the protracted sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe. Between 2008 and 2010 alone, “gross government debt as percentage 
of GDP in NATO’s European members rose by an average of almost 40%.”656 By 2012, 
defense spending “by NATO European states… has shrunk by around $45bn dollars – 
                                                 
653 Salmon, Trevor C. & Alistair JK Shepherd (2003), p.1 
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equivalent to the entire German defence budget.”657 These reductions raised the US share of 
total Alliance spending to about 75%, becoming a significant concern in the US and in 
European policy circles.658 With the decline in defense spending slowing down progress in 
remedying existing capability shortfalls, Rasmussen warned that if “Europe becomes unable 
to make an appropriate contribution to global security, then the US might look elsewhere for 
reliable defense partners.”659 
Policy concerns about what sustained reductions in military expenditures mean for 
military capacity of Europe strongly resonate with mainstream IR theories about what 
declining military resources mean for states’ military power. The prevailing assumption is that 
declining defense spending is detrimental to European states’ military capacity and that the 
declining trend stems from European rational choice to de-emphasize their military as the 
utility of military force has declined with increasing economic interdependence. The notion 
that cuts in defense spending and reductions in Europe’s military capacity are intentional has 
been propagated through policy rhetoric that warns of European demilitarization should these 
downward trends continue.   
Despite the general decline in European military assets, I find interesting variation in 
how cuts in defense spending relate to military capacity of the EU states in the period between 
2000 and 2012. My empirical analyses allay sweeping generalizations about European states’ 
strategic choice to diminish military readiness and the implication that all reductions in defense 
spending correlate with a decline in military capacity: often, reductions in military expenditures 
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increased at least one of the key indicators of military capacity in aggregate, and correlated 
with service-level increases in manpower and equipment or line-item spending on R&D. These 
findings indicate that intentionality, how declining defense spending is managed, may 
intervene to produce potentially non-detrimental military capacity outcomes. Even the likeliest 
cases of defense spending cuts that appear damaging to military capacity illustrate that states 
do not automatically succumb to unmitigated degradation of their militaries, nor do they 
implement demilitarization as strategic choice.  
I find that 30% of the 30 DSCP’s directly challenge the assumption of cuts’ detrimental 
effect on military capacity, relating to a net increase in military capacity, and additional 23.3% 
challenge the assumption indirectly, entailing an increase either in manpower or equipment 
despite a net decline in military capacity. By implication, over half of the 30 DSCP’s were 
potentially non-detrimental to military capacity.  
I find most robust support for the defense reform hypothesis, suggesting sustained 
qualitative improvements in military capacity despite cuts in defense spending. Almost all 
(96.7%) defense spending cuts related to potential defense reform under which states 
increased service-level manpower, equipment or line-item R&D spending despite budgetary 
pressures. As expected, defense reform appeared more frequently in the 9 DSCP’s related to 
an aggregated increase in military capacity, supporting the hypothesis that non-detrimental 
capacity outcomes are mediated by defense reform.  
Furthermore, I find that a vast majority (76%) of the 21 DSCP’s associated with an 
aggregated decline in military capacity may also be non-detrimental because they entail types 
of increases in military assets related to potential defense reform. Even the most likely case of 
  
 
229 
 
cuts damaging military capacity in Ireland proves insufficient, illustrating Ireland’s 
commitment to modernization of its armed forces. Such findings imply strategic intent to 
counter rather than to accept the conventionally assumed degradation of military capacity as 
military spending declines.  
The defense reform case studies further reveal that states intended to counter negative 
consequences of declining defense spending through defense reform aimed at improving 
expeditionary capabilities, but reforms were implemented in different ways. Because of the 
emergence of Russia as an increasingly existential threat, Sweden emphasized the need to 
support its territorial defense alongside expeditionary capabilities. It adopted thriftier 
procurement methods (buying off the shelf) and pursued pooling and sharing of resources 
through increased regional Nordic cooperation. Bulgaria battled the financial crisis by using 
state reserves to fund some modernization projects, downgraded previous procurement plans 
and aimed at increased efficiencies and accountability through battling corruption. Slovakia 
countered negative consequences of declining defense spending through increasing 
efficiencies of state-owned industries, eliminating all unnecessary or obsolete capabilities, and 
conducting intelligence reform. The goal of these varied approaches was the same: to create 
savings within declining defense spending that could be reinvested in support of expeditionary 
priorities. 
I find less robust support for the collective defense hypothesis. Findings imply that 
defense collaboration appeared 20.5% more frequently in DSCP’s related to an aggregated 
decline than in those related to an aggregated increase in military capacity. However, qualitative 
improvements in military capacity appear to have occurred to a greater extent in states that 
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increased rather than decreased defense collaboration during DSCP’s. In as many as 47.3% of 
the 19 DSCP’s, declining defense spending was potentially non-detrimental to military capacity 
because defense collaboration seemingly related to qualitative improvements in military 
capacity. Increases in service-level manpower, equipment and line-item spending on R&D 
appear more frequently in DSCP’s related to increased defense collaboration than they do in 
those DSCP’s unrelated to increased defense collaboration. These findings imply that defense 
collaboration may still be largely divorced from robust material improvements of military 
capacity at national level. This corresponds with the finding that defense collaboration means 
an investment in the future development rather than immediate remedy of existing capability 
shortfalls. 
Case studies also reveal that the intention to increase defense collaboration is possibly 
more present than empirical evidence shows. Both France (an empirically weak case of defense 
collaboration) and the UK (an empirically strong case) have countered budgetary pressures by 
turning to the EU and committing to EU collaborative projects (e.g. A400M, Eurofighter) to 
strengthen European as well as their own military-industrial base. In France, lack of empirical 
evidence of defense collaboration potentially resulted from a lag between a consistent policy 
supporting European defense collaboration and the delivery of actual military equipment. As 
a matter of priority, France has supported Europe’s aviation initiatives to remedy strategic and 
tactical transport capabilities and the need for satellite surveillance. The UK has defined EU 
collaboration as a matter of national interest, a mechanism to reduce the negative impact of 
the 2008 global financial crisis and the declining defense expenditures.  
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Buck-passing or free-riding offers the least compelling explanation of potentially non-
detrimental relationship between declining defense spending and military capacity. The 8% 
increase in buck-passing to the US and the UK and a 13% increase in buck-passing to France 
during DSCP’s is relatively small, and in 57% of the 30 cases there is insufficient empirical 
evidence to indicate that cuts in defense spending related to buck-passing. Only in 13% of all 
30 cases, declining defense spending related to potential buck-passing and an aggregated 
increase in military capacity. 
Evidence suggests, however, that the limited buck-passing that did occur might not 
have been detrimental to military capacity of states. In 61% of the 13 buck-passing cases, states 
appear to have invested in defense reform-related increases in elements of their national 
militaries despite the net decline in military capacity. The German cases demonstrates that 
although the strategic culture of restrained use of military force hampered the decision-making 
process on deployment of military personnel abroad, it did not entirely prevent actual German 
participation in operations. The decision to deploy perpetuated the need for Germany to 
continue investing in its expeditionary capabilities. The Austrian case study implies that lack 
of empirical evidence of buck-passing may also be sufficient to dispel detrimental military 
capacity outcomes: continued deployment of military forces abroad appears to have sustained 
modernization of the armed forces. 
In terms of evaluating how the three mechanisms interact within each DSCP to 
produce either an aggregated increase or decline in military capacity (Table 32.A), I also find 
strong support for defense reform as a mechanism that mediates non-detrimental relationships 
between defense spending and military capacity. Defense reform alone appears to explain 
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44.4% of DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase in military capacity. This exceeds the 33.3% 
of DSCP’s cases in which defense reform appears to relate defense spending cuts with an 
aggregated decline in military capacity by 11.1%.  
In additional 33.3% of the DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase in military 
capacity, the decline in defense spending apparently corresponded with defense reform in 
tandem with buck-passing. This percentage exceeds the percent of DSCP’s in which the 
combination of defense reform and buck-passing relates to an aggregated decline in military 
capacity by 4.8%. Greater percent of DSCP’s possibly associated with all three mechanisms 
seem related to an aggregated increase in military capacity than to its decline (Table 33.A). 
These findings directly support the conclusion that defense reform mediates non-detrimental 
relationships between DSCP’s and military capacity. 
I find that defense collaboration more frequently related to an aggregated decline than 
an aggregated increase in military capacity, but occurred only in tandem with defense reform. 
In about 11% of the DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase in military capacity, defense 
spending cuts appear related to the combination of defense collaboration and defense reform. 
This is 12.7% less than DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline in military capacity. These 
findings imply a non-detrimental relationship between defense spending cuts and military 
capacity: defense collaboration combined with defense reform appears to lead either to a 
quantitative increase or qualitative improvement of military capacity, even in spite of declining 
defense spending or net military resources. 
I find buck-passing as the only mechanism in one case of declining defense spending. 
When buck-passing intervenes between defense spending cuts and military capacity, it seems 
  
 
233 
 
to relate only to an aggregated decline in capacity. Declining defense spending related to buck-
passing seems less detrimental to military capacity only when cuts in spending are also 
accompanied by defense reform (Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15. - Combinations of Mechanisms and Military Capacity Outcomes 
 
In sum, my analysis indicates that although European military resources are in decline, 
much of this decline is accompanied by defense reform. Non-detrimental effect of defense 
reforms is most apparent in the ideational and organizational spheres, with states investing in 
professionalization and specialization of their militaries or consolidating their military 
structures and installations. The non-detrimental effect of defense reform is more ambivalent 
in the material sphere, involving a mix of positive and negative actions: cutting some military 
capabilities and reducing equipment stock, but also procuring new military capabilities. 
Defense collaboration is often a part of the defense reform calculus, but its non-detrimental 
effect during periods of declining defense spending has yet to be more robustly reflected at 
the national level.  
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These findings imply that once the decline in defense spending is reversed, we might 
expect greater investment in and modernization of the national militaries in European 
countries as well as in European collective military capabilities. This is because evidence 
suggests that even states that are in principle cautious about deploying their armed forces in 
military operations and continue to diminish their military assets, continue to invest in 
modernization and transformation of their militaries. The speed with which resurgence in 
military spending may occur will however depend on the nature of emerging security threats 
as well as the impetus (elite and public) for pursuing stronger European defense institutionally.  
 
I. Defense Spending Cuts Potentially Correlated with Pervasive Defense Reform in Europe 
The mainstream expectation is that declining defense spending weakens military 
potential and military power of states. This assumption does not seem to hold in many 
contemporary European states, however. Cuts in defense spending are often accompanied by 
reorganization, reinvestment or transformation of existing military resources and structures to 
improve military potential of states, not to deter it. 
In most cases, defense spending cuts did not mean large or medium-size reductions. 
About 30% of all DSCP’s entailed reductions below 25% of the level of defense spending in 
the year preceding the start of the cut period. Cuts in defense spending appear to relate to 
change in military capacity in non-linearly. I find that the deepest cuts in defense spending did 
not always correlate with the sharpest aggregated decline in military capacity. In 38% of the 
cases, large cuts meant an aggregated increase in military capacity. Deep cuts in aggregated 
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defense spending can be explained by reduced operational expenditures as countries withdraw 
their military forces from military operations abroad. On the other hand, reduced spending on 
operations does not have to significantly diminish states’ existing military force structures or 
equipment stock: when a fraction of the savings from diminishing operations is invested in 
military equipment acquisition, aggregated measure can increase despite a large cut in defense 
spending.  
I also find that large cuts in spending related to an aggregated increase in military 
capacity 3.4% more frequently than did small spending cuts. This relationship between large 
reductions in defense spending and small decline or an increase in military capacity can also 
be explained by large cuts in spending (e.g. austerity measures) that affect elements of military 
capacity other than what is captured by the manpower or equipment indicators. Slovakia has, 
for example, decided to reduce all non-essential expenditures to prevent significant cuts in 
manpower and essential equipment. 
As many as 80% of the 30 DSCP’s relate to potentially strong cases of defense reform. 
Only 16.6% of the DSCP’s were accompanied by evidence of weak defense reform and only 
Ireland (3.3%) did not provide empirical support for defense reform. More importantly, 
defense reform appeared more frequently in those DSCP’s related to an aggregated increase 
than a decline in military capacity. In the former cases, defense reform possibly related to 
acquisition of modern military equipment, or reorganization of the military force structures. 
In 89% of these 9 DSCP’s, cuts in defense spending relate to potentially strong defense reform. 
These numbers exceed evidence of strong defense reform by 13% in the 21 DSCP’s related 
to an aggregated decline in military capacity.  
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However, as many as 76% of the 21 DSCP’s related to an aggregated decline in military 
capacity also appear to be non-detrimental because they are associated with evidence of 
potentially strong defense reform mechanism. In this latter set of cases, the aggregated decline 
in military capacity could be explained by increasing efficiencies in equipment maintenance or 
acquisition, where old equipment was possibly replaced by a smaller but updated equipment 
stock. In many cases, decline in military manpower under defense reform makes sense as states 
streamline their military force structures to make it leaner and more specialized for 
expeditionary operations. 
These findings imply that in the study of the relationship between defense spending 
and military capacity, the utility of mainstream IR theories has possibly diminished. Aggregated 
measures of defense spending and empirical indicators of military potential do not tell us the 
entire story and can lead to misleading conclusions about what declining defense spending 
means for military potential of states. Budgetary pressures and diminishing stock of military 
assets is often counterbalanced by strategic decisions to improve aspects of national militaries 
below what is captured by aggregated data. Despite declining military expenditures, 
governments often reshuffle existing resources to prioritize modernization of military 
equipment, investment in equipment development and procurement, or employment of 
additional military personnel.  
The research demonstrates that service-level analysis of key defense assets matters 
because we can no longer rely only on aggregated data to proffer accurate understanding of 
what is happening with the military potential of states. We need mid-level theories that 
specifically apply to how defense spending relates defense reform rationale and execution. On 
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one hand this relates to the growing academic literature on mid-level theories on increasing 
organizational effectiveness and decreasing wasteful spending.660 On the other hand, we need 
more academic research that addresses and unpacks causality between the key variables in this 
relationship: to understand under what conditions reductions in defense spending emanate 
from defense reform policies as opposed to when reforms are galvanized after the reductions 
actually occur.  
My research also implies that the size of military equipment stock, the type of 
technology and quality of military capabilities are more prominent indicators of national 
military potential than the mere size of military manpower. Upward trends in military 
equipment procurement indicate good health of military capacity in European democracies. 
However, we also need to assess technological modernization against the quality of education 
achieved by military personnel. Such analysis would explore whether investments in military 
education, training, exercises and the associated outcomes coincide with a military ability to 
operate emerging military technologies. Any emerging, growing or persistent gaps between 
technological innovation and investment in military manpower will deter from how defense 
reform translates to improved military potential of states. 
Another consideration relates to what reductions in defense spending mean for 
defense reform and military potential given the dichotomy between the long-term nature of 
security strategies and the more frequent changes in the political leadership of democratic 
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states. Even if political parties agree on a mid- or long-term security strategy document, 
different political priorities of a new government can clash with the ideas of the previous 
political establishment on how resources are to be used and allocated. Future research could 
provide interesting answers to the question of how various degrees of democratic 
consolidation affect effective implementation of defense reform policies over time. 
Scholars could also begin to systematically investigate the role of agency in the 
relationship between diminishing defense spending and defense reform. Are defense spending 
cuts an intended corollary of defense reform, or is defense reform merely reactive to pre-
existing reductions in defense spending? Developing a theory about the role of agency – why 
and how governments decide to introduce and manage defense spending cuts – might further 
explain and anticipate changes in states’ military potential.  
We also need to garner basic academic consensus on what constitutes sufficient and 
standardized measures of defense reform itself. Service-level indicators of military capacity 
such as military equipment and manpower are only a start in this direction. These indicators 
are not exhaustive. They are merely indicative. Data measuring qualitative aspects of military 
power, e.g. expeditionary vs. territorial military equipment, level and quality of education of 
military personnel, congruence between the rate of modernization of military capabilities and 
hiring of military personnel would increase the accuracy of defense reform analysis.  
In the context of comparative studies, it should be noted that the analysis of EU states 
increases the degree of ceteris paribus conditions, but ultimately suffers from low 
generalizability to a set of cases outside of the group of EU member states. Standardization of 
data across countries outside of the EU or the Western world would enable broader 
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conventional cross-country comparisons and large-N statistical analyses. However, indicators 
of quantity and more importantly the quality of national military capacity require lower-level 
data, which are still hard to come by even in democratic states.  
 
II. No Demilitarization or Irreversible Degradation of Military Potential 
Scholars have explained decline in key indicators of national military potential by 
demilitarization policies or by military degradation resulting from declining economic growth 
or economic austerity. Only in 13.3% of military spending cut periods – in Ireland, Austria, 
Cyprus and Mala, did I find evidence of an aggregated decline in military capacity accompanied 
by a line-item decline in R&D spending. These present the most-likely cases of detrimental 
associations between declining defense spending and military capacity. However, even in the 
likeliest empirical case of potential demilitarization - Ireland, broad material military decline 
occurred alongside defense reforms and continued investment in modernization of Irish 
military.  
Despite the mainstream expectation that the greater the decline in defense spending 
the more detrimental outcomes in military capacity, I find that the suspected negative effect 
of the decline in defense spending on states’ military capacity after the 2008 global financial 
crisis might not have been as severe as policy experts feared. Most broad and sustained service-
level increases in military manpower and equipment or line-item increases in R&D occurred 
during defense spending reductions after the global financial crisis, not before. A net decline 
in military capacity was accompanied by broad defense reform twice as frequently after than 
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before 2008. Almost two thirds of the strongest cases of potential defense reform occurred 
after 2008. Simply put, European states appear to have been improving some key aspects of 
their expeditionary military capacity even in austere times. 
These findings imply that reductions in military capacity observed during a period of 
declining defense spending could be reversed with decreasing budgetary pressures. This 
reversal seems possible when the decline in material military assets coincides with defense 
reform policies dictating continued modernization and reorganization of existing resources of 
the armed forces. Eventual reversal of the declining trend in defense spending could – under 
a modernization agenda - mean increased allocations of resources to enhance states’ military 
capacity for expeditionary action. 
Most importantly, however, my findings confront contemporary academic claims 
about the emergence of a ‘normative power Europe’ with evidence that clearly does not 
support such claims. The finding that all but four European countries increased their 
investment in military R&D despite an aggregated decline in military capacity alone contradicts 
the literature based on soft power assumptions about Europe. I find no convincing evidence 
to support claims of European demilitarization or European transition into a post-modern, 
soft power – either in empirical or strategic terms. Military power is still a relevant instrument 
of European foreign policy. 
III. The Good and Bad of Alliances  
 Defense spending cuts can be non-detrimental to military capacity if mediated through 
increased defenses collaboration. When countries collaborate on common projects or pool 
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and share their military resources, the net military expenditures shouldered by a participating 
country can diminish without degrading national military capacity. Academic literature on 
buck-passing also offers explanations for why defense spending cuts do not have to lead to 
detrimental outcomes in military capacity. When states reduce their defense spending because 
they buck-pass their military engagements to allies, they can continue to invest a portion of 
the operational savings in defense modernization.  
 
III.A. Collective Investment in Future, Not Immediate Capabilities  
I find some evidence that the 47.3% of the 19 DSCP’s possibly related to increased 
defense collaboration were potentially non-detrimental to military capacity. Service-level 
increases in equipment and manpower in DSCP’s correlated with increased defense 
collaboration exceeded the frequency of service-level increases in equipment and manpower 
in the DSCP’s not related to increased defense collaboration by 7.7% and 23.1%, respectively. 
Empirical cases of increased defense collaboration were in 55.5% of the 9 cases driven by 
increased investment in collaborative R&T, and by increased spending on both collaborative 
R&T and equipment procurement in another 22.2%. However, there appears to be a potential 
trade-off between national and collaborative investment in research and development of 
military capacity. When states invested more money in collaborative projects, they appeared 
to have frequently reduced their investment in national R&D. Line-item increases in R&D 
occurred 23.1% more frequently in DSCP’s not correlated with increased defense 
collaboration.  
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My findings imply that we may need more granular theorizing about how declining 
defense expenditures and increased defense collaboration within alliances relate to national 
military capacity of states. European cuts in defense spending possibly correlated with 
increased collaborative investment in the future development rather than with immediate 
procurement of new military capabilities. Increasing political impetus for collaborative defense 
appears still divorced from having real impact on national level. French and UK case studies 
support this conclusion in so far as they reveal that the impetus for increased collective 
cooperation in military capabilities occurs at policy level but does not always mean actual 
hardware procurement as defense spending declines. States appear to have made increase in 
national military equipment stock within the framework of national procurement initiatives 
rather than through defense collaboration at the collective EU level.  
Findings on collective collaboration compel further investigation of the dynamic 
between deepening institutionalization of military cooperation within alliances and potential 
free-riding among allied states. On one hand, the degree of socialization and 
institutionalization of collective defense cooperation could increase free-riding behavior as 
some states deepen military cooperation while others abstain from it but still benefit from its 
output. It would be interesting to see whether free-riding associated with deepening 
institutionalization of defense cooperation occurs also when states perform well economically. 
Because of the possible association between free-riding behavior and increased 
institutionalization of defense cooperation, it is increasingly more important to evaluate the 
effect of free-riding behavior on military capabilities.  
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Collective collaboration could, on the other hand, mitigate policy-embedded free-
riding as states deepen their engagement within the alliance and feel greater obligation to 
maintain or increase their contributions. This may have positive implications for finalizing the 
EU enlargement process. If closer defense cooperation reduces free-riding, it might diminish 
resistance of existing EU member states to embracing small European EU non-members for 
fear of their free-riding. 
 
III.B. Europeans Reluctant Buck-Passers despite Declining Spending 
Scholars and policy makers routinely portray Europeans as countries that weaken the 
military potential of security alliances because they buck-pass crisis-management 
responsibilities (predominantly) to the U.S.. In their view, a sustained decline in defense 
spending could stem from buck-passing behavior which in turn reduces operational 
expenditures and allows investment in military modernization and defense reform.  
Contrary to this claim, however, I find that less than half of the DSCP’s potentially 
related to buck-passing. In most cases (57%), European reductions in defense spending 
potentially did not mean that states passed off their military responsibilities to other security 
allies. During periods of defense spending cuts, European states most often increased or 
decreased their foreign deployments simultaneously with the U.S., UK or France, rather than 
buck-passed to them. I find that reductions in defense spending did not excessively galvanize 
European buck-passing. Declining defense spending in 38% of the 30 cases related to buck-
passing to the U.S., in 38% of the 29 DSCP’s to the UK and in 24% of 29 DSCP’s to France.  
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A decline in defense spending related to buck-passing was in most cases not damaging 
to European military capacity. This is because buck-passing during periods of declining 
defense spending was accompanied by increases in military resources such as service-level 
manpower, equipment or line-item R&D spending. This is because European buck-passing 
was limited and states continued to deploy their military personnel abroad. Such findings 
contradict the Gates-inspired policy rhetoric about European demilitarization, especially in 
lieu of the 2008 financial crisis. 
My findings also challenge the conventional assumption that European countries 
predominantly pass off their foreign military engagements to the US alone. During declining 
defense spending periods, Europeans buck-passed most frequently to the UK, then to the U.S. 
and least frequently to France. The degree of trans-Atlantic buck-passing (buck-passing to the 
US and the UK individually or simultaneously) exceeds evidence of European buck-passing 
to France alone, or in combination with either the US or the UK. More frequently, however, 
European states shadowed U.S. foreign deployment patterns rather than buck-passed their 
security responsibilities to the U.S..  
These findings are good and bad news for trans-Atlantic cooperation. It is good to 
know that in more than half of the periods of declining defense spending, states either did not 
buck-pass more or buck-passed less. This means that the spending decline in Europe does not 
translate to a drastic decline in European military engagement abroad, and that when it does, 
it is infrequent. Furthermore, the findings imply that buck-passing does not automatically 
degrade national military potential. Germany, for example, managed to carry out substantial 
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defense reform and modernization despite a temporary period in which it chose to oppose 
military deployments in Iraq. 
Buck-passing in Europe can, however, mean bad news for alliance cohesion and 
credibility. German buck-passing philosophy meant opposition to the US invasion of Iraq, 
and explains Germany’s reservations about use of military force in Afghanistan. Both periods 
of buck-passing behavior contributed to strategic fissures in foreign and security policy of the 
EU member states. Buck-passing philosophy can also generate additional pressures to cut 
costs by prematurely minimizing or withdrawing national military forces from allied or 
coalition operations. However, I find only limited evidence of such eventuality, with countries 
most often increasing or decreasing their foreign deployments together with the key allies. 
 
IV. Further Considerations 
Despite declining military expenditures, defense reform has been a pervasive 
phenomenon among European Union states. Because reductions in defense spending have 
been frequently linked to national defense reform initiatives as well as to increased investment 
in collaborative military research, point-blank political demands for increased defense 
spending (above the bare minimum) may no longer be necessary and they may be insufficient 
for those democracies that wish to increase the efficiency of its military potential. To ensure 
continued and perhaps growing relevance of European military power vis-à-vis the militarizing 
world, European decision-makers should prioritize continued defense reform, military 
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transformation, and pursuit of closer cooperation between defense industries – under any 
amount of financial allocations to defense.  
The need to distinguish between spending on internal and external security is 
becoming a key security issue in the studies of economy of international security. Security is a 
very broad concept, and internal security is indivisible from external security. Identifying how 
much of government resources goes to enabling effective out-of-area, expeditionary military 
deployments abroad and how much goes to internal security to ensure proper border control, 
or transit of immigrants may greatly change our understanding of the actual ‘security spending’ 
package. This has great implications for how we measure national security: declining military 
expenditures may no longer be existentially threatening to states’ security if they are 
accompanied by increased spending on states’ internal security. 
Scholars have established that grave external security threats could compel countries 
to increase national defense budgets and military spending. IR theories suggest that the graver 
the perceived threat, the greater the defense expenditures. As we know, most European states 
cut their defense spending despite the continued presence of external security threats. 
However, the current decline in defense spending might be reversed if the nature of external 
security threats becomes more existential and territorial. If European neighbors change their 
military posture to elicit growing concerns over European territorial integrity or pose 
traditional threats to national defense, this can lead to a de facto militarization of assets and 
increasing defense expenditures.  
Heads of states and governments of NATO acknowledged, for example, the changing 
nature of security threats at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales: “Russia's aggressive actions 
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against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at 
peace. Growing instability in our southern neighborhood, from the Middle East to North 
Africa, as well as transnational and multi-dimensional threats, are also challenging our security. 
These can all have long-term consequences for peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region 
and stability across the globe.”661 To ensure that the Alliance is ready to address these new 
security challenges, the governments agreed “to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets, 
to make the most effective use of our funds and to further a more balanced sharing of costs 
and responsibilities.”662 It still remains to be seen whether this political commitment translates 
to growing military expenditures.  
What is becoming increasingly clear, however, is the growing complexity in amassing 
the right amount of conventional equipment to ensure security of European states. This may 
complicate assessments of necessary levels of military spending. Emasculation of UK’s 
conventional military capability has been perceived as irrational because we cannot assume 
that the international scene will remain benign.663 EU border countries – Poland, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – have recently demanded greater military presence 
from the US, Britain and Germany as a deterrent to Russian threat. In response to these 
demands, the U.S. administration made plans to spend about half of the $3.4bn on pre-
positioning of tanks, artillery and other equipment in Western Europe to improve transport 
                                                 
661 Wales Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council in Wales, Press Release, September 5, 2014: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm  
662 Wales Summit Declaration 
663 Former British general predicts Russia will seize territory in eastern Ukraine and invade Baltic states, 
sparking war. [MacAskill, Ewen (May 16, 2016). “West and Russia on course for war, says ex-NATO deputy 
commander.” The Guardian online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/18/west-russia-on-
course-for-war-nato-ex-deputy-commander  
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network for fast deployment to eastern Europe if necessary.664 The idea of a “21st Century 
Deterrence,” which assumes propositioning heavy equipment as a flexible, rapid-reaction 
force “in contrast with the heavy, fixed force that existed during the Cold War”665 prioritizes 
larger quantities and better quality of missile and coastal defense as well as artillery.666 A revived 
demand for high-quality conventional weapons and their implementation according to 
modern strategies and military doctrines might require further investigation into how variation 
in defense spending affects countries’ military potential to guarantee state’s external security.  
Although I find that not all contemporary cuts in defense spending were detrimental 
to military capacity, continued downward trend in military investment might prove dangerous 
in light of the most recent developments in Europe’s eastern neighborhood. The constant flux 
of the international security environment therefore demands continued and perhaps more 
nuanced analysis of the relationship between defense spending and military potential. Perhaps 
the next pressing question to be addressed in greater detail is whether the ongoing defense 
reform in Europe is indeed sufficient to tackle emerging security threats. 
Despite the questions that still remain unanswered, I found evidence that compellingly 
dispels the notion that sustained decline in European defense spending stems from intentional 
diminishing of European military capacity for expeditionary action. This research provides 
evidence that intentionality matters because certain political choices can translate declining 
                                                 
664 MacAskill, Ewen (February 9, 2016). “UK to send five ships to Baltic as part of NATO buildup against 
Russia.” The Guardian online: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/10/uk-to-contribute-five-
extra-ships-to-baltic-as-nato-boosts-presence 
665 Ibid.  
666 Petrovic, Jan (July 2, 2015). “USA posunu tazke zbrane blizsie k Rusku. Nie je to studena vojna, vravi 
bezpecnostny analytik,” Aktuality.sk online: http://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/278840/usa-posunu-tazke-
zbrane-blizsie-k-rusku-nie-je-to-studena-vojna-vravi-bezpecnostny-analytik/ 
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defense spending into positive military capacity outcomes. How defense spending cuts are 
managed, but also why they occur are some of the key parameters in understanding whether 
and to what degree defense spending cuts are actually detrimental to national military potential. 
Not knowing whether spending reductions are strategically intended clouds our understanding 
of how these cuts affect future development of military potential of states and alliances: 
whether they are a more permanent feature of national politics or a temporary set-back that 
will diminish as the conditions that lead to its rise disappear. Knowing more about how cuts 
in defense spending are implemented helps clarify the related patterns of change in national 
military capacity. My aim with this work was precisely to make a contribution to generating 
such knowledge, providing new material for understanding European contemporary decline 
in defense spending not as a choice to demilitarize, but a choice to maintain (if not improve) 
its military potential despite budgetary pressures. 
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Appendix 
Chapter 2: Military Capacity during Declining Defense Spending 
Table 1A - Total Military Equipment Stock 
 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. Equipment captures annualized holdings per country. These numbers 
refer to the following: Army main vehicles, weapons and total artillery; naval submarines, principle surface 
combatants (carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes), patrol and coastal combatants, mine 
countermeasures, amphibious equipment and craft, and support and miscellaneous naval equipment; and Air 
Force combat aircraft, attack helicopters and UAVs. 
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Belgium
1936
1802
1802
1747
1747
834
833
724
725
723
685
571
567
Denm
ark
2500
2458
13032
12994
12977
13463
13465
13453
6367
5616
5542
5418
1295
France
30864
30584
32326
30397
30402
10684
10695
10803
10645
9679
9257
9131
9185
Germ
any
13752
12912
13032
12720
12728
12757
12452
11449
10807
10850
9417
7064
4062
Greece
42664
42664
42318
41196
41167
44899
44889
44048
15022
14846
14885
14493
14399
Italy
8870
10214
7171
9779
10029
8209
8326
8352
8616
9178
8590
9256
8960
Luxem
bourg
6
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
60
Netherlands
2821
2673
2641
2585
2585
2599
2524
2566
2884
1265
2030
2555
2623
Portugal
1581
1702
1681
1574
1574
1598
1593
1587
1639
1638
1641
1805
1474
Spain
5540
5998
5795
5352
5365
6429
6436
6429
6427
6260
6075
5955
6120
UK
5754
7115
6753
6849
6860
6604
6664
6531
6874
7126
7064
5593
4710
Czech Republic
3952
3684
3590
3529
3535
2538
2152
1951
1776
1727
1778
1682
1064
Hungary
3916
3989
4012
4012
3574
1704
1709
1709
1702
981
748
635
660
Poland
7036
6925
5927
6506
6506
6362
5669
5705
5491
6116
5479
5568
5667
Austria
4166
5033
4934
4934
5052
4517
4517
3515
3320
3308
3286
897
655
Finland
2870
5448
6148
6148
6241
2684
2685
2465
2410
2305
2793
2034
2035
Ireland
765
1097
1089
1092
1128
1142
1167
1157
1172
1172
1130
1130
1136
Sweden
3322
3724
3306
3257
3257
3580
3796
1480
2078
2072
1882
1764
906
Bulgaria
5801
5875
5827
5661
5661
5626
5621
5556
6400
6402
3402
2686
2685
Cyprus
3103
3497
3758
3758
3758
3420
3430
3430
3421
3331
3288
3284
2443
Estonia
524
575
569
569
569
572
572
564
510
550
588
588
588
Latvia
59
91
173
173
173
1943
1946
140
141
144
151
78
96
Lithuania
351
435
1348
1599
1594
1600
1594
1594
642
641
646
351
353
M
alta
0
0
0
0
0
8
8
9
9
9
9
8
10
Rom
ania
5251
4824
5095
4506
4506
4725
4724
2894
2703
2603
2464
3106
3185
Slovakia
2212
2265
2067
2064
2064
2064
2064
1922
1683
1633
1611
1611
1053
Slovenia
296
405
419
341
341
471
471
333
333
359
368
265
276
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Table 2.A - Biennial Change in Total Military Equipment 
 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. Change in equipment is measured between two consecutive years. 
Sections highlighted in yellow indicate DSCP’s. 
  
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Belgium
-134
0
-55
0
-913
-1
-109
1
-2
-38
-114
-4
D
enm
ark
-42
10574
-38
-17
486
2
-12
-7086
-751
-74
-124
-4123
France
-280
1742
-1929
5
-19718
11
108
-158
-966
-422
-126
54
G
erm
any
-840
120
-312
8
29
-305
-1003
-642
43
-1433
-2353
-3002
G
reece
0
-346
-1122
-29
3732
-10
-841
-29026
-176
39
-392
-94
Italy
1344
-3043
2608
250
-1820
117
26
264
562
-588
666
-296
Luxem
bourg
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
48
N
etherlands
-148
-32
-56
0
14
-75
42
318
-1619
765
525
68
Portugal
121
-21
-107
0
24
-5
-6
52
-1
3
164
-331
Spain
458
-203
-443
13
1064
7
-7
-2
-167
-185
-120
165
U
K
1361
-362
96
11
-256
60
-133
343
252
-62
-1471
-883
Czech Republic
-268
-94
-61
6
-997
-386
-201
-175
-49
51
-96
-618
H
ungary
73
23
0
-438
-1870
5
0
-7
-721
-233
-113
25
Poland
-111
-998
579
0
-144
-693
36
-214
625
-637
89
99
A
ustria
867
-99
0
118
-535
0
-1002
-195
-12
-22
-2389
-242
Finland
2578
700
0
93
-3557
1
-220
-55
-105
488
-759
1
Ireland
332
-8
3
36
14
25
-10
15
0
-42
0
6
Sw
eden
402
-418
-49
0
323
216
-2316
598
-6
-190
-118
-858
Bulgaria
74
-48
-166
0
-35
-5
-65
844
2
-3000
-716
-1
Cyprus
394
261
0
0
-338
10
0
-9
-90
-43
-4
-841
Estonia
51
-6
0
0
3
0
-8
-54
40
38
0
0
Latvia
32
82
0
0
1770
3
-1806
1
3
7
-73
18
Lithuania
84
913
251
-5
6
-6
0
-952
-1
5
-295
2
M
alta
0
0
0
0
8
0
1
0
0
0
-1
2
Rom
ania
-427
271
-589
0
219
-1
-1830
-191
-100
-139
642
79
Slovakia
53
-198
-3
0
0
0
-142
-239
-50
-22
0
-558
Slovenia
109
14
-78
0
130
0
-138
0
26
9
-103
11
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Table 3.A Total Military Manpower 
 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. The data on manpower entails all servicemen and women on full-time 
duty including conscripts and long-term assignments from the reserves. 
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Belgium
39250
39420
39260
40800
40800
36950
36950
39690
39690
38844
38452
37882
34336
Denm
ark
21810
21400
22700
22880
21180
21180
21180
21620
29960
29550
26585
18707
18628
France
294430
273740
260400
259050
259050
254895
254895
254895
254895
352771
352771
238591
238591
Germ
any
321000
308400
296000
284500
284500
284500
284500
245702
245702
244324
250613
251465
251465
Greece
159170
159170
177600
177600
170800
163850
163850
147100
156600
156600
156600
138936
145647
Italy
250600
230350
216800
200000
194000
191152
191152
191152
186049
292983
293202
184609
184532
Luxem
bourg
899
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
N
etherlands
51940
50430
49580
53130
53130
53130
53130
53130
45608
40537
46882
37368
37368
Portugal
44650
43600
43600
44900
44900
44900
44900
43960
42910
42910
43330
43340
42634
Spain
166050
143450
177950
150700
150700
147255
147255
147255
149150
221750
128013
142212
143006
UK
212450
211430
210450
212660
207630
216890
216890
191030
180527
160280
175690
178470
174030
Czech Republic
57700
53600
49450
57050
45000
22272
22272
24752
23092
24083
17932
23441
25421
Hungary
43790
33810
33400
33400
32300
32300
32300
32300
32300
25207
29450
29626
22587
Poland
217290
206045
163000
163000
141500
141500
141500
141500
127266
121808
100000
100000
100000
Austria
35500
34600
34600
34600
35000
39900
39900
39600
39600
34900
27300
25900
25758
Finland
31700
32250
31850
27000
27000
28300
28300
29300
29300
29300
22600
22250
22100
Ireland
11460
10460
10460
10460
10460
10460
10460
10470
10460
10460
10460
10460
9650
Sw
eden
52700
33900
33900
27600
27600
27600
27600
27600
24000
16900
13050
21070
20363
Bulgaria
79760
77260
68450
51000
51000
51000
51000
51000
40747
40747
34975
31315
31315
Cyprus
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10050
10000
12000
Estonia
4800
4450
5510
5510
4980
4934
4934
4100
4100
5300
4750
5450
5750
Latvia
5050
6500
5500
4880
4880
5238
5238
5339
5696
5187
5745
5745
4600
Lithuania
12700
12190
13510
12700
13510
13510
13510
12010
13850
8850
8850
10640
10640
M
alta
2140
2140
2140
2140
2140
2237
2237
1609
1609
1954
1954
1954
1954
Rom
ania
207000
103000
99200
97200
97200
97200
97200
69600
74267
73200
73350
71745
73900
Slovakia
38600
33000
26200
22000
20195
20195
20195
15223
17129
17445
16531
16531
15799
Slovenia
9000
7600
9000
6550
6550
6550
6550
6550
5973
7200
7200
7600
7600
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Table 4.A Biennial Change in Total Military Manpower 
 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. Change in manpower is measured between two consecutive years. 
Sections highlighted in yellow indicate DSCP’s. 
 
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Belgium
170
-160
1540
0
-3850
0
2740
0
-846
-392
-570
-3546
Denm
ark
-410
1300
180
-1700
0
0
440
8340
-410
-2965
-7878
-79
France
-20690
-13340
-1350
0
-4155
0
0
0
97876
0
-114180
0
Germ
any
-12600
-12400
-11500
0
0
0
-38798
0
-1378
6289
852
0
Greece
0
18430
0
-6800
-6950
0
-16750
9500
0
0
-17664
6711
Italy
-20250
-13550
-16800
-6000
-2848
0
0
-5103
106934
219
-108593
-77
Luxem
bourg
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N
etherlands
-1510
-850
3550
0
0
0
0
-7522
-5071
6345
-9514
0
Portugal
-1050
0
1300
0
0
0
-940
-1050
0
420
10
-706
Spain
-22600
34500
-27250
0
-3445
0
0
1895
72600
-93737
14199
794
UK
-1020
-980
2210
-5030
9260
0
-25860
-10503
-20247
15410
2780
-4440
Czech Republic
-4100
-4150
7600
-12050
-22728
0
2480
-1660
991
-6151
5509
1980
Hungary
-9980
-410
0
-1100
0
0
0
0
-7093
4243
176
-7039
Poland
-11245
-43045
0
-21500
0
0
0
-14234
-5458
-21808
0
0
Austria
-900
0
0
400
4900
0
-300
0
-4700
-7600
-1400
-142
Finland
550
-400
-4850
0
1300
0
1000
0
0
-6700
-350
-150
Ireland
-1000
0
0
0
0
0
10
-10
0
0
0
-810
Sw
eden
-18800
0
-6300
0
0
0
0
-3600
-7100
-3850
8020
-707
Bulgaria
-2500
-8810
-17450
0
0
0
0
-10253
0
-5772
-3660
0
Cyprus
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
50
-50
2000
Estonia
-350
1060
0
-530
-46
0
-834
0
1200
-550
700
300
Latvia
1450
-1000
-620
0
358
0
101
357
-509
558
0
-1145
Lithuania
-510
1320
-810
810
0
0
-1500
1840
-5000
0
1790
0
M
alta
0
0
0
0
97
0
-628
0
345
0
0
0
Rom
ania
-104000
-3800
-2000
0
0
0
-27600
4667
-1067
150
-1605
2155
Slovakia
-5600
-6800
-4200
-1805
0
0
-4972
1906
316
-914
0
-732
Slovenia
-1400
1400
-2450
0
0
0
0
-577
1227
0
400
0
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Table 5.A - Defense Expenditure (million USD, constant 2012) 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. Defense expenditures entail operating costs, procurement and 
construction, R&D, and other expenditures. Operating Costs: salaries and pensions for military and civilian 
personnel, the cost of maintaining and training units, service organizations, HQ and support elements, servicing 
and repairing military equipment and infrastructure. Procurement and Construction: national equipment and 
infrastructure spending, and common infrastructure programs. R&D: defense expenditure up to the point at 
which new equipment can be put in service, regardless of whether new equipment is actually procured. Foreign 
Military Aid contributions are also noted. Military expenditures are reported in aggregate, not disaggregated by 
these categories. A sustained decline in defense spending is calculated in constant 2012 USD. Streamlining of the 
data required adjusting defense spending for inflation by using Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). 
 
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Belgium
4283
4023
4635
4895
5300
5431
4890
5723
5919
6019
5524
5635
4771
Denm
ark
3193
3212
3461
4160
4324
4182
4443
4626
4765
4641
4743
4613
4371
France
45403
43878
51289
57018
62835
62457
63177
68474
71644
58267
54728
54600
48121
Germ
any
37231
35868
42464
43854
45931
44724
43227
47160
50059
50797
48302
49181
40356
Greece
7370
7356
8304
8945
7130
8065
8298
9097
10814
10799
8332
6564
7616
Italy
29983
27954
32673
34628
37115
36895
34883
41746
32951
32629
30180
30877
23631
Luxem
bourg
172
193
260
291
295
310
280
317
247
266
280
286
258
Netherlands
8036
8342
9892
10302
11677
11692
11595
12722
13091
12983
11817
11583
10439
Portugal
2961
2968
3974
3959
3440
3487
3579
3667
3977
3970
3880
3690
2599
Spain
9417
9250
11139
12408
15300
15488
16382
18534
20542
18133
15527
14286
11782
UK
47539
46284
48499
53383
60307
60774
67710
76259
64829
63281
63501
64899
64080
Czech Republic
1531
1556
1891
2335
2402
2630
2742
2811
3375
3346
2798
2499
2177
Hungary
1073
1212
1461
1983
1860
1708
1609
1974
1993
1580
1420
1410
1029
Poland
4123
4544
4589
5110
5597
6557
6988
8698
10851
7809
8932
9091
8640
Austria
2149
1961
2293
3105
2701
2660
2995
3990
3405
2997
2829
2902
3160
Finland
2080
1909
2658
2870
3018
3242
3132
3489
3873
4159
3779
4061
3596
Ireland
839
831
969
1002
1102
1114
1268
1472
1693
1501
1041
983
1131
Sw
eden
6147
5197
5850
6903
6450
6931
6840
7500
7101
5670
5901
6099
5788
Bulgaria
457
487
507
588
704
766
1004
1335
1402
969
876
774
666
Cyprus
481
420
306
367
276
440
273
551
573
505
524
314
258
Estonia
104
123
126
215
209
252
271
430
480
381
347
397
434
Latvia
95
113
144
242
218
240
362
495
578
338
284
295
259
Lithuania
265
281
315
427
378
362
402
502
583
430
352
358
322
M
alta
36
32
94
119
63
58
52
49
52
63
62
57
52
Rom
ania
1253
1292
1348
1638
1839
2290
2573
2897
3204
2381
2189
2429
2176
Slovakia
456
515
592
782
886
985
1044
1372
1575
1445
1198
1088
1012
Slovenia
364
369
351
472
621
675
716
821
889
849
813
679
568
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Table 6.A - Defense Spending Cut Periods 
 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. A defense spending cut period (DSCP) is a continuous quantitative 
decline in national defense spending over a period of at least three fiscal years. I find 30 DSCP’s which are 
highlighted in yellow. 
  
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Belgium
-6.1%
15.2%
5.6%
8.3%
2.5%
-10.0%
17.0%
3.4%
1.7%
-8.2%
2.0%
-15.3%
Denm
ark
0.6%
7.8%
20.2%
4.0%
-3.3%
6.2%
4.1%
3.0%
-2.6%
2.2%
-2.8%
-5.2%
France
-3.4%
16.9%
11.2%
10.2%
-0.6%
1.2%
8.4%
4.6%
-18.7%
-6.1%
-0.2%
-11.9%
Germ
any
-3.7%
18.4%
3.3%
4.7%
-2.6%
-3.3%
9.1%
6.1%
1.5%
-4.9%
1.8%
-17.9%
Greece
-0.2%
12.9%
7.7%
-20.3%
13.1%
2.9%
9.6%
18.9%
-0.1%
-22.8%
-21.2%
16.0%
Italy
-6.8%
16.9%
6.0%
7.2%
-0.6%
-5.5%
19.7%
-21.1%
-1.0%
-7.5%
2.3%
-23.5%
Luxem
bourg
12.4%
34.7%
11.7%
1.6%
5.1%
-9.7%
13.0%
-21.9%
7.7%
5.1%
2.0%
-9.7%
N
etherlands
3.8%
18.6%
4.1%
13.3%
0.1%
-0.8%
9.7%
2.9%
-0.8%
-9.0%
-2.0%
-9.9%
Portugal
0.2%
33.9%
-0.4%
-13.1%
1.4%
2.7%
2.5%
8.4%
-0.2%
-2.3%
-4.9%
-29.6%
Spain
-1.8%
20.4%
11.4%
23.3%
1.2%
5.8%
13.1%
10.8%
-11.7%
-14.4%
-8.0%
-17.5%
UK
-2.6%
4.8%
10.1%
13.0%
0.8%
11.4%
12.6%
-15.0%
-2.4%
0.3%
2.2%
-1.3%
Czech Republic
1.7%
21.6%
23.4%
2.9%
9.5%
4.3%
2.5%
20.0%
-0.8%
-16.4%
-10.7%
-12.9%
Hungary
12.9%
20.6%
35.7%
-6.2%
-8.1%
-5.8%
22.7%
0.9%
-20.7%
-10.1%
-0.8%
-27.0%
Poland
10.2%
1.0%
11.3%
9.5%
17.2%
6.6%
24.5%
24.8%
-28.0%
14.4%
1.8%
-5.0%
Austria
-8.7%
16.9%
35.4%
-13.0%
-1.5%
12.6%
33.2%
-14.7%
-12.0%
-5.6%
2.6%
8.9%
Finland
-8.2%
39.2%
8.0%
5.2%
7.4%
-3.4%
11.4%
11.0%
7.4%
-9.1%
7.5%
-11.5%
Ireland
-1.0%
16.6%
3.4%
10.0%
1.1%
13.7%
16.1%
15.1%
-11.3%
-30.6%
-5.6%
15.1%
Sw
eden
-15.4%
12.6%
18.0%
-6.6%
7.5%
-1.3%
9.6%
-5.3%
-20.2%
4.1%
3.4%
-5.1%
Bulgaria
6.4%
4.1%
16.0%
19.7%
8.9%
31.0%
32.9%
5.0%
-30.9%
-9.5%
-11.7%
-13.9%
Cyprus
-12.7%
-27.1%
19.8%
-24.8%
59.4%
-37.8%
101.8%
3.8%
-11.8%
3.8%
-40.0%
-17.9%
Estonia
17.9%
3.0%
69.9%
-2.6%
20.3%
7.7%
58.5%
11.7%
-20.6%
-8.8%
14.3%
9.3%
Latvia
19.7%
27.3%
67.9%
-10.1%
10.2%
51.0%
36.7%
16.8%
-41.5%
-15.9%
3.8%
-12.2%
Lithuania
6.0%
12.1%
35.4%
-11.4%
-4.2%
11.0%
24.8%
16.3%
-26.2%
-18.3%
1.9%
-10.1%
M
alta
-11.1%
195.1%
25.5%
-46.7%
-8.9%
-9.1%
-7.0%
7.2%
20.8%
-1.6%
-8.0%
-9.0%
Rom
ania
3.1%
4.3%
21.6%
12.2%
24.5%
12.3%
12.6%
10.6%
-25.7%
-8.1%
11.0%
-10.4%
Slovakia
12.9%
15.1%
32.1%
13.3%
11.2%
6.0%
31.4%
14.8%
-8.3%
-17.1%
-9.2%
-7.0%
Slovenia
1.5%
-5.0%
34.4%
31.7%
8.6%
6.2%
14.5%
8.4%
-4.6%
-4.2%
-16.5%
-16.3%
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Table 7.A - Defense Spending Cut Periods: EU 27 (2000-2012) 
 Country Period Timing Duration Size % Drop 
1 Denmark 2010-2012 Post-2008 
 
Short Minimal -7.9% 
2 France 2008-2012 Long Medium -32.8% 
3 Germany 2004-2006 Pre-2008 Short Minimal -5.9% 
4 Greece 2008-2011 Post-2008 Medium Medium -39.3% 
5 Italy 2004-2006 Pre-2008 Short Minimal -6.0% 
6 Italy 2007-2010 Post-2008 
 
Medium Medium -27.7% 
7 Netherlands 2008-2012 Long Small -20.3% 
8 Portugal 2002-2004 Pre-2008 Short Minimal -13.5% 
9 Portugal 2008-2012 
 
Post-2008 
 
Long Medium -34.6% 
10 Spain 2008-2012 Long Medium -42.6% 
11 United Kingdom 2007-2009 Short Small -17.0% 
12 Czech Republic 2008-2012 Long Medium -35.5% 
13 Hungary 2003-2006 Pre-2008 Medium Small -18.8% 
14 Hungary 2008-2012 Post-2008 Long Medium -48.4% 
15 Austria 2003-2005 Pre-2008 Short Minimal -14.3% 
16 Austria 2007-2010 
 
Post-2008 
 
Medium Medium -29.1% 
17 Ireland 2008-2011 Medium Medium -42.0% 
18 Sweden 2007-2009 Short Medium -26.8% 
19 Bulgaria 2008-2012 Long Large -52.5% 
20 Cyprus 2000-2002 Pre-2008 Short Medium -36.4% 
21 Cyprus 2010-2012 
Post-2008 
Short Large -50.8% 
22 Estonia 2008-2010 Short Medium -27.6% 
23 Latvia 2008-2010 Short Large -50.8% 
24 Lithuania 2003-2005 Pre-2008 Short Small -15.2% 
25 Lithuania 2008-2010 Post-2008 Short Medium -39.7% 
26 Malta 2003-2007 Pre-2008 Long Large -58.9% 
27 Malta 2009-2012 
 
Post-2008 
 
Medium Large -58.9% 
28 Romania 2008-2010 Short Medium -31.7% 
29 Slovakia 2008-2012 Long Medium -35.7% 
30 Slovenia 2008-2012 Long Medium -36.1% 
Note: Duration: short = 2 biennial cuts, medium = 3 biennial cuts, long = 4 biennial cuts and more; Size: 
minimal (>0%, < 15.1%), small (>15%, < 25.1%), medium (> 25%, <50.1%), large (>50%). 
  
 
257 
 
Figure 1.A - Drivers of Aggregated Military Capacity Outcomes 
Note: Aggregated decline and increase refer to military capacity in the 27 European states. Refers to the discussion 
on the outcomes in military capacity during DSCP’s - Chapter 2, Section VI. 
  
66.7%
28.6%
4.8%
55.6%
22.2% 22.2%
Equipment Manpower Both
Aggregate Decline Aggregate Increase
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Chapter 4: Defense Reform  
Table 8.A - Army Equipment Stock 
 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. These totals include main vehicles (main battle tank (MBT), armored 
personnel carrier (APC), armored infantry fighting vehicle (AIFV), assault amphibious vehicle (AAV), exclusive 
of 'look alike' types), RECCE, total artillery, anti-tank missiles and guided weapons (AT MSL and ATGW), rocket 
launchers (RL), recoilless launchers (RCL, i.e. Carl Gustav), attack/assault helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV), and surface-to-air missile launchers (SAM).  
 
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Belgium
1761
1642
1642
1591
1591
1181
708
619
619
613
575
481
449
Denm
ark
2378
2336
12910
12872
12865
14746
13320
13320
6236
5485
5410
5326
1208
France
30201
29963
31737
29783
29788
11814
10256
10360
10252
9285
8842
8610
8656
Germ
any
13052
12346
12468
12238
12238
13227
11923
11043
10398
10441
9003
6641
3798
Greece
42102
42101
41799
40677
40677
49644
44515
43673
14565
14471
14539
14079
14005
Italy
8434
9714
6753
9308
9544
9035
7934
7930
8205
8770
8191
8847
8557
Luxem
bourg
6
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
60
N
etherlands
2580
2460
2431
2378
2378
3121
2346
2359
2716
1112
1877
2416
2486
Portugal
1462
1583
1566
1478
1478
2235
1502
1502
1539
1539
1540
1660
1389
Spain
5224
5684
5494
5069
5091
7677
6158
6158
6160
5986
5807
5694
5854
UK
5064
6445
6166
6311
6311
7995
6187
6138
6434
6687
6686
5172
4265
Czech Republic
3808
3575
3512
3441
3441
2764
2078
1881
1686
1665
1706
1610
991
Hungary
3824
3892
3871
3871
3460
1908
1678
1678
1662
937
707
607
632
Poland
6680
6639
5650
6206
6206
7467
5453
5453
5316
5914
5277
5363
5481
Austria
4103
4970
4871
4871
4978
7432
4477
3475
3279
3249
3249
860
618
Finland
2731
5309
6015
6015
6108
3678
2549
2335
2278
2178
2666
1813
1828
Ireland
735
1089
1081
1084
1120
1593
1159
1149
1164
1164
1122
1122
1122
Sw
eden
2973
3421
3006
2969
2969
3675
3520
1208
1825
1790
1602
1422
579
Bulgaria
5514
5582
5483
5390
5390
5734
5390
5390
6241
6241
3259
2567
2567
Cyprus
3103
3497
3752
3746
3746
3690
3399
3399
3399
3309
3267
3267
2426
Estonia
510
568
561
561
561
932
565
557
503
542
583
582
582
Latvia
44
81
163
163
163
1947
1937
131
131
131
131
66
83
Lithuania
337
422
1335
1586
1586
2412
1586
1586
634
631
631
340
340
M
alta
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rom
ania
4791
4436
4796
4330
4330
4922
4551
2787
2516
2420
2370
2989
3068
Slovakia
2109
2190
1988
1974
1974
2162
1974
1835
1621
1571
1573
1573
1016
Slovenia
288
397
411
333
333
478
470
470
332
358
358
255
265
  
 
259 
 
Table 9.A - Naval Equipment Stock 
 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. These numbers refer to naval submarines, principle surface combatants 
(carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes), patrol and coastal combatants, mine countermeasures, 
amphibious equipment and craft, and support and miscellaneous naval equipment.  
 
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Belgium
26
25
25
21
21
18
18
18
17
32
32
17
17
Denm
ark
53
54
54
54
52
81
83
85
83
83
84
44
42
France
146
144
136
132
132
133
135
140
137
133
138
190
195
Germ
any
141
132
118
106
106
102
103
111
111
111
111
105
101
Greece
104
105
101
101
101
101
96
97
100
104
104
111
111
Italy
94
89
86
149
158
153
158
160
157
156
148
151
151
Luxem
bourg
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N
etherlands
42
37
37
40
40
43
41
40
39
37
37
38
36
Portugal
53
53
50
46
46
46
41
39
41
40
42
41
42
Spain
105
103
103
97
97
94
92
89
86
93
89
82
81
UK
124
122
119
123
123
128
130
115
94
91
88
82
75
Czech Republic
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Hungary
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
2
2
2
Poland
79
74
76
76
76
75
74
65
72
74
74
80
74
Austria
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Finland
75
75
69
69
69
71
72
69
71
66
64
100
98
Ireland
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
14
Sw
eden
99
97
97
81
81
81
119
115
123
117
115
212
212
Bulgaria
63
69
69
69
69
69
64
72
61
63
63
39
38
Cyprus
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
15
6
6
6
6
6
Estonia
14
7
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
8
5
6
6
Latvia
15
10
10
10
10
6
9
9
10
13
20
12
13
Lithuania
14
13
13
13
13
8
8
8
8
10
15
11
13
M
alta
0
0
0
0
0
8
8
9
9
9
9
8
10
Rom
ania
121
63
76
70
70
68
67
45
48
46
45
47
47
Slovakia
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Slovenia
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
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Table 10.A - Air Force Equipment Stock 
 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. Equipment captures annualized Air Force holdings of combat aircraft, 
attack helicopters and UAVs. Air Force equipment totals exclude the number of missiles and flight hours.  
 
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Belgium
149
135
135
135
135
108
107
87
89
78
78
73
101
D
enm
ark
69
68
68
68
60
62
62
48
48
48
48
48
45
France
517
477
453
482
482
295
304
303
256
261
277
331
334
G
erm
any
559
434
446
376
384
417
426
295
298
298
303
318
163
G
reece
458
458
418
418
389
283
278
278
357
271
242
303
283
Italy
342
411
332
322
327
199
234
262
254
252
251
258
252
Luxem
bourg
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N
etherlands
199
176
173
167
167
138
137
167
129
116
116
101
101
Portugal
66
66
65
50
50
50
50
46
59
59
59
104
43
Spain
211
211
198
186
177
177
186
182
181
181
179
179
185
U
K
566
548
468
415
426
339
347
278
346
348
290
339
370
Czech Republic
144
109
78
88
94
72
74
70
90
62
72
72
73
H
ungary
92
97
141
141
114
26
31
31
40
39
39
26
26
Poland
277
212
201
224
224
142
142
187
103
128
128
125
112
A
ustria
63
63
63
63
74
40
40
40
41
59
37
37
37
Finland
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
61
61
61
63
121
109
Ireland
22
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Sw
eden
250
206
203
207
207
170
157
157
130
165
165
130
115
Bulgaria
224
224
275
202
202
167
167
94
98
98
80
80
80
Cyprus
0
0
6
12
12
16
16
16
16
16
15
11
11
Estonia
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Latvia
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Lithuania
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
M
alta
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rom
ania
339
325
223
106
106
106
106
62
139
137
49
70
70
Slovakia
103
75
79
90
90
90
90
87
62
62
38
38
37
Slovenia
8
8
8
8
8
0
0
0
0
0
9
9
9
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Table 11.A - Army Manpower 
 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. The data on Army manpower entails all servicemen and women on 
full-time duty including conscripts and long-term assignments from the reserves under the Army service 
branch. 
 
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Belgium
26800
26400
26400
24800
24800
24800
24800
12571
12571
14263
14013
13601
12544
Denm
ark
12850
12900
12800
14700
12500
12500
7300
13580
14240
14240
10570
9925
9925
France
169300
150000
137000
137000
137000
133500
133500
133500
133500
134000
134000
130600
130600
Germ
any
221100
211800
203200
191350
191350
191350
117900
160794
160794
160794
163962
105291
105291
Greece
110000
110000
114000
114000
110000
110000
30000
93500
93500
93500
93500
78836
87441
Italy
153000
137000
128000
116000
116000
112000
112000
112000
108000
108000
108300
107500
107500
Luxem
bourg
899
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
N
etherlands
23100
23100
23150
23150
23150
23150
23150
23150
18266
21483
21825
20836
20836
Portugal
25650
25400
25400
26700
26700
26700
26700
26700
26700
26700
26700
26700
25701
Spain
100000
92000
118800
95600
95600
95600
95600
95600
95600
95600
79736
78121
78121
UK
113950
113950
114800
116670
116760
112900
112900
104980
99707
95780
100290
102600
99950
Czech Republic
25100
23800
36370
39850
36600
16663
16663
14784
16962
13375
12656
7026
12833
Hungary
23500
13160
23600
23600
23950
23950
23950
23950
23950
10936
10936
10100
9911
Poland
132750
120300
104050
104050
89000
89000
89000
89000
79000
62762
46400
47300
46900
Austria
35500
34600
34600
34600
34600
33200
33200
32900
32900
28200
13600
12800
13115
Finland
24000
24550
24550
19200
19200
20500
20500
20500
20500
20500
16000
16000
16000
Ireland
9300
8500
8500
8500
8500
8500
8500
10470
8500
8500
8500
8500
7850
Sw
eden
35100
19100
19100
13800
13800
13800
13800
13800
10200
10200
5900
7332
6718
Bulgaria
42400
42400
31050
25000
25000
25000
25000
25000
18773
18773
16268
16304
16304
Cyprus
na
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10000
10050
10000
12000
Estonia
4320
4040
2550
2550
4450
3429
2000
3600
3600
4700
4200
4800
5300
Latvia
2400
3100
4300
4000
4000
1817
1817
985
1526
1526
1058
1058
1137
Lithuania
9340
7500
8100
7950
11600
10100
10100
10100
12500
7380
7190
8200
8200
M
alta
2140
2140
2140
2140
2140
2237
2237
1609
1609
1954
1954
1954
1954
Rom
ania
106000
52900
66000
66000
66000
66000
66000
41300
42200
43000
43000
42500
41500
Slovakia
23800
19800
13000
13700
12860
12860
12860
6038
7324
7297
7322
7322
6230
Slovenia
9000
7600
4000
6550
6550
6550
6550
6550
5973
7200
7200
7600
7600
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Table 12.A - Navy Manpower 
 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. The data on Naval manpower entails all servicemen and women on 
full-time duty including conscripts and long-term assignments from the reserves under the Navy service 
branch. 
 
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Belgium
2600
2560
2400
2450
2450
2550
2500
1605
1605
1628
1605
1590
1590
Denm
ark
4060
4000
4000
4000
3800
3800
3300
3450
3650
3498
3498
2959
2880
France
49490
45600
45600
44250
44250
43995
43995
43995
43995
43995
43995
40353
40353
Germ
any
26600
26050
25500
25650
25650
25650
20700
24328
24328
22950
24407
19179
19179
Greece
19000
19000
19000
19000
19000
19250
19000
19000
20000
20000
20000
20000
20000
Italy
38000
38000
38000
36000
34000
34000
34000
34000
34000
34000
34000
34000
43000
Luxem
bourg
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N
etherlands
12340
12130
12130
12130
12130
12130
12130
12130
10401
9468
9420
8502
8502
Portugal
11600
10800
10800
10950
10950
10950
10950
10010
9110
10120
10540
10540
9715
Spain
36950
26950
26950
22900
22900
19455
19455
19455
23200
23200
17943
21606
22200
UK
43770
43530
42350
42370
40630
53620
53620
40840
38900
30880
35650
35480
34680
Czech Republic
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Hungary
0
270
270
270
60
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Poland
16860
16760
14300
14300
14300
14300
14300
14300
11600
10864
8000
8000
8100
Austria
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2300
0
0
Finland
5000
5000
4600
5000
5000
5000
5000
4100
4100
5700
3800
3500
3500
Ireland
1100
1100
1100
1100
1100
1100
1100
1110
1110
1110
1110
1110
1015
Sw
eden
9200
7100
7100
7900
7900
7900
7900
7900
7900
3100
2850
3423
2796
Bulgaria
5260
5260
4370
4370
4370
4370
4370
4370
4100
4100
3471
3471
3471
Cyprus
na
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Estonia
250
300
440
440
335
331
208
300
300
300
300
400
200
Latvia
840
840
930
620
620
685
685
614
603
700
587
587
485
Lithuania
560
580
650
650
710
710
710
710
450
470
470
530
530
M
alta
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rom
ania
20800
10200
6200
7200
7200
7200
7200
7300
8067
6500
7150
7345
6900
Slovakia
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Slovenia
100
100
100
47
47
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 13.A - Air Force Manpower 
 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. The data on Air Force manpower entails all servicemen and women on 
full-time duty including conscripts and long-term assignments from the reserves under the Air Force service 
branch. 
 
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Belgium
8600
8600
8600
10250
10250
6350
6350
7470
7470
7322
7203
6814
5739
Denm
ark
4900
4500
4500
3500
4200
4200
4100
3910
3830
3572
3446
3358
3358
France
60500
63000
64000
64000
64000
63600
63600
63600
63600
57600
57600
52669
52669
Germ
any
73300
70550
67300
67500
67500
67500
51400
60580
60580
60580
62244
44565
44565
Greece
30170
30170
33000
33000
30200
23000
23000
23000
31500
31500
31500
28500
26606
Italy
59600
55350
50800
48000
48000
45152
45152
45152
44049
43016
42935
43109
43032
Luxem
bourg
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N
etherlands
11300
10000
8850
11050
11050
11050
11050
11050
10141
9586
9559
8030
8030
Portugal
7400
7400
7400
7250
7250
7250
7250
7250
7100
7100
7100
7100
7218
Spain
29100
24500
22750
22750
22750
22750
22750
22750
20900
20900
21606
21172
21172
UK
54730
53950
53300
53620
48500
50370
50370
45210
41920
33620
39750
40390
39400
Czech Republic
13400
11600
11300
13100
6700
5609
5690
6130
6130
4938
5276
4567
4804
Hungary
11500
7500
7700
7700
7500
7500
7500
7500
7500
5664
5664
5806
5039
Poland
46200
43735
36450
36450
30000
30000
30000
30000
28466
23327
17500
17500
17200
Austria
6500
6500
6850
6850
6000
6700
6700
6700
6700
6700
11400
2900
3239
Finland
2700
2700
2700
2800
2800
2800
2800
4700
4700
4700
2750
2750
2600
Ireland
1060
860
860
860
860
860
860
860
850
850
850
850
785
Sw
eden
8400
7700
7700
5900
5900
5900
5900
5900
5900
3600
4300
3770
3069
Bulgaria
18300
18300
17780
13100
13100
13100
13100
13100
9344
9344
6706
6706
6706
Cyprus
na
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Estonia
140
110
220
220
195
193
195
200
200
300
250
250
250
Latvia
210
210
270
250
250
255
255
322
480
480
319
319
284
Lithuania
800
800
1000
1150
1200
1200
1200
1200
900
1000
950
980
980
M
alta
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Rom
ania
43500
18900
17000
14000
14000
14000
14000
10500
10500
10200
9700
8400
9500
Slovakia
11500
10200
10200
7000
5160
5160
5160
3660
4280
4192
4190
4190
3944
Slovenia
120
120
250
530
530
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 14.A - Summary Truth Table of Service-Level Increases in Military Equipment  
 
Note: Coding for service-level increases in military equipment can range from 1 to 3, indicating the number of 
services in which increase in equipment occurred. For example, 1 corresponds to equipment increase in one of 
the armed forces services (e.g. Army, or Navy, or Air Force). Number 2 relates to service-level equipment 
increases in two services, and number 3 refers to equipment increases in all three armed forces services. Increases 
in equipment are therefore coded 1-3. Decreases or no change in service-level equipment are coded 0. 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 3
Germany 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Austria 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Cyprus 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
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Table 15.A - Summary Truth Table of Service-Level Increases in Military Manpower  
 
Note: Coding for service-level increases in military manpower can range from 1 to 3, indicating the number of 
services in which the service-level increase in manpower occurred. For example, 1 corresponds to manpower 
increase in one of the armed services (e.g. Army, or Navy, or Air Force). Number 2 relates to service-level 
manpower increases in two out of three armed services, and number 3 refers to manpower increases in all three 
armed forces services. Increases in manpower are therefore coded 1-3. Decreases or no change in service-level 
manpower are coded 0. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Portugal 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
Hungary 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Austria 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
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Table 16.A - Service-Level Increases During Defense Spending Cut Periods 
Note: The table summarizes the total number of services in which service-level increases in manpower and 
equipment were observed during a DSCP, in the 27 European states between 2000 and 2012. 
 
 
 
DSCP Country Period 
Aggregate 
Change in 
Military Capacity 
Number of Biennial 
Increases in Service-Level 
Military Capacity Indicators 
Military 
Manpower 
Military 
Equipment 
1 Denmark 2010-2012 Decline 0 0 
2 France 2008-2012 Decline 1 8 
3 Germany 2004-2006 Decline 0 4 
4 Greece 2008-2011 Decline 0 4 
5 Italy 2004-2006 Decline 0 1 
7 Netherlands 2008-2012 Decline 2 4 
8 Portugal 2002-2004 Decline 2 0 
9 Portugal 2008-2012 Decline 3 5 
10 Spain 2008-2012 Decline 3 3 
11 United Kingdom 2007-2009 Decline 0 4 
12 Czech Republic 2008-2012 Decline 3 3 
13 Hungary 2003-2006 Decline 1 1 
14 Hungary 2008-2012 Decline 1 2 
16 Austria 2007-2010 Decline 2 2 
17 Ireland 2008-2011 Decline 0 0 
19 Bulgaria 2008-2012 Decline 1 1 
21 Cyprus 2010-2012 Decline 1 0 
24 Lithuania 2003-2005 Decline 3 1 
27 Malta 2009-2012 Decline 0 1 
28 Romania 2008-2010 Decline 2 0 
29 Slovakia 2008-2012 Decline 1 1 
6 Italy 2007-2010 Increase 1 2 
15 Austria 2003-2005 Increase 1 3 
18 Sweden 2007-2009 Increase 0 2 
20 Cyprus 2000-2002 Increase 0 3 
22 Estonia 2008-2010 Increase 2 3 
23 Latvia 2008-2010 Increase 1 2 
25 Lithuania 2008-2010 Increase 2 2 
26 Malta 2003-2007 Increase 1 2 
30 Slovenia 2008-2012 Increase 2 4 
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Table 17A - Summary Truth Table of Line-Item Increases in Military R&D  
 
Source: NATO data on National Defense Expenditures by Category. The R&D data covers only NATO EU 
member states in the period from 2000 to 2012. Each category represents the percent share of the annual national 
defense expenditure. I track two categories that contain spending devoted to R&D: equipment and ‘other.’ 
Equipment category entails % of defense expenditure spent on major equipment and R&D devoted to major 
equipment. The category of ‘other’ includes spending on operations and maintenance expenditures, other R&D 
expenditures and other expenditures not included elsewhere. Line-item increase in R&D in one of these 
categories is coded 1, increase in both R&D categories is coded 2. A decline or no change in R&D spending is 
coded 0. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1
Germany 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0
Italy 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Hungary 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
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Table 18.A - Aggregated Analysis of Service-Level Equipment and Manpower, and Line-Item R&D 
Increases during DSCP 
 
Note: Aggregated analysis examines whether increases are sustained – over time and across the three indicators 
of potential defense reform. This table summarizes patterns of change within each DSCP and across the three 
variables: service-level manpower, equipment stock and line-item spending on R&D. Duration of increases can 
be sustained through a DSCP fully or partially, or be sporadic. Fully sustained increases cover the entire defense 
spending cut period, partial increases cover the cut period only partially: they fall short of covering the entire 
DSCP but at minimum entail a sequence of two biennial increases within a DSCP. Sporadic increases indicate 
increases that do not occur in immediate succession during the defense spending cut period. Overlap between 
the indicators of military capacity can be broad, partial and singular. Broad overlap means increases in all line-
item and service level indicators of defense reform. Partial overlap indicates increases only in two indicators. 
Increases that occur only in one line-item or service level indicator of military capacity indicate no overlap.  
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 2
Germany 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0
Italy 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1
Portugal 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 2
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 3
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 3
Hungary 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 1 0 2 2
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Austria 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1
Cyprus 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 2
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Table 19A - Type of Service-Level and Line-Item Increases during DSCP, per Indicator of Military 
Capacity 
 
Total 
Aggregated Military Capacity 
Decreased 
Aggregated Military 
Capacity Increased 
Increases 
during 
DSCP’s 
R&D E M R&D E M R&D E M 
Sustained 63.3% 60% 36.6% 71.4% 47.6% 33.3% 44.4% 88.9% 44.4% 
Not 
Sustained 10.0% 23.3% 33.3% 9.5% 28.6% 33.3% 11.1% 11.1% 33.3% 
Absent 0.0% 16.7% 30.0% 0.0% 23.8% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 22.2% 
n/a 26.7% 0.0% 0.0% 19.0% 0.0% 0.0% 44.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Figure 2.A - Drivers of Potential Defense Reform 
Note: E = military equipment, M = military manpower, R&D = research and development, All = equipment, 
manpower and R&D. 
 
20.0%
20.0%
3.3%
26.7%
3.3%
3.3%
10.0%
13.3%
R&D
R&D, E
R&D, M
E
E, M
M
All
No clear driver
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Chapter 5: Collective Defense Collaboration 
Table 20.A – European Collaborative Defense Equipment Procurement (Millions of Euros) 
 
Source: European Defence Agency (EDA) online Defence Data Portal 2005-2012. The data comes from 
‘European collaborative defense equipment procurement.’ Collaboration is defined as an “agreement by at least 
two EU member states Ministries of Defence for project or programme contracts,” with possible non-EU 
participation lower than 50%. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 45 61 80.7 68.4 67.4 81.7
Denmark
France 1193 1639 1179 1802 2195 1847 1315 1364
Germany 680 696 717 725 2413.2
Greece 0 0
Italy 491 277 1332.4 2001 1373.1 1376.4 1486.7 692.6
Luxembourg 6 5 5 5 1.6 5 5.7
Netherlands 168.9 0
Portugal 0.4 22.7 9 2 9.9 16.8 0.3
Spain 1188 1197 938.4 935 721 703 298.1 1697.7
UK 432 2260.5 1866.7 1525 1845.8 2474.3 1712 1811.9
Czech Republic 0 0
Hungary 45 0 0
Poland 0 0
Austria
Finland 23 34.9 33 33 29.8 0 0
Ireland 0 0
Sweden 0 297.1 23.3 78.5
Bulgaria 0 0
Cyprus 0 0
Estonia 2.4 3.7 0.2 0
Latvia 0 0
Lithuania 0 3.6 2 0.1 0 0 0
Malta 0 0
Romania 0 0
Slovakia 0 0
Slovenia 0 0
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Table 21.A National Equipment Procurement (Millions of Euros) 
 
Source: European Defence Agency’s (EDA) online Defence Data Portal 2005 - 2012. National patterns capture 
‘total defense equipment procurement.’ This relates to equipment procurement expenditure for all major 
equipment categories per an EU state. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 223 0 0 348.34 333.73 256 253.6 161.3
Denmark 0 0 0 0
France 5618 6321 6448 6258 6871 8272 7534 11108
Germany 3445 3697.82 3592.57 5322.875 5197.6 5658 5803.6 5476.4
Greece 1400 1499.94 1699.6 2129.104 2128.32 1138 293.1 319.9
Italy 2119 2099 2594.87 3050.3 2405.54 3077 2368.5 1735.7
Luxembourg 24 18 19 63 66.4 88 71.1 42.2
Netherlands 1215 1292 1522 1409 1449 1375 1124 1080.8
Portugal 223 151.38 284.03 339.97 354.97 289 296.8 254.6
Spain 2166 2342.8 2367.31 2536.74 1979.16 1265 604.6 2422.5
UK 6699 7512.88 8761.51 10603.34 10174.64 8443 6802.4 7509.6
Czech Republic 213 280.43 185.54 160.116 435.23 176 287.1 260.4
Hungary 106 98.17 156.03 192.201 134.5 123 106.1 59.7
Poland 633 881.32 1294.06 845.104 1007.07 1435 1418.2 1399.3
Austria 184 80.18 491 352.13 294.5 310 288.6 246.5
Finland 539 567.3 584 655.4 735.88 698 457 623
Ireland 94 85 96 94 61 84 70.3 63.3
Sweden 1217 1158.33 1289.65 900.83 789.92 1036 966 1044.8
Bulgaria 74.57 172.58 169.756 92 97 40 22.2
Cyprus 48 7 4 18 40 72 64.2 34.7
Estonia 20 40.94 43.92 65.149 67.68 57 64.2 99.5
Latvia 14 29.58 26.73 54.828 10.84 24 21 18.7
Lithuania 37 58 72 66 49 26 28.8 29.5
Malta 9 0.229 0.1456 0.391 0.4 2 0.3 0.3
Romania 421.86 249.67 343.685 149.65 119 128.4 67.6
Slovakia 95 113.2 132.5 143.486 138.75 84 54.8 70.8
Slovenia 39 94.43 55.11 41.495 48.83 105 27.4 5.1
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Table 22.A - Increased Collaborative Equipment Procurement during DSCP’s 
 
Note: This table entails evidence in support of increased collaborative procurement (coded ‘1’). When 
collaborative procurement spending shadows national spending patterns, the observation is coded ‘2’. Other 
patterns are coded ‘0’. Highlighted sections relate to DSCP’s. This analysis captures a population of 10 DSCP’s 
for which EDA data on collaborative spending on military equipment procurement is available. In the years 2006-
2009, EDA does not provide information on national equipment procurement alone. This is determined by 
subtracting national spending on “R&D” from national spending on “Equipment procurement and R&D”. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 1
Denmark na na na na na na na na
France 2 2 0 1 2 0 2 2
Germany 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 2
Greece na na na na na na na na
Italy 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
Luxembourg 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Netherlands 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 1
Portugal 0 1 2 0 0 1 2 2
Spain 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2
UK 2 2 0 0 1 1 2 2
Czech Republic na na na na na na na na
Hungary na na na na na na na na
Poland na na na na na na na na
Austria na na na na na na na na
Finland 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 0
Ireland na na na na na na na na
Sweden na na na na 1 2 2 2
Bulgaria na na na na na na na na
Cyprus na na na na na na na na
Estonia 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0
Latvia na na na na na na na na
Lithuania 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0
Malta na na na na na na na na
Romania na na na na na na na na
Slovakia na na na na na na na na
Slovenia na na na na na na na na
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Table 23.A – European Collaborative R&T Spending (Millions of Euros) 
 
Source: European Defence Agency’s (EDA) online Defence Data Portal 2005 - 2012. Evidence in support of 
collaborative R&T spending is assessed on the basis of data under ‘European collaborative R&T Spend.’ 
European collaboration is defined as an “agreement by at least two EU Member States Ministries of Defence for 
project or programme contracts,” and where possible non-EU partners’ share in such contracts in lower than 
50%. 
  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 4.1 4.4 4.5 1 1 1
Denmark
France 81 110 130 150 140 135 132 71.8
Germany 87.5 103.3 10.4 9.7
Greece 1 0 7.9 2.6 0 0
Italy 12 20.4 3.9 5.7
Luxembourg 0 1.2 0 0
Netherlands 0 14 20 3.1 3.8 4.2
Portugal 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4
Spain 34 41.7 53.4 73.6 51.3 37.5 54 30.7
UK 14 6.3 5.9
Czech Republic 1.1 1 1 1.1 1 0.6 0.5
Hungary 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0 0
Poland 0.3 3.1 8.4 0 3.1 1.7
Austria 0.1 0 1.1
Finland 2 0.9 1.3 4.1 3.3 3.3 4.3 2.9
Ireland 0 0
Sweden 27.8 21 23.4 23.6 26.3 20.3 16.8
Bulgaria 0 0
Cyprus 0 0
Estonia 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 0
Latvia 0 0
Lithuania 0 0
Malta 0 0
Romania 0 0
Slovakia 0 0.7 1.1 0 0.1 0
Slovenia 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 0 0
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Table 24.A – National R&T Spend (Millions of Euros) 
 
Source: European Defence Agency’s (EDA) online Defence Data Portal 2005 - 2012. National R&T investment 
patterns are based on data under “R&T Spend in Europe,” where R&T entails expenditure for basic research, 
applied research and technology demonstration for defence purposes. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 8.63 9.335 8.86 8.49 7.9 7.3
Denmark
France 695 762 814 835 904 820 760 647.6
Germany 405 522.02 455.49 470.17 406 394 411 418.1
Greece 1.1 0.05 0.03 0.17 3.63 0.15 0 0
Italy
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0.19 0 0
Netherlands 110 112 107 105 105 74.74 69.4 70.7
Portugal 1.4 5.62 4.97 5.32 9.03 6.98 2.3 0.6
Spain 85.3 104 107.8 124 100.22 81.7 81.4 63.3
UK 653.8 899 895.76 649 526.08
Czech Republic 13.1 12.73 6.47 4.87 7.05 7.29 6.6 7
Hungary 0.3 0.58 0.2 0.56 0.68 0.05 0.1 0.1
Poland 12.4 22.98 8.32 52.13 12.73 13.85 118 85.4
Austria 6.5 0.819 1 0.06 7 1 1.1 1
Finland 32 20 14.2 26 12.5 16.9 6 29
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sweden 140 129.08 119 92.08 85.88 77.6 23.4
Bulgaria 0.22 0.24 0.04 0 0 0 0
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Estonia 0.5 0 0.83 1.62 0.3 0.67 0 0
Latvia 0.2 0 0
Lithuania 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Romania 0.44 1.31 1.23 0.31 2.12 1.9 2.1
Slovakia 2.2 2.65 2.5 1.62 2.4 0.1 0.6 0.3
Slovenia 1.2 8.96 6.4 15.47 8.65 5.63 0.8 0.7
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Table 25.A – Increased Collaborative R&T  
 
Note: This analysis entails a population of 19 DSCP’s for which EDA data on collaborative spending on military 
equipment procurement is available. Evidence in support of increased collaborative R&T is coded ‘1’, same 
patterns of spending on collaborative and national level are coded ‘2’, other patterns are coded ‘0’. Highlighted 
sections relate to the DSCP’s. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1
Denmark na na na na na na na na
France 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2
Germany 0 0 1 2 2 2 0 0
Greece 2 2 1 2 0 2 1 2
Italy 1 0 2 2 2 1 0 1
Luxembourg 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Netherlands 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 2
Portugal 2 2 2 0 0 2 1 1
Spain 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
UK 2 0 1 2 2 1 2 2
Czech Republic 0 1 2 1 2 0 2 0
Hungary 0 2 1 2 0 2 2 2
Poland 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
Austria 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 1
Finland 2 2 1 2 2 0 1 0
Ireland na na na na na na na na
Sweden 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
Bulgaria 2 0 0 1 1 2 2 2
Cyprus na na na na na na na 2
Estonia 0 1 2 0 1 0 1 2
Latvia 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Lithuania 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Malta na na na na na na na na
Romania 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
Slovakia 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2
Slovenia 0 2 1 2 2 0 2 1
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Table 26.A - Increased Defense Collaboration and Drivers of Defense Reform 
 
Note: In this analysis, I compared evidence of increased defense collaboration during DSCP against drivers of 
defense reform. In the population of 19 DSCP’s, there are 13 equipment-driven cases, 11 R&D-driven cases and 
5 manpower-driven cases of defense reform. 
E R&D M
1 France 2008-2012 R&D, E 1 1 -
2 Germany 2004-2006 R&D, E 1 1 -
3 Greece 2008-2011 R&D, E 1 1 R&T
4 Italy 2007-2010 E 1 -
5 Netherlands 2008-2012 E, M 1 1 Procure
6 Portugal 2008-2012 All 1 1 1 R&T
7 Spain 2008-2012 R&D, M 1 1 R&T
8 United Kingdom 2007-2009 E 1 Procure
9 Czech Republic 2008-2012 R&D 1 -
10 Hungary 2008-2012 R&D 1 -
11 Austria 2007-2010 E 1 R&T
12 Sweden 2007-2009 E 1 Both
13 Bulgaria 2008-2012 R&D 1 -
14 Estonia 2008-2010 R&D, E 1 1 Both
15 Latvia 2008-2010 R&D, E 1 1 -
16 Lithuania 2008-2010 E 1 -
17 Romania 2008-2010 M 1 R&T
18 Slovakia 2008-2012 - -
19 Slovenia 2008-2012 All 1 1 1 -
No.
Service-Level / Line-Item Drivers 
of Military Capacity Change
Drivers of Defense 
Collaboration during 
DSCP
Drivers 
of 
Defense 
ReformPeriodCountry
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Chapter 6: Buck-Passing 
Table 27.A - Military Forces Deployed Abroad: Europe and the U.S. 
 
Source: The Military Balance 2000-2012. Foreign deployments of European states are located under the rubric 
of ‘forces abroad’ or ‘foreign deployments.’ European foreign deployments. In this table, annualized totals entail 
all deployments outside of the EU territory. The data on U.S. foreign deployments entails military deployments 
outside of the U.S. or EU territory. This includes all deployments except the following: (1) those that are deployed 
in any one of the 27 EU member states being analyzed, which includes EUCOM forces deployed in NATO 
member states (Germany, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Mediterranean, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey, UK), (2) forces that are deployed in Alaska and Hawaii under the USPACOM (Pacific Command) 
umbrella, (3) forces deployed on the US West Coast, (4) forces that are part of Central Command, Southern 
Command (HQ Miami FL, Honduras), Joint Forces Command (US East Coast, Bermuda, Haiti, Iceland, 
Portugal, UK) or part of the Continental US deployments.  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 1461 1471 1565 683 768 770 785 1118 1308 1269 1019 693 720
Denmark 1358 1287 1210 1613 1010 1089 1108 1366 1388 1150 1001 1097 984
France 32596 32098 31987 29009 28475 22584 20656 24574 24651 23059 18770 16989 19675
Germany 7693 7226 8568 6990 7403 5493 7142 9276 7355 6278 7607 6273 6989
Greece 692 1961 1989 1989 2085 2099 2740 3142 2315 2299 1986 2065 1397
Italy 8203 7171 7674 7437 7568 9069 8857 6527 7686 7550 7845 6755 6703
Luxembourg 23 23 23 60 58 48 56 39 35 36 35 34 38
Netherlands 2999 2669 3095 2872 2345 2197 2268 2422 1893 2028 2306 505 303
Portugal 1471 1601 1425 1438 1299 796 714 818 696 692 680 549 585
Spain 2500 2500 2856 4158 2270 2650 2039 3400 2762 3026 2378 2660 2662
UK 11826 12648 10193 21537 16413 20666 22890 23148 18676 18739 15189 15661 14662
Czech Republic 741 691 775 1225 569 677 729 899 1089 861 978 581 814
Hungary 806 816 665 1039 1049 1006 1224 705 1010 867 908 1064 975
Poland 2057 1811 1827 3855 3887 3869 2113 4460 3555 2474 3448 2778 2957
Austria 1161 989 938 936 921 1230 1155 1236 1274 1325 1090 1152 1360
Finland 1938 1488 999 917 1083 826 762 779 895 677 675 379 248
Ireland 885 779 451 443 613 627 641 670 863 619 752 125 543
Sweden 1354 842 873 779 1034 938 941 945 998 660 711 789 725
Bulgaria 30 36 8 537 540 540 554 494 719 795 636 645 732
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 2 3
Estonia 47 47 3 3 152 49 40 102 202 198 193 144 170
Latvia 50 107 112 165 103 145 161 165 120 96 176 157 175
Lithuania 71 32 125 174 223 223 214 222 238 245 292 223 239
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 8
Romania 215 90 905 1569 1558 1563 2144 1578 1503 1547 1252 1907 2102
Slovakia 137 610 641 854 771 571 569 635 530 510 624 685 538
Slovenia 31 89 86 85 180 180 245 302 198 500 564 450 440
USA 110439 107973 115123 300156 272066 471270 340973 265936 266814 243619 256267 217555 230541
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Table 28.A - Potential Buck-Passing to the U.S.  
 
Note: On the basis of Boolean algebra, I coded observations that meet the necessary conditions of buck-passing 
as ‘1.’ When a European state and the U.S. are simultaneously either decreasing or increasing their military 
deployments abroad between the same two consecutive years, the observation is coded ‘0’. When a European 
state exhibits reversed buck-passing behavior and increases its foreign military deployments when the U.S. 
decrease its, the observation is coded ‘-1’. Highlighted sections relate to DSCP’s. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium -1 0 1 -1 0 -1 -1 0 0 1 0 0
Denmark 0 1 0 0 0 -1 1 0 0 1 -1 1
France 0 1 1 0 1 0 -1 0 0 1 0 0
Germany 0 0 1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 0 0 0 0
Greece -1 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 1 0 1 -1 1
Italy 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 1 -1 1 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 1 -1 0 0 1
Portugal -1 1 0 0 1 0 -1 1 0 1 0 0
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 -1 1 -1 0
UK -1 1 0 0 0 -1 -1 1 -1 1 -1 1
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary -1 1 0 -1 1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 1
Poland 0 0 0 -1 1 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0
Austria 0 1 1 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 1 -1 0
Finland 0 1 1 -1 1 0 -1 0 0 1 0 1
Ireland 0 1 1 -1 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0
Sweden 0 0 1 -1 1 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1 1
Bulgaria -1 1 0 -1 1 -1 0 0 -1 -1 1 0
Cyprus 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 -1 -1 0 0
Estonia 0 1 1 -1 1 0 -1 0 0 1 0 0
Latvia -1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 1 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 0 0 0 -1 1 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 0
Malta 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 -1 0
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 1 -1 1 -1 0
Slovakia -1 0 0 0 1 0 -1 1 0 0 -1 1
Slovenia -1 1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 0 0 1
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Table 29.A - Potential Buck-Passing to the UK  
 
 
Note: On the basis of Boolean algebra, I code observations that meet the necessary conditions of buck-passing 
as ‘1.’ When a European state and the UK are simultaneously either decreasing or increasing their military 
deployments abroad between the same two consecutive years, the observation is coded ‘0’. When a European 
state exhibits reversed buck-passing behavior and increases its foreign military deployments when the UK 
decreases its, the observation is coded ‘-1’. 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 0 -1 1 -1 0 0 0 -1 1 0 1 -1
Denmark 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 0 0 0
France 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 -1 1 0 1 -1
Germany 1 -1 1 -1 1 0 0 0 1 -1 1 -1
Greece 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Italy 1 -1 1 -1 0 1 1 -1 1 -1 1 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 -1
Netherlands 1 -1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 -1 1 0
Portugal 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 -1
Spain 0 -1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1
UK
Czech Republic 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 1 -1 1 -1
Hungary 0 0 0 -1 1 0 1 -1 1 -1 0 0
Poland 1 -1 0 -1 1 1 0 0 1 -1 1 -1
Austria 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 -1 0 0 0 -1
Finland 1 0 1 -1 1 1 0 -1 1 0 1 0
Ireland 1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 -1 1 -1 1 -1
Sweden 1 -1 1 -1 1 0 0 -1 1 -1 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 -1 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 -1
Cyprus 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 -1
Estonia 1 0 1 -1 1 1 0 -1 1 0 1 -1
Latvia 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 1 -1
Lithuania 1 -1 0 -1 1 1 0 -1 0 -1 1 -1
Malta 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 -1 0 -1
Romania 1 -1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 -1
Slovakia 0 -1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 -1 0 0
Slovenia 0 0 1 -1 1 0 0 0 0 -1 1 0
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Table 30.A - Potential Buck-Passing to France  
 
Note: On the basis of Boolean algebra, I code observations that meet the necessary conditions of buck-passing 
as ‘1.’ When a European state and the France are simultaneously either decreasing or increasing their military 
deployments abroad between the same two consecutive years, the observation is coded ‘0’. When a European 
state exhibits reversed buck-passing behavior and increases its foreign military deployments when France 
decreases its, the observation is coded ‘-1’. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 1
France
Germany 0 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 1 0 -1 0 0
Greece -1 1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 1 0 0 -1 1
Italy 0 -1 0 -1 -1 0 1 0 0 -1 0 1
Luxembourg 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 1 1 -1 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1
Portugal -1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Spain 0 -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 1 -1 0 -1 0
UK -1 0 -1 0 -1 -1 0 1 -1 0 -1 1
Czech Republic 0 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1 0 0
Hungary -1 0 -1 -1 0 -1 1 0 0 -1 -1 1
Poland 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 1 0 -1 0 0
Austria 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 0
Finland 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Ireland 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1 0 0
Sweden 0 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 1
Bulgaria -1 0 -1 -1 0 -1 1 0 -1 0 -1 0
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -1 0 0 0
Estonia 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latvia -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 0 1 0 -1 0 0
Lithuania 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 0
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 -1 -1 0
Romania 0 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 1 1 -1 0 -1
Slovakia -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 1 0 -1 -1 1
Slovenia -1 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 1 -1 -1 0 1
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Figure 3.A - Baseline Frequency of Buck-Passing to the US (23 European States) 
 
Source: Data from The Military Balance 2000-2012 
Figure 4.A - DSCP Frequency of Potential Buck-Passing to the US (23 European states) 
 
Source: Data from The Military Balance 2000-2012 
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Figure 5.A - Baseline Frequency of Potential Buck-Passing to the UK 
 
Source: Data from The Military Balance 2000-2012 
 
Figure 6.A - DSCP Frequency of Potential Buck-Passing to the UK 
 
Source: Data from The Military Balance 2000-2012 
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Figure 7.A - Baseline Frequency of Potential Buck-Passing to FR 
 
Source: Data from The Military Balance 2000-2012 
 
Figure 8.A - DSCP Frequency of Potential Buck-Passing to France 
 
Source: Data from The Military Balance 2000-2012 
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Table 31.A – Types of Potential Buck-Passing During DSCP’s 
Buck 
Passing to: 
DSCP  
(2000-2012) 
Pre-2008 DSCP Post-2008 DSCP 
DSCP 
Count 
% 
DSCP 
List of DSCP List of DSCP 
FR 3 14% - NL, SK, SI 
UK 5 17% - PT, CZ, SE, LV, IE 
UK, FR 1 3% MT - 
US 4 14% - ES, AT, EE, RO 
US, FR 2 7% - DK, UK 
US, UK 5 17% DE, HU, CY, LT EL 
None 9 31% IT, PT, AT FR, IT, BG, CY, LT, MT 
Source: Data from The Military Balance 2000-2012 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Table 32.A - Evaluation of Multi-causality 
Country Period 
Aggregated 
Change in 
Military 
Capacity 
DSCP 
Related to 
Defense 
Reform 
DSCP 
Related to 
Collective 
Collab 
DSCP 
Related to 
Buck-
Passing  
Denmark 2010-2012 Decline S x Y 
France 2008-2012 Decline S N N 
Greece 2008-2011 Decline S Y Y 
Italy 2004-2006 Decline S x N 
Netherlands 2008-2012 Decline S Y N 
Portugal 2008-2012 Decline S Y N 
Spain 2008-2012 Decline S Y N 
Hungary 2003-2006 Decline S x N 
Hungary 2008-2012 Decline W N Y 
Austria 2007-2010 Decline S Y N 
Ireland 2008-2011 Decline A x Y 
Bulgaria 2008-2012 Decline S N N 
Romania 2008-2010 Decline S Y N 
Slovakia 2008-2012 Decline W N Y 
Germany 2004-2006 Decline S N Y 
Portugal 2002-2004 Decline S x N 
United Kingdom 2007-2009 Decline S Y Y 
Czech Republic 2008-2012 Decline S N Y 
Cyprus 2010-2012 Decline W x N 
Lithuania 2003-2005 Decline S x Y 
Malta 2009-2012 Decline W x N 
Italy 2007-2010 Increase S N N 
Austria 2003-2005 Increase S x N 
Sweden 2007-2009 Increase S Y N 
Cyprus 2000-2002 Increase S x Y 
Estonia 2008-2010 Increase S Y Y 
Latvia 2008-2010 Increase S N Y 
Lithuania 2008-2010 Increase S N N 
Malta 2003-2007 Increase W x Y 
Slovenia 2008-2012 Increase S N N 
Note: S = Strong Case of Potential Defense Reform, W = Weak Case of Potential Defense Reform, A = 
Potentially Absent Defense Reform, Y = Yes, N = No, x = data unavailable 
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Table 33.A - Combinations of Mechanisms and Aggregated Change in Military Capacity 
  
Combinations 
of Mechanisms 
Aggregated Decline in Military 
Capacity 
Aggregated Increase in 
Military Capacity 
Only Defense 
Reform 
SxN, SNN, 
WxN 
IT, HU-1, PT-1, 
FR, BG, CY-2, 
MT-2 
33.3% AT-1, IT-2, 
LT-2, SI 
44.4% 
Only Buck-passing AxY IE 4.8%   0.0% 
Only Defense 
Collaboration counterfactual   
0.0% 
  
0.0% 
Defense Reform and 
Collaboration SYN 
NL, PT-2, ES, 
AT-2, RO 
23.8% 
SE 
11.1% 
Defense Reform and 
Buck-Passing 
SxY, SNY, 
WNY, WxY 
DK, LT-1, DE, 
CZ, HU-2, SK 
28.6% 
CY, LV, 
MT-1 
33.3% 
Buck-Passing and 
Collaboration counterfactual   
0.0% 
  
0.0% 
All Three 
Mechanisms SYY EL, UK 
9.5% 
 EE 
11.1% 
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